Winners, Losers, Heroes & Strategies

Matt,
Let's take 3rd Ypres for example. The offensive started in July of 1917, when there had been no appreciable amount of rainfall for a couple of months. Haig being a proponent of the big "hurroosh"- the rapid advance, didn't listen to the reports from his forces about the deterioration of the weather. So consequently during the month of August 1917, the rainfall should have delayed any advances. On the average 70 mm of rain normally fell during the month of August however, in 1917 the total amount of rainfall was 127 mm for that month almost double the average. The offensive lasted until October 11 at which time when the War Cabinet looked at the casualty figures the total cost of the 3rd Ypres campaign had been 275,000 for the British forces and the Germans suffered just under 200,000. Agunner who participated in the fighting of 11 October relates how a 'month of incessant attacks', with little progress and severe fighting, was having 'a bad effect on the morale of everybody concerned.' He continued:
Reinforcements of the new armies shambled up past the guns with dragging steps and the expressions of men who knew they were going to certain death. No words of greeting passed as they slouched along; in sullen silence one by one they filed past to the sacrifice.
The minister for national service spoke of, how men home from the front frequently spoke with great bitterness about 'the waste of life during the continued hammerings against the Ypres ridge'.
A general is supposed to look out for his troops, not expend them in such a wanton butchery. That is only one of his offensives!
What do you think of him now?
VBR,
Jim

Andrew:

I didn't miss the point of your quote, its just that it is equally applicable in all wars. Your quote from Haig actually makes the bottom line point that his goal, as dictated by the Parliament and the Prime Minister, was to win the war AT ALL COSTS. If you believe the price was too high show me what tactical options he had. Your reference to a Blitzkrieg type operation was a good faith attempt in that direction, but it doesn't stand up to analysis. Blitzkrieg requires high mobility. Thats what made it revolutionary (and that's certainly what it was at the time) and that's also what put it out of the hands of the Generals of both sides in WW 1. They didn't have several hundred fast, mechanically reliable, and well armed tanks, reliable motorized transport capable of rough field operations, or the required air capabilities, much less the communications and mobile logistics capabilities (getting massive amounts of supplies to a static front is far different an undertaking than trying to supply troops who have moved rapidly in advance of the supply network). The philosophical doctrine behind Blitzkrieg is to move so quickly that the opposing force cannot regroup or reestablish an organized resistance for the purpose of mounting an effective counterattack. What both sides lacked in WW 1 was the capability to rapidly move their forces in sufficient strength to get out and behind the enemy's trenches while also maintaining their own supply lines. Admittedly, there were some localized attempts in this regard, particularly by the Germans, but the capabilities simply didn't exist for this type of operation on the scale neccessary to eliminate trench warfare.

Besides, if you were the General who decided you wanted to think about a Blitzkrieg type option, you would also have had to weigh the potential risks. Can you move sufficient forces to mount effective and sustained combat operations fast enough, can you keep them supplied, will your army be enveloped in the enemy rear (a la Stalingrad) cut off from supply and relief, will your troops be killed or captured, and, in the process, will you end up having surrendered your ENTIRE country, not just several hundred thousand troops, to the enemy? And are you willing to try this for the first time in the "real world"? Remember, even when the Germans so effectively used Blitzkrieg in 1939-1940, it was only after many large scale exercises over several years had given them the opportunity to work out the kinks and to develop some confidence in the tactic. No such luxuries for a field commander of WW 1.

I do not discount the tragedy of the frontlines in WW 1. What you must do is put it in perspective. Is a 25% casualty rate (or even a 50% rate) among all males of military age in your country too high a price to pay to save the remaining 90% of your nation's population, its territory, and its very existance? The PEOPLE of Europe, and their political leadership, not the Generals, ultimately had to make this choice. The Russians decided the price was too high in 1917 and the Germans the same in 1918. The US had to answer the same question in 1861-1865. Its per capita losses in that war were even higher (according to a number of sources I've seen) than were most of the main combatants of WW 1. Indeed, Grant ultimately turned to a strategy of attrition after his predeceasor's attempts at a more mobile, lower casualty style of warfare had been proved inadequate to resubjegate the Confederacy.

Matt,
The only reason why U.S.Grant was put in charge is because Lincoln liked what he did in the western theater at Shiloh, he won. As far as the south, they had better military leadership than the North did. The only reason the Confederates lost at Gettysburg was the failure of Lee to give concise orders and the failure of A.P. Hill to read into Lee's orders. On the first day, if Hill would have pushed on around to the high ground following Bufords defeat at the road, the South would have held the high ground and the outcome would've been totally different. But Grant was also known as a 'Butcher' by his troops. The options open to Haig was to 'bite and hold' which was more successful than his penchant for rapid advance. Haig was not a good general.
VBR,
Jim

Matt,
I find some of your reasoning absurd in the light of what has been pointed out. A 50% casualty rate for a country who was not directly threatened by that war is extremely high. The Australians went to war as a part of the British commonwealth, but Andrew's comments about them and the ANZAC's being viewed as expendable forces is correct. The British high command tended to look at 'colonials' with a dim view. When you look at the outcome of 3rd Ypres and I quote ' The Third Battle of Ypres, including its overture at Messines, cost the British army approximately 275,000 casualties. Of these 70,000 were killed and an unknown number wounded so badly that they could not return to the front. In all, the campaign probably reduced the strength of the BEF by the equivalent of 10 to 12 divisions out of a total strength of 60. No significant accessions of territory were made as a result. The only reward for these endeavours was a great dimunition in the fighting strength of the enemy, although to a lesser extent than the reduction of Britain's forces. ( GErmany probably suffered just under 200,000 casualties during the Third Ypres Campaign.) In the perilous months that lay ahead, consequent upon the collapse of the Eastern front against Germany and the failure of the Americans to put in an appearance on the Western Front, this balance sheet was plainly to Britian's disadvantage." The British Prime Minister Lloyd George repudiated Haig's strategy when he said to the Paris public on 12 November..." We have won great victories. When I look at the casualty lists I sometimes wish that it had not been necessary to win so many."
In this light Haig has clearly earned the sobriquet of Butcher.
VBR,
Jim

Matt,
You want tactics, in the view of mobility and technology of those times, a better strategy would've been to use the 'bite and hold' strategy instead of rapid advance. Haig's strategy of rapid advance was seiously flawed when you take into account he didn't have the mobility of troops and supporting equipment (i.e. artillery, ammunition, and supplies) to keep up with the leading troops. So that always left the leading troops open to counter attack and enfilade fire, owing to the fact that some divisions could advance a little further than others. Plus his lines and methods of communication were never completely adequate for what he was attempting. With the limited mobility that he was afforded, he would've done better to take smaller more important tactical gains and move his supporting elements in a more protective manner. Haig was stubborn about this. He wasn't looking at the cost in lives, he was looking at what glory he could gain for himself. His own government had limited confidence in him, and his own troops had very little except to know that they were going die. He was a grandstander, who threw away troops like so many poker chips in futile efforts that netted him nothing except scorn.
VBR,
Jim

Hi Jim,

just to momment on this one:
>the ball really didn't get rolling until
> they decided to jump in on
> Austria's side. Had they not have, the
> Austrians would not have fought Russia and
> more than likely backed down. So obviously
> Germany must've had enough military might to
> counterbalance the threat to Austria.

This hardly qualifies Germany as alone guilty, since Russia has assured support to Serbia even before the assassination, and again the light of the Austrian threats after the assasssination to Serbia.
So I think you may blame at least Serbia and Russia with the same weight like Austria and Germany. Combine this with the French-Russian alliance, which allowed Russia to believe they could stand up against Germany and Austria, and to the Entente cordiale between France and Britain (France knew that Britain would protect their coasts in the case of a conflict) and you have only some part of the diplomatical problems that imho where totally disregarded with the war-guilt-clause of Versailles.

BTW: ONE of the reasons that this crises became a war is imho that Germany DID fear the Russian army, especially they believed they could stand against a fully mobilized Russian army AND against France (even not together with Austria). When Russia started to mobilize, the choices for Germany where very few. Before 1914, Russias infrastructure, especially railway-lines that would help with a faster mobilization, was vastly expanded with French money. In 1914 a situation existed in which many German militaries believed that they could win a war now, but not in a few years (using the Schlieffenplan), while the French and Russian militaries believed that now they could already win a war. So this time no side backed down, and looking into the actions of the diplomats I think that especially the Austrians and Russians where intent on leading this war, less so (but not unwilling) Germany, France and some British (like Grey, or Churchill).

Back to the original question:
In the air, Germany made their mistakes in the few moments of air superiority (like during the Fokker plague or in bloody April), but on the whole they did what was possible and realistic. The Allies, having the superiority in numbers, paid in blood for their control of the sky, but on the whole it certainly was worth the cost.

regards

Axel

Axel,
Germany knew that war was coming and the populace wanted it.
1. The Kaiser's remarks in the 'Daily Telegraph Interview Incident' of 1908.
2. The last minute secret Alliance with Turkey. (so they'd have someone to occupy the Russians while the French were being Taken Care of.
3. The German Army strength acording to records 8,500,000... more than twice that of their European neighbors.
4. Industrial capacity was the largest in Europe at that time.
5. Their fleet was experiencing a massive build-up during the first decade of this century, to rival the English fleet.
6. The sending of their diplomats on vacation when Austria mobilized although they knew of said mobilization through diplomatic ties.
7. The wording of the letter of permission to pass through neutral Belgium " If permission is refused then you will be considered as an enemy of the reich."
8. The invasion of neutral Belgium in violation of the Treaty of Neutrality that they had signed with Belgium.
Sounds to me like they had every intention of starting war. The Austrians just provided an excuse.
VBR,
Jim

Matt,
Haigs plans were derived from the plan that he conceived for the battle of Neuve Chappelle and he used this basic plan of battle throughout the war. His plans were always very painstaking, timing was meticulous and critical and as much prior intellegence as possible was obtained by aerial observation and photography, ground patrols and interrogation of prisoners. The battles always started with an artillery bombardment to destroy the German barbed wire in front of their trenches and this preceeded a massed infantry attack over No Man's Land on the German trenches. The bombardment, he hoped would kill or demoralise the German front line troops with their machine guns and allow his men to cross safely to the German trenches before they were exposed to the deadly fire.
Unfortunately, his plans did not allow for those unavoidable mistakes that always occur during the confusion of battle. Specifically they failed to allow for the frequent occasions when the artillery failed to cut the barbed wire and to disable the German heavy artillery situated well to the rear, often out of range of the British guns. The result was those hapless men who were facing uncut wire were funnelled into zones that were enfiladed by German machine guns and exposed to pre registered shell fire.
General Hackett wrote of the battle of Loos "...Then twelve batallions, 10,000 men, on a clear morning, in columns, advanced up a gentle slope towards the enemy's trenches. The wire behind which those lay was still unbroken. The British advance met with a storm of machine gun fire. Incredulous,...the Germans mowed down the attackers, until, three and a half hours later, the remnants staggered away...having lost 385 officers and 7,681 men. The Germans as they watched the survivors leave, stopped firing in compassion. Their casualties at the same time had been nil."
With Haigs precision timing upset because of this slaughter, significantly, Haigs usual reaction was to order them to advance again, against the wishes of his junior officers that asked him to regroup and dig in, the troops advanced again, almost to certain deaths. At Neuve Chappelle, a relatively small battle, the British lost nearly 17,000 casualties, at the Somme thy lost about 420,000.
At Messines he had been advised that the battle ground was below sea level and to open the attack with a bombardment would destroy the drainage ditches and dykes that kept the area dry, and if it rained the area would flood. Haig ignored his advice and open the battle with a bombardment, the dykes and drains were destroyed, and the inevitable rain came resulting in the battlefield being turned into a quagmire of mud, deep enough to prevent movement of guns and vehicles and in which men and animals drowned. Initially Haig had proposed the battle to be a short intensive attack on a narrow front. He wrote to Plumer "...That is to break through the enemy's trench system and get to open fighting with the least possible delay so as to defeat the troops immediately available before they can be reinforced."
What I cannot understand is why Haig insisted with the battle in view of his proposal to Plumer, when it was obvious that he was not going to break through, yet he ordered the battle to continue to the north at Langemarck. General Gough who Haig had chosen because he was the most aggressive of his generals, actually advised Haig to cease the attack, but Haig persisted, despite horrific losses, for another three weeks untill August 26th. He then changed the axis of his attack from the north to the east and, when finer weather came he ordered the assualt on the Passchendale Ridge itself. He then won his three famous victories of Menin Road, Polygon Wood and Broodseinde, possible only because the weather remained fine.
It started to rain again by October 5th and Haig encouraged by his 3 victories order the ANZACS to take Passchendale, on Oct 9th, even though the weather had turned to gail force conditions. This order was given despite his experience at the Somme, the result was disaster, the attack cost 7,000 casualties and the Aust. 3rd Division lost 3,199 lives in 24 hours.
By now the artillary was running out of ammo and the shells they did fire were burying themselves in the mud only to make foutains of water and a cloud of steam. Even then Haig contiued the battle, on Oct 12th Haig ordered another attack, and as men struggled in mud up to their waists they were cut down, the attack failed again.

It was not until November when the Canadian General Currie, refused to advance untill conditions had improved, were able to take Passchendale Village.

Haig now allowed the battle to end, having incurred 275,000 casualties which about 70,000 were killed for very little gain. The original objectives had not been realised.

To balme Haig for these deaths is unfair, for he is not the only one to blame, but his management of this battle and the Somme a year earlier suggest that he was unable to learn from his mistakes, that he was not in control of events, that he underrated the enemy and that, indeed, he was far from being a great leader.

Matt as you can see Haig was presented with alternitaves, he choose not to take them. I know he was CinC but all the great generals of the past listened to their juniors. I intentionally left out the Somme as I would have had to extend this reply over 4 parts. Most of this was taken from an article written by Professor Geoffrey Miller, as you have had experiences in the military I decided to even things up and quote an academic. What really gets to me about Haig was that in 1919 he accepted an Earldom from his goovernment and was given his family home Paid for from public contribution and also a cash reward of 100,000 pounds! I wonder who much reward all those widows he created got?

Andrew

[Vigilant]

1. I am staying well away from the "war guilt" question. I recall a monster thread on this very topic a few weeks back.

2. Haig may have got things wrong, but he was also prepared to recognize his mistakes. For example, after the first disappointing phase of the 3rd Ypres he removed "breakthrough" Gough from operational command and gave it to Plumer, who carried out a number of successful "bite and hold" attacks. No stubborness there I can see. Incidently, I wonder if the weather in autumn 1917 had been normal would we be even discussing Haig now? The Germans conceded the weather was their best weapon. As it was, mud and all, Crown Prince Ruprecht concluded as a result of the battle that the advantage no longer lay with the defence. He was quite unable to stop the British advance and he knew it.

Further, in 1918, it could be argued that Haig succeeded where Ludendorff had failed. He was able to master mobile warfare (by making it a series of huge bite and holds) while Ludendorff's pushes just ran out of steam and were utterly vulnerable to counter-attack. In other words he solved the supply problem.

I find Lloyd-George's behaviour just as questionable as Haig's. If he thought the cost was too high why didn't he order Haig to conserve his soldier's lives more carefully? If he couldn't because the Cabinet would not agree, he should have kept to the cabinet line or else resigned, if he thought it at all important.

3. (Stay with it -- almost finished!) While it was understandable, I wonder if the "reactive" German strategy of deploying Jagdgeschwader at troublespots was actually adequate. Before the invention of radar, could a small force hope to really deal with a larger airforce? I recall that the Germans only had air superiority over their MICHAEL offencive in March 1918 for the first 3 days. And at 3rd Ypres I get the impression that the RFC was quite able to do its job despite the presence of the JG 1 "Flying Circus". Perhaps a better policy might have been to say "One can't be defencive in the air. We will defend on the ground, but attack in the air. Only then can defence on the ground have a good chance of success." Material would necessarily have been diverted away from the ground but maybe a bolder policy would have been worth it? Any comments?