Bristol & Steve
The RFC &
att RNAS certainly had an influence on the ground. A good negative example is 16 Aug 17 - the Battle of Langemarck - the second major thrust of Third Ypres. Poor waether & poor communications led to a break down of co-operation between the Corps squadron's and the attacking divisions, where after reasonable gains on the ground, German counter-attack divisions were able to retake much of the won ground as the Corps aircraft were largely unable to direct Arty fire onto them to break up the attacks.
The next two major thrusts on 20 Sep & 26 Sep saw these problems overcome and the German counter-attacks were broken along the line.
The other great contribution was between 21 March & 28 March, when every available British squadron was thrown into low missions against the advancing Germans particularly from 25 March onwards. There can be no doubt of their effectiveness & contribution to slowing & halting the German advance. Again Jones in War in the Air gives ample evidence from German regimental histories to support this. Histories which again bemoan the lack of like support from their own air force.
The superficial readers however seem to dwell on what looks to be some good scoring on the part of units from JG I & JG III against SE5's & Camel formations - but in truth these successes were not in traditional dog-fights but against low flying planes - either encumbered with bombs at the beginning or low on ammo & fuel at the end. The bottom line being that these successes did little to relieve the suffering of the attacking German troops on the ground.
Of course when the boot was on the other foot from 8 Aug 18 onwards when the German Armee's were being forced relentlessly back - there was no like sacrifice on the part of the Jadgstafflen.
Tactics - one WW2 pilot said the prevailing tactics were the opinion of the Squadron commander at the time. What should not be missed is that British Offensive Patrol's were just that and British formation sought out and pretty well always attacked all German aircraft which could be closed with. Often without any finess. The problem was that in late 16 & early 17 the avaerage British scout lacked the horse power to routinely get above German scouts so as to gain the best advantage in attack - this was compounded by half the firepower which meant they could only achieve half the effective fire potential of the German scouts.
With the advent of the 200hp SE5a in particular and Camel's to a lesser extent from mid 17 onwards - British patrols could get above German formations and then dictate terms. The Dolphin also enjoyed this advantage in 1918.
On the other side of the coin, it is clear from British reports that Jasta formations would willingly accept combat - even at a height disadvantage - up to the middle of 1917. Thereafer they became more - to use the RFC venacular - 'Hunish.' Unwilling to accept combat without advantages of height or numbers - preferring dive and zoom attacks on formations or shaddowing them with aim of pouncing on stragglers. Not pretty but effective,
A common German Jasta tactic was to fly an upper & lower patrol. Usually three machines would fly in front and below the remainder of the Jasta formation - usually 5 to 6 machines. In part the lowere patrol were on lookout for Corps machines - 3 aircraft being the best number for attacks, as any more would see macines getting in each others way. Two would distract the observer while the 'kanon' would close in from behind and below. The second aim was to act as bait for British scouts. Once attacked the Lower flight would melt away and the Upper patrol would strike with advantage of height. I think it was a good tactic and many an inexperienced Brit scout pilot paid for taking the bait.
But certainly as 1917 progressed British flights would go out in pairs and co-operate. 1 Squadron foe example always sent out two flights at same time: one on Northern patrol and the other on Southern patrol over the salient, the two often meeting over the central salent. Jasta's also clearly co-operated from an early stage. It is interesting for example how Jasta 4 nearly always appears in Jasta 11's combats in April & May quite some time before creation of JG I.
I think the problem the German's had was not a lack of courage but a lack of recources - I'm ceratain both at Jasta level & Kofl level they knew they could not absorb the attrition an offensive air war would entail - not so much pilots but machines. By fighting over their own side they could better manage attrition but at the same time they surrendered the inituative.
Time as always against me.
Cheers Russ.