How to deal with bad fighter pilots?

[rammjaeger]

In fall 1917 Erwin Böhme reported in a letter to his girl friend that he was just firing four (!) pilots of his squadron. Top ace Berthold released three of his squadron leaders (!) in spring 1918. It is well-known that successless pilots of the Richthofen-Geschwader had to leave very fast too.

How did the different Allied Air Forces deal with the problem of successless or demotivated pilots in WWI?

I welcome every comment or contribution.

Hannes

[Barrett]

I'm running on supposition, but I'd imagine that German squadrons were more likely to transfer nonproductive pilots than the allies because Germany had less materiel to dispose of, requiring a higher standard of performance from the "users." This probably applied across the board: fighters, recon, bombers, etc. The obs/recce pilots most willing to press westward undoubtedly got more opportunity than those who hung around the lines. As somebody once observed, "Every spring the earth produces another crop of 18-year-olds," and wantabe aviators, paratroopers, or other elites continually draw the eager, the foolish, and the motivated!
Still, the French fighter squadrons rarely produced more than a couple of top hands apiece, indicating that even in numerically strong air forces the hunting instinct is found in relatively few individuals. I know of no better example than Fonck, who got something like 70% of SPA.103's victories--in the elite Stork Group, no less.
As for Berthold, he seems to have been able to pick & choose much as he liked, down to swapping pilots straight across in the J.15/18 tradeout. He was, after all, very senior in experience as well as rank (hauptmann was as high as a jagdflieger could go.) If there was a proportionately higher turnover among COs, it's understandable. The German armed forces have always excelled at unit- to operational-level leadership--it's the strategic stuff that trips them up.

Hi Hannes

A good but blatant example would be Edward Mannock who simply ripped of the pilot wings from the tunic of officers (pilots) in his squadron who requests desk jobs rather than to fly.

Regards

Gert

[Reinout]

Dear Hannes,

Böhme fired those four pilots because the Jasta hadn't been succesful under Franz Walz. In one of my books, it says that he went back from 12 to 7 pilots just so that he could teach a small nucleus of pilots the ropes of combat. He also switched airfields and thus surroundings. It worked.

As for Berthold, he was very aware of aggressiveness - and lack there of! He sent pilots and leaders away if they didn't catch on. Most pilots who remained in his units speak favourably of his leadership: hard and strict, but well-defined and succesful. Also note that Berthold didn't remove anybody who didn't score, he removed the non-aggressive. For instance, he had a friendship with one fighter pilot who had never scored and this man was eventually made a Jastaführer! I'm not sure about the rest of his career but he was a succesful leader, so scoring victories isn't the only part of being a good leader.

Kind regards,

Reinout

Bruderlein Hannes: a pilot is either successful or he is unsucessful; a pilot is either motivated or he is unmotivated. The unsuccessful and the unmotivated Flieger in the Allied air forces were usually transferred to a ground slot in supply, put in hospital for air sickness, and sent to second rate squadrons. There was one Russian pilot in the Cigognes who fought like crazy for almost four years, but could nnot down a single plane. Just before the war ended he crashed into a German Fokker to terminate his frustration. The elite German outfit were mainly composed of aces, so that there was very little transfer movement, but even the best of aces can crack under the strain of too much flying, etc. Billy H/9/08/99.

[Reinout]

Billy H,

You'd be surprised to see how much shuffling went on in the Luftstreitkräfte! In general, pilots will usually have flown with 3 or 4 units. This is a guesstimation, but page through The Jasta Pilots to see what I mean. Some of the older veterans (from 1914-1916) can have as much as 13 units, including their early two-seater units and Jagdgruppe commands. It often happened that fighter pilots who were unable to score were sent to home defense units, back to two-seaters or like their Allied counterparts, to other (ground) duties such as supply, Kofl etc.. Despite not having many victories (or none at all), some pilots still had what it took to be a valuable asset in the air. An ace needs his back to be watched out for as well as the next man. Roughly speaking, the aces of Germany made up some 10-11% of the Jasta compliment (just under 400 out of 3,000 pilots), so "roughly made up of aces" doesn't hold up. It is true however that the percentage of German fighter pilots who scored one or more victories is a lot higher than in the Allied air forces. Several reasons: more targets and better training. Maybe Barrett can tell us more about the statistical success of the average German fighter pilot compared to his Allied counterparts.

Kind regards,

Reinout

[Darryl]

Hi All,

And as we have said before, some 'bad' pilots just failed to return one day.

regards

Darryl

[Reinout]

Dear Darryl,

Unfortunately, some good pilots didn't return one day either.

Kind regards,

Reinout

[rammjaeger]

Hi Reinout,

I agree with you concerning the German "Ace-squadrons" - even JG1 had always alot of youngsters in its squadrons. Aces were always a minority.
Sometimes the good leadership of a Jasta-Führer or Squadron leader could develop "Blindgänger" into successful aces.

Hannes

P.S. My e-mail address was a little bit complicated therefore I have choosen an additional easier one. I think I will built also a homepage about this topic in the next month.

[Reinout]

Dear Hannes,

Rammjaeger? Have you been reading (auto)bio's of Hajo Herrmann or Walther Dahl? Or were you inspired by the Sturmstaffel of which only 4 out of 36 pilots survived WWII. They were the ones who vowed to get one kill every mission be it by shooting or ramming!

Kind regards,

Reinout