Empire Aces

Sid Wise did indeed say that records of Canadians in the British flying services were incomplete - and I agree (occasionally I work with those same records), but once one has gone over the various lists and card files, through CEF records of officers, school and university yearbooks, etc, it seems that even if SOME Canadian personnel have not been identified, the odds are that the overwhelming majority of them HAVE been found. There is little likelihood of finding another couple of thousand Canadians hiding in RAF aircrew ranks (although the recent opening of RAF Other Ranks records - PRO Air 79 as I recall - may turn up a few more mechanics and clerks).

I did not mean to imply that Canadian or Australian aircrew were more "robust" than their British counterparts (once they got to flying schools, one candidate was much like another) - but the over-representation of Canadians and Australians in the air services (by whatever proportion) was probably attributable in part to health factors which weeded out appreciable numbers of British. I believe, for example, that the incidence of TB was lower in Canada and Australia than in Great Britain (this is something that can probably be proved or disproved with reference to national health statistics).

Did Canadians have a superior training machine in the JN-4 ? The comparison has been made between the JN-4 amd and the Farman Shorthorn - but in 1917-18 would it not be more appropriate to compare the JN-4 with the DH.6 and the Avro 504 ? And although many aircraft had standard engines, would not a rotary-engined Avro 504 be better preparation for Camels and Snipes ?

The "immigrant ethic" theory I discussed in an earlier posting was borrowed (by myself) from Pierre Berton, and especially from his book VIMY. The Canadian Corps had a reputation as skilled shock troops, and this was most evident at the taking of Vimy Ridge (April 1917). The bulk of the middle leadership of the Canadian Corps at that time (the Majors, Captains and senior NCOs) had learned their trade (and managed to survive)with the First Canadian Division battles of 1915; and 60 percent of that formation - which sailed from Canada in October 1914 - was British born. The irony of Berton's theory is that the greatest differences were not those of Canadian soldiers compared to British soldiers, but between British immigrants who returned as soldiers vs British soldiers who had never experienced the traumas and challanges of migration. This somehow reminds me of John Chipman Kerr who, with his brother Roland had settled at Spirit River, Alberta. On learning that war had been declared, they immediately set out to enlist. Tacked to the door of their shack was a note, "War is hell, but what is homesteading ?" John was awarded a VC; Roland was killed in action.

As an afterthought - Bill Rawlings wrote a good book some years ago, SURVIVING TRENCH WARFARE. It has been a long time since I read it, but one point sticks in my mind. He described the Canadian Corps troops as being successful because they were so THOROUGH (in training, in going in fully equipped and prepared, etc) - but he also argued that the Australian Corps was equally successfully because its troops were more INVENTIVE. Perhaps our ANZAC colleagues may wish to expand on this.

Thanx for the stimulating discussion, all. I'm really enjoying this.

My comments about the Shorthorn of course refer to 1915 through early 1917. The Avro was definitely superior; it's a bit of a curiosity that it didn't replace the JN-4 in Canada (I know that RFC Canada wanted it). The 504 wasn't adopted as the standard ab initio training machine until later in 1917, though. I'm unsure of the numbers of DH-6 used in training; it seems to have been pretty much the forgotten airplane of WWI from the RFC point of view. None of the pilots whose reminiscences I've read report any DH-6 hours.

Must run; perhaps I'll post more later.

Hugh i have heard, in referance to Canadian shock troops...the Germans used to hold up signs in saying "No Canadians". It seems they were very sick of the night raids.

I've not found referances only heard it through "veteran talk". Have you heard of this?

>was equally successfully because its troops were more INVENTIVE.<

There is a thesis on the First AIF, technology and tactics etc that may help you with that. It is at;

http://www.adfa.oz.au/~rmallett/Thesis/

The website mentions among other things where they recieved their training from and how they executed their organization at the line. Very informative.

As to inventive the Australians operated well at smaller levels and as small units. You often read that officers explained to the troops objectives and why they wre going after what they were. So when an officer died or the troops got cut off they werent paralyzed wondering what to do, they were still able to achieve their objectives, predominantly because they knew their objectives and its place in the broader scheme of things. Information the average Tommy probably did not get. It would be interesting to know if the Canadians, Guards and Fusiliers had that sort of flow of information between their higher officers and lower officers and men.

Another thing that helped the small unit in the AIF was due to the losses the AIF had taken they were short on manpower in late 1917 and 1918. To overcome the lack of manpower they gave their platoons more Lewis Guns. As small units they were very capable of laying support that a larger British unit would only be capable of.

The other thing that may have helped is the "'ave a go mate" or "'ave a crack at it" attitude. In the trenches the British had specialized platoons of snipers that fired from the trenches day and night. They didnt do fatigues etc. The Australians instituted the same system in France but the average Australian soldier is unable to sit on his hands for more than two seconds and within a couple of days they were all firing as if they were snipers. Must have made things uncomfortable for the Germans in their sector.

In the air I dont know, the AFC pilots did a whole bunch of stupid stuff that is funny in retrospect, but being lads of 20 - 24 which every air force was then, I doubt they got up to any worse shenanigans in the air than other Squadrons in other Air Services.

On the Avro 504K, none reached Australia or Point Cook until late 1918. They were assembled at Marrickville by a local company who used Australian Hardwoods in the aircraft. The wood added an extra 50 - 100 lbs (IIRC)


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There are a lot of points being raised in these discussions, so I will just touch on two. Canadian Aeroplanes Limited had received an order to build 500 Avro 504Ks for the training scheme in Canada. Two had been delivered as of the Armistice; they see to have been flown only by instructors and staff officers. Peace having broken out, the balance of the order was cancelled; the fate of the two built in Toronto is a mystery. A little over a year later, when the British offered free aircraft to the Dominions, Canada took 114 machines of which 62 were Avro 504Ks.

The reputation of the Canadians as shock troops is most often discussed in connection with a remark attributed to General Ludendorf along the lines of "Whenever we found the Canadians coming into the line, we prepared for the worst". This reputation was attributable to many factors (we were lucky in having two very fine generals in charge of the Canadian Corps at key points - Byng (a Brit) and Currie. Another factor was the refusal of Canadian politicians and generals to allow the Corps to be broken up, even on a temporary basis. It could be argued that this was both good and bad. I understand that, in the crisis of March 1918, the Australians allowed their divisions to be committed here and there where needed to plug holes or fight delaying actions; the Canadians refused to allow commitment of troops unless it was done with the whole Corps. As situations often demanded only a brigade or a division (a Corps being too cumbersome in the circumstances), the Canadian Corps largely sat out the German spring offensive. The most significant Canadian contribution to that battle entailed the Canadian Cavalry Brigade - which was not part of the Canadian Corps but was serving with an Imperial cavalry division.