The Other Billy

While most of these people sound like "characters", they don't appear to be much in the military leadership department. (At leat that's what it sounds like.) Aside from the Inchon landing, I read (think the title was "Eagle against the Sun") that MacArthurs plan of strategy was the only one that made military sense and was cost effective in terms of saving lives. Aside from this, he nor anyone else came up with anything original. Perhaps we should start a new thread on this?

[Barrett]

Tony may have in mind some articles in various military pubs claiming that Mac was a superior general because his SW Pacific forces (he hardly ever referred to the Aussies, BTW) sustained lower casualty rates than the marines (and GIs) in the Central Pacific campaign. The numbers are accurate--the interpretation is disingenuous. New Guinea and the Philippines bore no resemblance to the killing grounds like Tarawa and Iwo Jima, where the Japanese had skillfully layered defense in depth, requiring a head-on assault with high casualties. The places simply weren't big enough for maneuver warfare. Among the infantry, the decisive weapons were flame throwers and satchel charges--and that's as close as it gets. Military pros know all this stuff but it can get swept aside in the interservice rancor that still exists.

Barrett; I've read articles along the lines that you mentioned. What I had in mind though, was the great arguement between the army, that wanted to head north towards Japan, and the navy that wanted to head west. One of the authors made the point that the US Navy committed mutiny in all but name by categorically refusing to follow the northward approach plan. The US, being in the position to fight a rich mans war, opted for using both plans rather than one. A poorer nation could not have done so, and would have been forced to choose between plans. It's my understanding that MacArthur, or his staff, came up with the army plan. If the army plan is in fact the better one, it follows that the lives lost in the westward approach plan, were lost, not needlessly (since the westward approach did cause damage to the japanese military), but rather without having had the stronger effect, as would have been the case had the army plan followed solely.

[Barrett]

Hi Tony. OK, gotcha. And yes, there was fear & loathing as to what WestPac strategy to follow. Nimitz and others wanted to take Formosa since it was better positioned to interdict Japanese seaborne communications, would support the hard-pressed Nationalist Chinese, would cost fewer allied lives, and drew the nose around the home islands. However, MacArthur prevailed largely on the basis of his argument that the US owed early liberation to the Philippines, with an eye toward postwar US status in Asia. )And he would thereby keep his "I shall return" pledge).
In a sense, the Formosa option would have represented island-hopping on a grand scale, largely isolating the Philippines and the oil-rich Java region--a major factor in Japan's decision to go to war in the first place. As it was, the Imperial Navy was feeling the effect by late '44 anyway, often sailing with semi-refined crude oil which proved highly volatile when exposed to bombs & torpedoes!
The CentPac approach still was necessary, as fleet anchorages in the Admiralties, Carolines, and Marianas supported the Philippines and Okinawa ops, and ultimately would have been involved in the colossal Olympic/Coronet assault on the home islands.
Irony Dept: it's often forgotten that some of the mid-Pacific islands were former German bases ceded to Japan after WW I.

Barrett; I see your point about island hopping on the grand scale. But bear in mind that such a policy would have been akin to a siege of Japan. In other words cut Japan off, (vitual isolation from neccessities), and let the Japanese people overthrow the government. Such a policy would have been, at best, LONG term. The more direct policy of engaging and overcoming the Japanese, would have logically followed the northward approach from Australia. This approach would have worked with or without the Philippines being taken. To put it another way, if the US had been poor enough to allow only one plan, the Army plan would have been the less costly of the two due to a faster timetable and more positive results.