LEADERSHIP

>Joe admired and respected the Australians
>but cautioned them about using ETO tactics
>against the Japanese.

When 75, 76 and 77 were worked up, 75 especially they were filled with ex 3 Sqn pilots who had been fighting for three years in North Africa. When 452 RAAF, 457 RAAF and 54 RAF came, they were led by Caldwell who had also come from the North African theatre and had been knocking off 109's in P40's. Must have reckoned in Spitfires against Zero's would be a cakewalk. It seems several warned the Australians of the Zero being more manouvreable, from 49th PG pilots in Darwin, to the Richmond Base Commander where they worked up to strength. IIRC 457 got knocked about the first time they met Zero's but many were lost to the Spitfires lack of range as well. Not an entirely suitable aircraft to the theatre it seems. Probably there more for propaganda (or token) reasons, cant imagine they were there as conscience for Churchill diverting without asking the 6th and 7th Divisions to Ceylon


>Technology as an ace-making factor?

I think the most important asset for a competent pilot to become an ace is to have a lot of targets, one of the reasons the Gladiators, Buffaloes etc did well was there were plenty of things to shoot at. Caldwell, despite his combat effectiveness, wasnt going to score in 1945 in Moratai as there was no Japanese aircraft left, and his Spitfire wasnt going to give him the 1000 mile range to really go looking for aircraft.

Also, rather than technology, the matching of an aircraft type to a theatre or it's operations count, 1 Sqn AFC's Brisfits were effective in 1918 in Palestine as they had the legs and the power to fly for long periods and still have enough fuel to fight and get home. Same reason FA300's Rumpler CI's were so important in 1916-1917 in the same theatre. SE5a's were also in the region, but they dont appear to have had the same effectiveness as the Bristols did.



cam
AFC - http://members.xoom.com/pointcook/

How to measure leadership ? It is not the effectiveness of the man but the efectiveness of his unit. In the case of a fighter (scout) unit there is a relatively easy way to calculate - "kills" and "losses". So, if Flight Commander "X" shoots down ten enemy aircraft in a month but the rest of the flights gets only two, he should get low marks for "leadership". If, on the other hand, the same man shoots down six and his flight shoots down seven or eight, higher marks to Flight Commander "X" as Leader. Other factors to bring in would be number of times Flight Commander "X" actually flew as opposed to number of times he COULD have flown.

As was pointed out earlier, it gets a bit more complicated as the man is promoted; Squadron Commanders had more opportunity to lead their units in World War II as compared to World War I, and even Wing Commanders of 1939-45 got a lot of combat time compared to their 1914-1918 counterparts. So once our World War I leader reaches a certain rank, it becomes difficult to guage him in terms of combat; one looks to the responsibilities he is given and how well he succeeds. Thus, the postwar record is very kind to men like Rickenbacker, Miles Thomas, and Collishaw (to name but a few).

It becomes more difficult to measure "Leadership" with non-fighter aircrew, because the measure becomes one of tonnage of bombs dropped or number of sorties flown (compared to numbers of sorties abandoned), etc. Again, opportunities to fly vs actual flights made must be taken into account, and at a certain rank the combat factor diminishes while strategic savvy (military or commercial) come into play.