Good points Russ, and complete agreement here.
I have long been an advocate of two points that are not always stressed on these pages enough,
1) The R.F.C. and temporarily the R.N.A.S. squadrons 'on loan' were tied inexorably into the British army tactical stance which was offensive orientated. (not surprising as the R.F.C. WAS army) This resulted in an offensive doctrine which was without doubt Trenchards---but which linked seamlessly (how could it not) with overall army tactics, and indeed Strategy.
I would say that the Air arm only became truly offensive Strategically with the formation of the I.A.F.
2) That it is, as we mostly agree, impossible to view the 'air war' without at least some understanding of the 'ground war' it was so important an adjunct to. Unfortunately their are some here with only hazy understandings of what was going on on the ground, although i don't mean that to sound overly critical---it's just that they are so inextricably linked they cannot be classed as seperate disciplines.
Too many times we hear comments like 'the air war itself did nothing to alter the war either way' or some such
Dave.