[NeilE]

Hi Pete;

Yes Mr Bean... its interesting the differences between Bean's private diaries and what he wrote later - and what he didn't write also (that he knew later from the research for his history).

Strachen's theses regarding the 'benefits' of trench warfare are interesting. The casualty rates from 1914 were certainly more intense than later and forced the adoption of trenches for protection but the perception of trench warfare as 'hell' has more factors to it I think there is more than its relation to casualty rates. Casualties in The Great War were far beyond those ever experienced previously in recent wars, and the constant hemorrhaging of casualties on a day to day level and the casualty figures (fudged though they often were by both sides) in major battles/campaigns (Verdun, The Somme etc) were almost beyond the imagination of Europe at the time. Add to this the concentration of artillery barrages, gas, the infantryman's feelings of helplessness under barrage usually experienced, sanitation, smell etc ect and you have the popular perception trench warfare as 'hell'. (and really maybe it wasn't really that far from that notion)

Also given that The Great War extended the experience of war to class groupings that normally were not exposed to the bloodiness of warfare, it is no surprise that the experience - normally the lot of the working/peasant class and the aristocracy - was interpreted as hell. In the Great War, the reality of war was 'everybodies experience' (not really but it was far wider than ever before) and its no surprise that it became interpreted as 'hell' by 'ordinary' 'civilian'-soldiers who were exposed to the randomness of death and a range of sights etc far beyond their normal experience - which had no templates or lore to interpret these experiences.

As actual memory fades and is replaced by interpretation and myth drawn from popular culture, the propaganda icons of each nation's fighting men begin to replace the reality of the situation. Writers like Blair, Winter, and the oral historians work to recentre the human factor in the history of the Great War.

Talking of Winter, I thought his earlier work on the experience of the British Infantryman in The Great War, "Death's Men" was a far superior work. I always thought "The First of The Few" to be a bit of a quickie knock off following on the popularity of "Death's Men". Its been critiqued here a fair bit. I haven't read it for a while but I remember I felt his lack of in depth research in it meant he inadvertently fell into adopting many of the popular stereotypes of the RFC - Something he didn't do in "Death's Men". Also on Winter, his "Haig's Command - A Reassessment" - Winter's answer to the Haig/British Army revisionists is a good read. Its methodology has been criticised in some circles but the truth of the matter can't be ignored. he makes lots of reference to Bean as he used Bean's research notes and letter held at the AWM as part of his research into Haig and the British High Command.

Have a look at Winter's "Haig's Command" and see how Sheffield's work stands up. There has been a lot of revisionist work over the past few years re-examining the role of the British Army in The Great War. Its interesting but it tends to be more assertion than based on documented evidence - particulary the notion that the British Army 'evolved' to a modern force by 1918 (Thanks to Haig et al!). Generally though this assertion doesn't hold up when compared to document based evidence. Many of the facts and sources presented are selective and others that contradict that assertion are ignored or downplayed. Still, I haven't read the Sheffield work so I should give it a look before I comment on it.

Max Hastings? Hmmm... he reminds of Niall Ferguson for some reason. Ferguson's neo-conservative historical revisionism in relation to the Great War has always struck me as being of very limited value as it is just too ideologically driven to be useful. I haven't read Hasting's work but a lot of the reviews from here have been less than complementary. I think his theses have some value by the sound of things. Look at Kokoda for example - whilst it would be easy to think this was a massive battle, the reality was it was really a small scale action involving small quantities of troops (relative to the size of other WW2 actions that is). The Japanese didnt expend large numbers of troops invading New Guinea (because they basically couldn't) and the Australian forces were no more than two brigades. "The Legend of Kokoda" however elevates this series of small infantry actions to heroic proportions. Kokoda did stop a Japanese probe towards Port Moresby but it was hardly a full scale invasion by WW2 standards. I'll see if I can borrow Hasting's book from the local library - I don't feel like giving Max my money!

What did you think of Dale Blair's work? (also not the most popular person at the AWM).

Its good to hear from someone else interested in the unsaid aspects of Australian military history. I think generally we are beginning to see a wider questioning of the popular historical myths regarding Australian experience in The Great War and World War II.

Whereabout in Oz are you from Pete?

Cheers

Neil