Coordinated Attacks & Defensive Formations

It seems probable that mass attacks on an enemy formation is likely to maximize the damage done, although collisions become more of a concern.

It also seems logical that maintaining a formation in order to maximize the number of guns aimed at an attacking force is the best way to disrupt such an attack. Granted, with enemy planes diving at you, it seems like a natural reaction to get out of their path, but isn't this more likely to cause your isolation and destruction?

Reading about some of the more successful bomber units in WWII, it appears they taught pilots to maintain formation when under attack by fighters, thereby minimizing losses.

To what extent were these tactics used by squadrons in WWI? Were any specific squadrons known for developing or using such tactics? Could this practice be considered a proper reaction to the Boelcke Dicta?

Dear Mark,

About the Boelcke Dicta, I can't answer you, however I know that the hydroplane fighters of the Seeflugstation Flandern I and II (Zeebrugge and Oostende) used this kind of tactics.
As they were rather vulnerable for normal land-fighters, they used to fly low over the water and in formation. If attacked the tried not to break the formation, being able this way to open concentrated firepower on their enemy, who had to come from above.
It is not clear when this kind of tactics were used for the first time, but I remember reading in the biography of Friedrich Christiansen that it was something they learned out of their mistakes and losses and that it was a slow learning process. I know that by the end of 1917 it had become a quite general tactic for them.

Regards,

Johan

I do know the "Lufberry" (sp?) was developed as an anti-fighter technique by 2 seaters but had vunerabilities. That would point to "someone" thinking about techniques/strategies but I don't know of any docs to point to formation flying of the 2 seaters...

Sensei

Hi,

RFC two-seater fighter/reconnaissance squadrons were using formation flying from around middle-late 1916. One of their favourite techniques when attacked by large numbers of enemy scouts was to form a "defensive circle". It worked well with machines like the FE2, in which the observer (in the front cockpit) and the pilot behind him each had a gun of his own. They would cover the tail of the machine in front, that one would cover the next one's tail, etc, until the circle was complete. Then the whole formation, keeeping its circle, would gradually edge its way towards the British lines. When the later FE2D came in with a third (observer controlled) Lewis gun on a pillar that could fire back over the top wing it was even more effective. The Canadian/RFC/American flier Harold Hartney describes it all very well in "Wings over France", and at one point mentions the German Scouts attacking in rigid formation, and being very easy to beat off when they did so.
I have also read some original Squadron Record Books at the Public Records Office at Kew, London, where the Recording Officer mentions the enemy being beaten off partly because they (ie the British pilots)Kept their formation well.

I imagine the same sort of thing applied to bomber units.

I believe that when the Bristol Fighter replaced FE2's in the F/R role they started off with similar tactics, but changed them when they realized what a good fighter they had.

Hope that helps.

Bob

P.S.

20 Squadron RFC in particular were exponents of formation flying and fighting.

Bob

Thanks to all. Bob, wasn't RFC 20 also one of the two highest scoring British squadrons? If so, it goes to show that sound tactics might even be more more important than the machine used, considering this was a 2-seater unit.

Hi again,
Yes, they were credited with around 630 kills between February 1916 and the armistice. Many of those were "Out of Controls", but one "OOC" was Richthofen, wounded, and a "certain" was Karl Scheafer, killed. They tried out a number of different formations, including Diamond and Vee.
Certainly, the close formations concentrated their firepower; but I think it was found that single-seaters were better off breaking off from formation once they got in a serious dogfight, except maybe for a wingman keeping close to his leader. It would be interesting to know what the official views were, both British and German.

Bob

[Vigilant]

The RAF Independent Force used exactly the same formation tactics as the USAF above Germany in the next war. Hardly surprizing seeing as they were doing exactly the same job - daylight strategic bombing. The I.F. formations would be harassed most of the way to and from the target by D.VII and Dr.1 and to lose formation meant becoming easy meat. There's a painting in the Imperial War Museum by G.H.Davis called "Closing Up" (dated 1919) which shows just such a scenario.

Vigilant