FlyXwire
Your comments are very interesting. They tend to confirm what I have deduced looking at the DR1 in a fight by fight basis. That the Dr1 was not overly successful in traditional dogfights against fighters like SE5's & Camel's. As noted previously, its greatest success against fighters, was over those on low missions.
I'm not into computer games in a big way - though I have dabbled. As I see it from a purely historical stance; fighters have three atributes - firepower, horsepower (power to weight) and maneouvrabilty. However I feel the last is given too high priority in the minds of our fraternity in regards scoring victories. I think it was more of a defensive asset. Firepower & horse power mixed with tactics was the key. And the desired tactic was to bounce one's enemy - surprise from above. And when you read contemporary reports patrols of both sides spent quite a lot of time & effort in trying to bounce the opposition.
In line with this I like to pose that there were three phases to a fighter v fighter dogfight. The attack, the dog-fight and the dispersal. And in my view the greatest amount of 'real kills' were gained in the first and last phase. Once the dogfight proper started it was difficult to remain on anyone's tail for long enough to deal the fatal blow. The dispersal phase overlaps the dogfight phase and entails aircraft that left the fighting.
This is the phase which in my view causes the problems with modern perceptions. For
the Jasta pilots fighting over their own lines, it was easy to quit the fight when hit, or simply outfought, by diving or spinning away - Lothar I think uses the euphamism of 'going down stairs'. As state in an earlier thread, they knew they were unlikely to be followed. This in turn led to the plethora of OOC by the British. Likewise they were unlikely to be finished off. You might say an OOC was half a victory. For the British pilot the opposite was true - if they dropped out through damage or wounds or simply outfought - they would most certainly be followed down and often finnished off if they continued to make for Allied lines.
Trying to compare relative claims is difficult due to the many vaguries of claim & loss reporting of both sides. However one constant which allows a window are the fatal losses. I number crunched these once and for the period of late 1917 when the Allies were clawing back German air accendency (over their own side) - the RFC/RNAS still had two fighter pilot fatalities for each German fighter fatality in air combat. On these grounds one might think the German's were twice as good, but in reality the discrepancy has more to do with the dispersal phase which allowed the German pilots, by dent of fighting over their own side, a far greater chance of surviving dogfights. One might say double the chance. In truth few if any German pilots of any longevity, were not downed more than once along the way. Few British pilots ever got a second chance.
This in turn leads to the stress factor. Allied pilots in both wars, had tours of duty, as compared to the Germans who fought until they dropped (or were rested when visibly stressed). But in truth the Allied pilot's lot was more taxing with all the stress & strains of having to fight over enemy territory. Pilots came and went more frequently - VM Yeates called them 'here today gone tomorrow folk.' This was less evident in the Jasta's and novice pilots often got a what de Ridder called a 'birthday present' - shot down but unscathed. As a consequence there were more experienced pilots in Jasta's than the average British squadron - and novices were the easiest prey of experienced pilots. That said many British units - particularly SE5's - had flights with high numbers of experienced pilots - McCudden's B Flight is a good example - and they often called the tune over the German side of the lines.
Time running out so I must wind up.
Cheers Russ