Winners, Losers, Heroes & Strategies

[Vigilant]

Andrew, we were tapping our keyboards 12,000 miles apart at the same time. My post answers your criticism of Haig's inflexibility I think.

I am not trying to defend everything Haig did -- I just think a dead man deserves his side of the argument to be put. ( Billy Bishop, MvR, anyone.) So firstly, Messines is on a hill, not below sea level -- you are thinking of the Ypres plain, which is only a few feet above SL. Messines was an enormous success due to the laying of huge mines under the German front line. British/Commonwealth casualties were very light.
Secondly, there was nothing "inevitable" about the amount of rain that fell that autumn around Ypres. It was a freak year. Then there was the bombardment. Well really there was no option but to use one. Only tanks (like at Cambrai) could destroy wire like shells could, and the ground in the plain was not suitable for tanks. (However, Haig had been practically ordered to attack there in order to deny German submarines use of the Belgian coast.) After the Somme fiasco, everyone had realised that shelling could not be relied upon to destroy everything (even Haig) -- thus we used "creeping barrages" aswell in 1917 as cover for the advancing men.

I probably agree that Haig's control on events looks a bit laid back, and that he was not a great leader. But then, was Falkenhayn, Ludendorff, Joffre, Petain or Pershing? Trench warfare didn't just cause problems for Haig.

Finally, when I bought my Remembrance Day poppy this year the black bit in the centre was stamped "Haig Fund." After the war Douglas Haig devoted his time to raising funds for war widows and injured soldiers, and his efforts are still going today.

Hi Jim,

just some remarks to your points:
>1. The Kaiser's remarks in the 'Daily Telegraph Interview Incident' of 1908.

Have you read the actual text? I have. Ramblings and sable rattling, but he got more fire for this in the Reichstag then from any foreign nation. If he was really planning a war in 1908, why did they not just start it? Until 1911 Germany imho would have easily won any war, due to the reconstruction of the Russian army after their defeat in 1905 and French army. The later was largely expanded after 1910 to the size of the German army (with only half the population - the enlistment time in France was a year more, and there were less exceptions than in Germany).

BTW: You can find articles pertaining "Germania est delendam" in British newspapers as early as 1890, way before a German fleet existed, adn I am sure that you can find many statements of French or Russian politicians that spoke of the coming war with Germany - the difference is mostly that Wilhelm was not a diplomat.

>2. The last minute secret Alliance with Turkey. (so they'd have someone to occupy the Russians while the French were being Taken Care of.

Sorry, but the Turkish alliance BEFORE the war did not include any commitment of Turkey to enter the war. This was only done after the war started when the British withhold some ships despite of treaty obligations to Turkey and two German ships managed to flee to Turkey. See eg. Tuchmans August 14 for a description of the events. If anything, you could count the secret negotiations of France with Italy (securing their neutrality in the case of a German attack) as some proof, if not for the German war guilt.

>3. The German Army strength acording to records 8,500,000... more than twice that of their European neighbors.

In 1914 the peace time strength of Germany was roughly the same as those of France, and a THIRD of those of Russia. The army strenght at the start of the war (INCLUDING reservists) was for Germany 2.3 million, for France 1.8 million, Austria 1.4 and Russia 3.4 (Russia was kind of slow in enlisting reservists). The potential of Russia in this was immense (they alone mobilized some 12 million in the war, without using all available resource).

>4. Industrial capacity was the largest in Europe at that time.
Agreed. Since 1870 they rose to second position in the world, leaving France and Great Britain behind. This was one of the main factors for the British/German rivalry. Do you suppose that this was done by Germany to provoke a war?

>5. Their fleet was experiencing a massive build-up during the first decade of this century, to rival the English fleet.

Indeed. I could start to explain about the concept of the risk fleet, but that would go to far here. Just know that the US-Fleet was the third at this time, and was quickly expanding too (as the fleets of France, Austria, Italy...) What was the purpose of the US fleet (other than that of the German fleet?) - hunting bandits in mexico? Everyone was building fleets like hell in these times, and you can hardly blame Germany for being successfull due to its industrial capacity. And I think we agree that Germany lost mainly because of the blocade, so WITHOUT a stout alliance with a naval nation (which leaves Britain) the only choice for Germany was to build an own navy, and if anything it was too small. The wise thing would have been the alliance, but ...

more to follow

>6. The sending of their diplomats on vacation when Austria mobilized although they knew of said mobilization through diplomatic ties.

Sorry again, but the mobilization happend only in late July. The vacations started shortly after the assassination and could also be interpreted as proof that nothing unusual was happening.
I am sure that you would bring in this point as proof too when all diplomats would have cancelled their vacation-plans immediately.

>7. The wording of the letter of permission to pass through neutral Belgium " If permission is refused then you will be considered as an enemy of the reich."

Agreed. This is a point of war-guilt, but only against Belgium. You have to consider the fact that the invasion of Belgium (and the preceeding ultimatum) was a CONSEQUENCE of the decision to go to war, which was a consequence of the Russian mobilization. If you seek for any war-guilt in Germany, you have to look at the time before that. You will find plenty, but you will ALSO find it in other nations. The invasion of Belgium and the subsequent reign of terror for the time until the occupation troops arrived are German war-crimes, but not part of a guilt FOR the war.

8. The invasion of neutral Belgium in violation of the Treaty of Neutrality that they had signed with Belgium.
See 7

>Sounds to me like they had every intention of >starting war. The Austrians just provided an >excuse.

It just puzzles me that in the perhaps nine years before, when Germany imho could and would have won the war, there was none. It started in the moment, when France and Russia saw a chance of winning.

I agree that Germany WAS willing to enter a war, more so because they knew that France and especially Russia were still expanding their armies - an arms race that Germany could not win in the long run.
I am just opposed to the convenient point of view that Germany was to blame and the rest of Europe was an island of peace. It is exactly this view that led to Versailles and that prevented the other European politicians to take on their own responsibility against their people.

Best regards

Axel

Sorry I meant the third battle of Ypres, anyway the fact is that he ignored advice on starting with a bombardment and destroyed the dykes and drainage ditches, thus when "the unseasonal rain" came the battle field was a quagmire.

The short comings of British artillery was well evident at The Somme, Haig was aware that his artillery barrage was a failure, but still after the failures at Neuve Chappelle and Loos, he still stuck with the same strategy, the result was 61,816 casualties in 24 hours. Of the Somme Brigadier General Marshall wrote that Haig "...by self hypnosis, became convinced that the Somme was an open sesame to final victory. He would cut the German army in two, and do it in one day. He would have the Cavalry Corps under bit and ready to charge through the shell-cratered gap and 'into the blue' as proof of his intent to crush the enemy....By Feb 11th his plan was tentatively set. By late April a great part of Europe knew that the British were organising the Big Push....but by then the German attack on Verdun had slackened....When General Fritz von Bulow...reported that he sensed that a great attack was coming, Falkenhayn told him that it was a wonderful hope. Having splintered his own army by throwing it against the immovable object (Verdun), Falkenhayn couldn't imagine that the enemy would be equally stupid."(World War 1 S.L.A. Marshall.)

I can understand you sticking up for dead men, most of us on the Forum have done so, what I was driving at was that there were options presented to Haig, but he choose to ignore them. (that is for you Matt.) As for the shot at Haig and widows I apologise it was toungue in cheek, as my friend who comes from Dover said on reading your reply, he must have grown a conscience after the war.

[Vigilant]

(Andrew, here's some more incoming fire on your position

I don't know a lot about the Somme, but I would make one point. If Haig really cared nothing for his mens' lives, then why did he wait until he had assembled a huge force of artillery before attacking? The reason the soldiers were ordered to walk across no-mans-land was surely that Haig thought they would meet no opposition. The artillery would have done all the work. That to me looks like concern to keep casualties down, not reckless disregard for them.

Concerning artillery, I don't see that Haig's belief in preliminary bombardment was wrong-headed. He saw (correctly) that bombardments had been unsatisfactory at Neuve Chapelle and Loos because they were too small. He assumed that - having assembled the largest force of artillery ever seen, on the Somme in 1916 - he now had enough. In this he was not being unusual or dogmatic: General Foch believed "Artillery conquers, infantry occupies." It was a doctrine designed to avoid unnecessary loss of life. Surely that was a comendable concern?

In the light of the Somme, Haig's thinking on artillery did change appropriately. First, the Royal Artillery was made even more massive and effective. This meant bombardments could be made shorter, thus maintaining surprise for longer. Secondly, what was expected from a bombardment changed. Destruction was recognised as being unlikely. To use a recent catchphrase, the purpose was now to "degrade and diminish" the enemy's ability to fight. Thirdly, creeping barrages were used to screen the infantry from the attentions of those Germans who had not been degraded or diminished. With a "creeper" howling down on them (and often multiple creepers "searching" back and forth over their rear) the Germans would have to keep their heads down until the creeper had lifted over them. And hopefully a few seconds later the first wave of infantry would be on them.

All these were used at 3rd Ypres with some skill (with artillery cooperation aircraft playing a useful part). And in September 1918 the artillery was able to lob 950,000 shells at the Hindenburg Line in 48 hours. Massive use of artillery was crucial to everything the BEF achieved in 1917 and 1918, as was evolving thinking on how it should be used.

The British by 1918 had improved on their tatics re artillery, however, in 1916-1917 they had a problem with their shells, about 1 in 3 did not explode on impact, thus Haig's relience on his artillery cutting the barbed wire was a poorly thought out strategy. As for gathering his artillery because he cared for his men, I'm sorry but I cannot agree with that. After Messine Haig wanted to seize the Gheluvelt plateau, Plumer wanted 3 days to enable his supporting artillery to be put in place, Haig thought the delay excessive and ordered Gough to take over from Plumer, Gough asked for a delay and Haig granted it even though Gough took longer in organising his attack, the result was that the delay allowed the Germans to reinforce the plateau, and any chance of taking it was lost. Wilson wrote, "So the only consequence of the commander in cheif's determination on a hasty sequel to Messines was no action what so ever."

Back to the 3rd Ypres Haig had planned for a quick decissive victory, but after the attack started the rains came and because the artillery had destroyed any drainage, the field turned into a quagmire, in some parts of the field men struggled waist deep in mud. Surely after the first two weeks Haig must have realised that a quick victory was an impossible task, but for the next 5 months he continually ordered attack after attack. It was not untill General Currie ordered the Canadians not to attack until the conditions improve, this was against Haigs wishes, and I feel Currie would have been removed from his position, the only thing that saved him from Haig's ire was the successful capture of Passchendale village.

The end result of Haig's quick victory was 275,000 casualties of which 70,000 were killed for 5 miles of ground, the sad thing being that none of Haigs pre battle objectives were met. I really don't think Haig cared a great deal for the enlisted man. During 3rd Ypres on the 9th of October Haig's orders killed 3199 of the Australian 3rd Division in 24 hours, that was nearly half of the men lost a Gallipoli and that conflict lasted 8 months.

Surely in light of Haig's 3 victories, Polygon Wood, Menin Road and Broodseinde, all which were won in favourable conditions, he must have realised he was throwing away mens lives in the mud, that is why IMHO that Haig was a butcher, he continually fought the stalemated battle instead of holding the line, resulting in horrific loss of life.

Germany had adopted 2 new tactics, firstly a well constructed maze of trenches and tunnels and bunker houses that even a direct hit from the British artillery could not be destroyed, so while Haig insisted on his pre infantry attack barrages the Germans simply went to ground, after it had stopped they came back out assembled their machine guns and continued the slaughter. The second new tactic was concrete pill boxes, the Germans had decided to use firepower instead of manpower, this allowed them to withdraw troops to the rear, so when the British broke the German lines, fresh troops were thrown into the battle, a great advantage at the time. Haig was aware of these new tactics as he had gained the information from German POW's.

CEW Bean wrote after the Somme:

"A general who wears down 180,000 of the enemy by expending 400,000 men ...has something to answer for."

I think that somes up Haigs strategies, except for one quote from the man himself.

"I think the machine gun is a much overrated weapon." 1915.

General Haig, Leadr of men... NO..Butcher...YES!!

Axel,
Well I'm back, I feel real good about myself, and without further ado...
I quote Prince Lichownowsky's (the German Ambassador to England) reply dated July 1914:
It is shown by all official publications and is not disproved by our White book, which, owing to the poverty of its contents and to its omissions, constitutes a grave indictment against ourselves, that:

1. We encouraged Count Berchtold to attack Serbia, although no German interest was involved and the dnger of a World War must have been known to us. Whether we were acquainted with the wording of the ultimatum is completely immaterial.

2. During the period between the 23rd and the 30th of July, 1914, when M. Sazonof (Russian Minister in Vienna) emphatically declared that he could not tolerate an attack on Serbia, we rejected the British proposals of mediation, although Serbia, under Russian and British pressure, had accepted almost the whole of the ultimatum, and although an agreement about the two points at issue could have easily been reached and Count Berchtold was even prepared to content himself with the Serbian reply.

3. On the 30th of July, when Count Berchtold showed a disposition to change his course, we sent an ultimatum to St. Petersburg merely because of the Russian mobilization and though Austria had not been attacked; and on the 31st of July we declared war against the Russians, although the Czar pledged his word that he would not permit a single man to march as long as negotiations were still going on. Thus we deliberately destroyed the possibility of a peaceful settlement.

In view of these incontestable facts, it is no wonder that the whole civilized world outside of Germany places the sole responsibility for the World War upon our shoulders.

Dispute that!
VBR,
Jim

Axel,
This is part two of my rebuttal to your statements.
The French had been able to take on all of Europe back in the days of Louis XIV and Napoleon. It had now fallen so far behind the other powers that it was too weak to even take major initiatives on it's own. In 1850, France had the second largest population in Europe(after Russia). A dearth of French babies left it number five by 1900, behind Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Britain. The French military had a mobilized strength of 3.5 million to the German's 3.8 million. France had a much smaller population than Germany did (45 million compared to 65 million). War had been looming on the horizon for years, and almost came to a head in 1911 during the Second Moroccan Crisis between France and Germany. During this crisis Germany used gunboat diplomacy to obtain a slice of the Congo in exchange for it's acceeding to a French protectorate over Morocco.
The 1911 crisis also resulted in an accelerated arms race: Germany increased the size of its standing army from 612,000 in 1911 to 782,000 in 1913, while the French army increased from 593,000 to 700,000. Germany knew war was coming, the whole world knew. Russia's military preparations had an even greater impact on Germany's sense of vulnerability. It was projected that by 1917 the French-financed improvements in the Russian railway system would allow Russia to mobilize in 18 days. Such speedy mobilization would wreck Germany's Schlieffen Plan, which counted on slow Russian mobilization. Moltke, the German chief of staff, ttok a worst case view of the threat and turned his fears into self fulfilling prophesies. "We are ready [for war] and the sooner the better for us."
VBR,
Jim

Vigilant,
History has labeled Haig an 'Incompetent' and his actions support that. He was a butcher who threw away men's lives like they were pawns in a chess match. June of 1916 for six days, the thousands of British and French heavy guns, fed round the clock by munition trains, had poured 1.6 million shells onto the deeply echeloned German trench lines on the Somme. British generals promised their men that nothing could suvive this, the heaviest artillery bombardment in history.
Just before 7:30 AM, on Monday, July 1, 1916 British sappers fired two enormous mines, containing 200,000 lbs of high explosives, under German lines. The explosions tore gaping holes in the German trenches, and were heard as far away as London. Then whistles blew and bagpipes skirrled all along the British line. The finest army ever assembled by the British Empire went over the top.
Many were volunteers: The rich cream of English society from Oxford and Cambridge; miner's sons from Wales and Yorkshire; lads from Belfast's slums; sturdy Devon farm boys; and the 'Pals', the groups of friends and sports teams who had enlisted under the promise of being kept together in the army units. And beside them, Imperial troops from across the vast British Empire sharpened their bayonets, khukris, scimitars and kirpans.
The British commander, Sir Henry Rawlinson, was sop certain that there would be no German resistance he ordered his troops to march forward in parade formation.
Read on in part 2.
VBR,
Jim

Vigilant,
Here comes part 2...
Running over ground torn up by shellfire, Rawlinson feared, would disrupt formations and tire the men. Once German lines had been siezed, massed Imperial calvary divisions, that included even the fabled Bengal Lancers and the Frontier Scouts from the Khyber Pass, waited to pour through the breach and pursue the fleeing Germans back to the Rhine.
But the Germans were neither all dead, nor demoralized. Most survived the 6 day avalanche of shells in deep concrete shelters. soldiers of a lesser nation might of run for their lives, or gone into shell shock after the hellish ordeal. Not the valiant Germans. They surfaced, set up their machine guns on prepared platforms, and poured fire into the packed ranks of the British, who were advancing ponderously in tight formation across no man's land. Somehow, much German barbed wire had also survived the bombardment. As the British became entangled in the thick belts of rusting wire, sheets of bullets from German Maxim machine guns massacred their battalions and companies. Though falling by the thousands, the gallant British continued their hopeless advance.
Gen. Rawlinson, horrified by the German riposte, thought of calling off the attack. His superior, Haig, demanded that the assault continue. This sunny morning on the Somme was the worst moment in British history. Brigade after brigade was ground to a bloody pulp. Whole untis of 'Pals' died, together in the end. German machine guns grew red hot. British shells fell short among advancing Imperial troops. The slaughter continued into the evening. A few heroic British units managed to reach the enemy's trenches and storm the concrete blockhouses and fortified villages defending the German lines. But the redoubtable Germans launched fierce coordinated counter-attacks that drove the British back.
Part 3 finishes my tale.
Jim