Disapproved VCs

There is evidence that Victoria Cross awards (or lack thereof) rankled RCAF authorities. On March 10th, 1944, a section known simply as P.1d in RCAF Overseas Headquarters gave the matter special attention. Copies of all air force VC citations hitherto awarded were studied and compared to recommendations previously submitted on behalf of RCAF aircrew. The diary of P.1d does not indicate the conclusions drawn, but on July 28th, 1944, the document noted the RCAF's first VC award (to Flight Lieutenant David Hornell), and commented:

"When it first became known that this recommendation was on its way to Air Ministry, P.1d kept in close touch with the department concerned at Air Ministry. Close contact was kept with the members of the U.K. Honours in War Committee, and every effort was made to facilitate the passage of this much coveted award through the rigorous channels of investigation necessary before this highest ranking decoration could be approved by His Majesty The King."


The Victoria Cross - probably the most famous gallantry award in the world, the Pour le Merit and Congressional Medal of Honour notwithstanding - is a military icon, of near-mystical and quasi-religious significance. Yet it was created by humans, and its award is administered by humans. Its award had been subject to policies - and politics - which varied with time and circumstance. This paper is a look at those policies, with specific - but not exclusive - reference to RCAF experiences. I believe that when we are finished, the Victoria Cross may have lost some of its status as an icon - but conversely, I believe that those recommended, whether or not they received it, will have grown in our eyes.

In retrospect, it is difficult to say why or when the Victoria Cross achieved its mythic status. Instituted by Queen Victoria in 1856, it was awarded generously until 1914, largely because for much of that time it was the only gallantry award available. No fewer than 522 were awarded between 1856 and 1913, often in quantities. Eleven went to defenders of Rourke's Drift (Zulu Wars, 22/23 January 1879). Three VCs went to Canadians saving artillery pieces from capture by Afrikaaners in 1900. Indeed, at various times authorities wondered if the Victoria Cross was being awarded too liberally. As early as 1864, Lord Lugard wrote that the VC was "losing its value...being looked upon in the light of a medal from the Royal Humane Society." The many awards for Rourke's Drift drew a protest that the VC was being awarded with "lavish prodigality". Even Queen Victoria questioned as to whether "the award might become too common."

As other awards were created - the Distinguished Conduct Medal in 1862, Distinguished Service Order in 1886, the Military Cross in 1914, the Military Medal in 1916 - awards other than the Victoria Cross became possible, and VC standards were raised. Yet those standards were not defined - could probably never be defined - and each case had to be decided on its own merits. The result was that uniformity of standards could not be attained, and the standards of 1914-1918 were very different from those of 1939-1945.

During the First World War the British Army, facing its greatest and most prolonged test in history, sometimes increased the issuance of medals to maintain morale. This also extended to "upgrading" recommendations to honours higher than originally intended - and possibly higher than merited. The Victoria Cross awarded Lieutenant (later Brigadier) F.M.W. Harvey, Lord Strathcona's Horse, actually began as a recommendation for a Military Cross following a routine trench raid; it was upgraded to a Distinguished Service Order at Corps level and subsequently raised to a Victoria Cross at the level of BEF Headquarters. The political impact of Victoria Cross awards was evident in the air war; William A. Bishop's controversial VC (awarded without the testimony of witnesses) was undoubtedly a tonic to the Royal Flying Corps at a time of very heavy losses. It was also a gesture towards "colonials" who were becoming a large proportion of the British flying services. In 1915, when Zeppelin raids on England were causing panic out of all proportion to their bomb loads, Victoria Crosses were awarded to the first two British pilots who shot down these airships; thereafter, a Zeppelin kill became a DSO action, and by 1918 it had been downgraded to a DSC, MC or DFC affair.

There is a substantial body of documentation respecting Second World War Victoria Cross awards. Although the material was declassified in 1974, much of the data remains to be tapped. I saw some of this during a 1995 research expedition, but could not examine it all, much less assess it, because other matters had priority. Nevertheless, several points - remarkable points, I believe - emerge from this cursory study, which justify further research.

Let us begin by remembering that "Man Proposes - God Disposes". In the case of the Victoria Cross (and many other awards at that time), many might be recommended for honours, but the rules of the game and the final decisions were in British hands. They were not inflexible hands - in the case of at least one Canadian Army Victoria Cross - that to Lieutenant-Colonel C.C.I. Merritt - the British bent their own rules at the request of Canadians. But in the end, it was British committees - and even King George VI himself - who made the final decisions. A vigorous Canadian effort to have a Victoria Cross awarded to Chief Petty Officer Max Leopold Bernays, RCN, helmsman of HMCS Assiniboine during a vicious surface battle with U-210, foundered in the face of British intransigence - whether at the level of Admiralty or Buckingham Palace is not clear - and a Conspicuous Gallantry Medal was ultimately substituted.

The correspondence in Britain shows officials agonizing over who should receive a Victoria Cross and what might be substituted should a VC be vetoed. The problem was compounded by the fact that posthumous awards could be made with only three honours - the Victoria Cross, George Cross and Mention in Despatches. In the hierarchy of gallantry awards, these were the two highest and the very lowest. A gallant man who survived his brave feat could be rewarded with many types of decorations - one who died in the course of his courageous act could be given a VC, GC, or MiD - but nothing in between. Thus, in the three cases cited at the outset -McHarg, Sargent and Reichert - it had to be a VC, an MiD - or nothing.

British authorities from the outset were uneasy about awards to fighter pilots - or more particularly, about Victoria Crosses awarded merely for piling up large numbers of "kills" - and whereas at least eight First World War Victoria Crosses - one third of the air VCs of that conflict - went to high-scoring fighter pilots - Ball, Bishop, Barker, Hawker, Jerrard, McCudden, Mannock and Proctor - only two Commonwealth fighter pilots were awarded the Victoria Cross during the Second World War - and neither was a "high scorer" like Johnston, Malan or Beurling. There is more than a hint that Flight Lieutenant J.B. Nicholson's VC was motivated as much by political concerns (honouring Fighter Command as a body for winning the Battle of Britain) as for Nicholson's own heroism. The other fighter VC - to Lieutenant Robert Hampton Gray - appears as much as anything to have honoured the Fleet Air Arm at the moment of victory.

But what is most often stated in the Air Ministry correspondence (and widely communicated to senior officers in the field) is that a Victoria Cross should be awarded for getting into trouble and not for getting out of trouble. In other words, desperate acts of self-preservation should not count as meriting the Victoria Cross. Desperate acts to execute a mission would qualify - from the suicidal attack on the Maastrict Bridges in May 1940 on through Guy Gibson's famous Dams Raid; desperate acts to save others would qualify (Andy Mynarski's Victoria Cross action is the finest possible example) - but furious self-preservation alone was not enough. William Barker's fight against odds of October 1918 would not have been a VC action by Second World War standards.

Apart from David Hornell and Andrew Mynarksi, how many members of the RCAF were recommended for Victoria Crosses ? I know of eight men who were recommended and who did not receive it (there may have been more; I cannot swear to have seen every relevant document). They were as follows:

Flight Lieutenant John Alan Anderson (J25399), whose VC recommendation was downgraded to a Distinguished Service Order, awarded in February 1945 for services with No.419 Squadron.

Flying Officer Harold Freeman (J22448), killed in action 24 May 1944. A Typhoon pilot with No.198 Squadron, shot down and killed attacking German radar units near Cherbourg.

Pilot Officer Harvey Edgar Jones (J12866), killed in action, 6 June 1944. A Dakota pilot with No.233 Squadron, shot down as he delivered paratroopers to the Caen area in the early hours of D Day.

Flight Sergeant Vernon Frederick McHarg (R118176), killed in action, 26 January 1943, a pilot with No.424 Squadron.

Flight Lieutenant William Eugene McLean (J35287), killed in action, 3 February 1945. A bomber pilot with No.514 Squadron.

Pilot Officer Clifford Clarence Reichert (J18983), killed in action, 23 June 1943, a pilot with No.408 Squadron.

Flight Lieutenant Paul Treneman Sargent (J10828), ki1led in action, 17 October 1943. A Sunderland pilot with No.422 Squadron.

Flight Lieutenant James Andrew Watson (J20076), killed in action on 27 April 1944. A bomber pilot with No.622 Squadron.

Why did the Mynarksi and Hornell recommendations succeed while these seven did not ? It is significant that six of the eight - Jones, Sargent, McHarg, McLean, Watson and Reichert - involved pilots staying at their posts while others were saved. In fact, this sort of thing happened with such frequency in Bomber Command that awarding a Victoria Cross in every instance would have devalued the award - "uncommon valour" was actually so common that it could not be properly rewarded. Moreover, it was stated more than once that pilots had a duty to remain at their posts for as long as possible; it smacked a bit of the adage that "The captain should go down with the ship", which was almost literally so with Flight Lieutenant Sargent, who went down with his Sunderland.

This rule was bent slightly in the case of a posthumous VC award to Squadron Leader Ian Willoughby Bazalgette, a Canadian who had enlisted directly in the RAF. He, too, had remained with his burning Lancaster in an attempt to save comrades - he actually rode the bomber down to a crash-landing in France because two injured crewmen could not bale out, but the aircraft exploded just as he touched down. Nevertheless, events preceding this had marked Bazalgette out for a VC rather than a Mention in Despatches; with his aircraft already heavily damaged by flak, he had nevertheless pressed on to a target to execute the duties of Master Bomber, remaining over the target as his own plight worsened.

As early as October 1942 consideration was being given to awards of Victoria Crosses for long-term, sustained gallantry rather than for specific daring deeds. In fact, only two such "periodic" VCs were ever awarded - to Wing Commander Guy Gibson and to Group Captain Leonard Cheshire, and then only after protracted discussions at Air Ministry Honours and Awards Committee level. Gibson is generally thought to have been awarded his VC for the famous Dams Raid, but Air Ministry correspondence reveals the extent of his service (four tours, 170 sorties) as factors. Cheshire was, in fact, a very brave man who had won three DSOs and a DFC by 1944; he had flown four tours totalling 100 sorties (536 operational hours) in the most dangerous of all RAF commands; there was almost nothing more to give him other than a Victoria Cross.

Nevertheless, Air Ministry shrank from rewarding further distinguished bomber pilots with a "long-haul" Victoria Cross; Group Captain J.B. Tait, recommended for a Victoria Cross, was granted a third Bar to his DSO, in part because authorities claimed that Tait's exploits (including the final sinking of the Tirpitz) had been blown out of proportion by the press, and because they were loath to treat the Cheshire case as a precedent to be followed. Similarly, a VC recommendation for Group Captain P.C. Pickard (DSO and two Bars, DFC, three tours, 105 sorties, killed while leading the famous low-level raid on Amiens Prison on 18 February 1944) was turned down on two grounds. Quoting Air Ministry minutes, these were:

(i) He had already been sufficiently decorated in relation to other officers with comparable records of service.

(ii) Press reports of his last sortie exaggerated its importance.

Given the reluctance of officials to award "long haul" VCs, it was almost inevitable that J.A. Anderson's VC nomination would be downgraded to a DSO. Like Pickard and Tait, the recommendation had been for a series of brave acts rather than for a single death-defying gamble. Compared to Cheshire's four tours, and the three tours completed by Gibson and Tait, Anderson had completed only one tour. In fact, given the reluctance with which Air Ministry approved a VC for Cheshire and his four tours, it was unlikely that Anderson's recommendation would succeed, given that he completed only one tour. Air Marshal Robert Saundby, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, wrote on 17 December 1944:

"I do not think that this is up to V.C. standard. It mostly consists of brining back aircraft on a number of occasions which had been damaged by flak. No doubt very gallant efforts, and it is rather surprisng that F/L Anderson was not recommededfor a DFC at some time earlier in his operational career, since the incidents quoted extend from July 28th 1944 to October 146h, 1944.

"I agree that a DSO would be appropriate."

The case of Flying Officer Freeman generated considerable correspondence within Air Ministry. Leading a formation of eight Typhoons to attack a radar station prior to D Day, his aircraft had been hit by flak; the tail was almost completely shot away. He nevertheless pressed on to his target, dived to very low level and fired his rockets with deadly effect. As he attempted to pull up, the wingtip of the following aircraft touched Freeman's fuselage; both aircraft crashed in flames. His VC nomination failed on several grounds; he was conducting a mission of a type carried out before and by many others - "part of the general offensive rather than as a forlorn hope entailing exceptional risk"; many others were taking the same risks as Freeman; it was not clear that the flak hit had damaged his aircraft beyond all hope of return. Freeman's VC might still have succeeded but for the fact that officers in 2nd Tactical Air Force disagreed; Air Marshal Conningham did not consider Freeman's bravery up to VC standards while Conningham's immediate superior, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory supported the VC recommendation.

But perhaps the most interesting correspondence is associated with David Hornell's Victoria Cross - a recommendation which succeeded. On 4 July 1944 the Air Officer Commanding, Coastal Command (Air Chief Marshall Sholto Douglas) forwarded the Hornell nomination to Air Ministry. His arguments in support of the nomination were blatantly political:

"Only one Victoria Cross has been awarded to Coastal Command in the course of the war. That award was made more than two years ago to the captain of a torpedo aircraft, who carried out a very gallant torpedo attack against a battle cruiser in Brest Harbour. I would point out that no award of the Victoria Cross has been made to any officer or airman engaged in anti-U-boat duties.

"I feel that, apart from the outstanding heroism displayed by this officer, some recognition of the gallantry displayed by the crews of the anti-U-Boat squadrons in Coastal Command is well deserved.

"The fact that this officer is a member of the Royal Canadian Air Force, serving in a Canadian squadron, if anything strengthens the recommendation, in that it would be some small recognition of the very great part played by Dominion squadrons and Dominion air crew personnel in Coastal Command's successful war against the U-boat."

Air Ministry did not agree entirely with Air Chief Marshal Douglas; Flying Officer L.A. Trigg (RNZAF) had been awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross in 1943 following a successful attack on a German submarine although he had not been a member of Coastal Command; rather, he had flown under West African Air Forces control. Within Air Ministry the Hornell case was considered "borderline"; three factors appear to have swung opinion towards a VC - the fact that he was flying a cumbersome, underpowered Canso amphibian; his skill in effecting a crash-landing on the water without injury to his crew; his sustained leadership in the 21 hours that followed when the survivors endured exposure to the North Atlantic and depressing incidents including a failed life-boat drop. It is interesting to note, however, that Air Ministry, having decided to support a Victoria Cross for anti-submarine work, proceeded to support two (Hornell and Flying Officer J.A. Cruickshank, a Catalina pilot in No.210 Squadron).

Andrew Mynarski's Victoria Cross appears to have been much less political, yet the Air Ministry discussions concerning it reveal divisions and differences of opinion. It is worth remembering that in this instance the Canadians were not pushing for any specific award. Surviving crewmen had written to RCAF Headquarters asking if there could be some recognition for "Andy", and RCAF authorities considered it only in general terms; when RCAF Overseas Headquarters contacted Air Ministry in February 1946, it was merely to request that the circumstances of Mynarski's death be investigated "with a view to the possibility of a posthumous award to P/O Mynarski." It would appear that Air Marshal Bottomly, Air Officer Commanding Bomber Command, recommended a VC for Mynarski, in a document dated 30 August 1946.

Yet once the recommendation had been submitted, officials within Air Ministry debated whether his actions had been up to VC standards. There was no doubt that had he survived, he would have received a Distinguished Service Order, but dying did not automatically upgrade his deeds to those befitting a Victoria Cross. The circumstances were similar to those of a VC to Flight Sergeant G. Thompson, RAF who had gone through fire twice to save comrades; Mynarski, it was suggested, might not qualify as he had attempted to rescue only one man. The Chief of the Air Staff disagreed. In a strong minute, dated 10 September 1946, he wrote:

In my view the quality of the action in the two cases was identical, the quantity was different because P/O Mynarski only had one member of the crew to try and rescue, Flight Sergeant Thompson had two. I suggest that the award of the VC should be given on grounds of quality and not of quantity.

Virtually all officers agreed that Mynarski had deliberately sacrificed himself in his attempt to save a comrade, and the recommendation was duly agreed upon.

The paper debates indicate that, in the Second World War, the award of a Victoria Crosses was to be made according to some undefined standard. Courage is impossible to quantify, and the attempts by some to do so only underline the futility of such efforts. Although it does not relate directly to Victoria Crosses, a document circulated in Canada in 1944 showed AFHQ thinking as it attempted to relate "risk" to "awards" according to a formula in which the odds of perishing were expressed as a percentage:


(a) 85/100 % GC Acts of gallantry having entailed the supreme sacrifice or degree of risk equal to this condition.

(b) 50/85 % GM Risk of life being extremely great but less than the degree covered in (a).

© 25/50 % AFC The degree of gallantry
AFM, being less than that
OBE, of (b)
MBE,
BEM

(d) 1/25 % Commendation


The problems associated with deciding who got what were not unique to the RCAF, nor to the Second World War. This writer has found several examples of Victoria Cross nominations involving Army personnel which failed. Nominations for George Crosses have turned into awards of George Medals - or less. A Canadian Army report, drawn up in June 1946, laid down attributes of a satisfactory awards system. It merits extensive quotation:

(a) the awards must go to those who most deserved them. If they do not, the whole system will quickly fall into disrepute...

(b) the awards must be available on a scale liberal enough to permit recognition of outstanding achievement but not so liberal that they cease to have real value in the eyes of the recipients and of the army as a whole.

© the awards must be granted with the maximum possible speed...

These guidelines help explain the practices of the Second World War and caution us about administering honours today. Needless to say, the challenges of bestowing the right honours upon the right people for the right reasons are all the more demanding when one is dealing with what are - or should be - national icons.

Hugh,
Thanks for the information on this topic. I was able to add four names to my total of Canadians recommended for the VC in WW2.
Did F/L J.A.Watson receive anything - MID?

WATSON, F/L James Andrew (J20076) - Mention in Despatches - No.622 Squadron (deceased) - Award effective 21 February 1947 as per London Gazette of that date and AFRO 120/44 dated 7 March 1947. Home in Hamilton; enlisted there 22 September 1941. Trained at No.5 ITS (graduated 31 January 1942), No.22 EFTS (graduated 19 June 1942) and No.5 SFTS (graduated 23 October 1942). Killed in action 27 April 1944 (Lancaster ND781); buried in France. Certificate sent to his mother, 10 January 1949.

Public Record Office Air 14/4115 has extensive correspondence and affidavits relating to a possible Victoria Cross to this officer. Although no formal citation was drafted, the documents record the story as follows. The aircraft (code letter "R") took off from Mildenhall, the crew briefed to attack Friedrichshaven. At about 0130 hours, while en route to the target, and flying at 17,000 fet a little south of Strasbourg, they were attacked by a night fighter. This was driven off, but further attacks continued and the aircraft sustained increasing damage. The rear gunner, Flight Sergeant M.D. MacKinnon (RCAF), later reported that his turret was knocked out; 30 seconds later (evidently a second fighter was involved) the starboard wing and starboard inner engine were set on fire. Watson maintained control but efforts to fight the fire were unsuccessful and he ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft. MacKinnon, in s deposition sworn in Toronto on 30 March 1946, went on to say:

"The aircraft lost altitude rapidly. Nevertheless, Flight Lieutenant Watson remained at the controls and kept the aircraft under sufficient control to enable the other members of the crew and myself to parachute to safety.

"It is beyond doubt that the unselfish conduct of Flight Lieutenant Watson and his devotion to duty and complete disregard for his own safety resulted in the lives of the crew and myself being saved. I sincerely trust that such heroic action be duly acknowledged and strongly urge that Flight Lieutenant Watson be suitably awarded posthumously so commensurate with the highest possible gallantry."

The flight engineer, Sergeant Roy Clive Eames (RAF) swore a more detailed deposition on 25 July 1946, saying in part:

"On the night of April 27th, 1944, I flew with Flight Lieutenant Watson on an operation and our mission was to bomb Friedrichshaven. At approximately 0115 B.S.T. on the 28th April, we were at 17-18,000 feet approximately; I was in the nose of the aircraft carrying out window (radar defence) procedure when some shells came through the nose of the aircraft and realising we were being attacked, I immediately left the nose to take up my standing position beside the captain, Flight Lieutenant Watson. In this position, I saw the call light flickering. This call light is used in emergency when the intercommunication by telephone is unserviceable. I realized that although the rear gunner's intercom has been all right a few minutes before that it must be out of order, since we heard no report from [about] the attackers.

"I subsequently learned that the first burst which I had encountered in the nose had also damaged the port tail plane, port aileron and rear controls. The Mid-Upper gunner then gave orders to corkscrew starboard and an enemy aircraft opened fire which set out starboard inner petrol tank on fire and also starboard inner engine. Flight Lieutenant Watson gave the order immediately to prepare to abandon aircraft. I feathered the starboard inner engine and also pressed its fire extinguisher to try to put the flames out. Flight Lieutenant Watson put the nose down to keep the flames away from the aircraft and to possibly quench the flames.

"Realizing this was impossible, Flight Lieutenant Watson then endeavoured to keep the aircraft straight and level. This was only achieved by keeping control column pressed tightly on his chest and I realized that our flying controls were seriously damaged.

"As part of the drill, the bomb aimer endeavoured to attach to Captain's harness his parachute and succeeded after considerable difficulty.

"During this time the Captain asked the navigator to inform the crew of our position fr the purpose of escape. The navigator told us we were approximately on the French border, 30 minutes flying time from the turning point into our target. This point was a little south of Strasbourg.

"There was at no time any suggestion of panic and this was largely due to the coolness and perfect calm of out Captain.

"I must point out that all the action of combat actually occurred in the space of a few minutes.

"At this time, the rear gunner was out of communication with the rest of the crew, but I heard bursts of machine gun fire from his turret. I saw that the rear of the aircraft was badly damaged and I thought that the rear gunner must have been injured

"Throughout the combat, Flight Lieutenant Watson repeatedly asked for news of the rear gunner and assured us that he would look after him; I think his exact words were, 'Whatever happens, he'll be O.K.'

"I told the skipper that his turret was still moving, but that was the only indication we had that he was alive. The damage caused by the second attack had damaged the cal light communication.

"The Mid-Upper gunner was giving a commentary on the fires of the starboard wing.

"The captain gave us orders to bale out. I remember his words, 'I'm sorry lads, but you'll have to hit the silk' and in accordance with our drill, I was the first one to leave the aircraft at approximately 12,000 feet. I acknowledged the captain's order as I left, and that was the last time I saw him."