Quote:
Originally Posted by steven brown
Sagittarius,
Thanks for your thoughts. I was not saying that the Jastas should have been as aggressive as the British, and in my first post of this thread, I expressed my surprise at how well they held on in late 1917, but I do feel that they should have intervened more often over the front lines to disrupt the British gun spotters and ground strafers. I understand that their resources were limited and that they were doing what they felt they must, but the RFC attacks on the German ground troops were very distructive. It accomplishes nothing to save resources if you lose. Maybe I just do not realize how bad their supply situation was. I have not yet read much about 1918, but it seems the Jastas were much more aggressive then, at least on the French/American front.
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I think Mr. Bristol made an excellent point, Sir, here in an earlier post:
"The R.F.C. and temporarily the R.N.A.S. squadrons 'on loan' were tied inexorably into the British army tactical stance which was offensive orientated. (not surprising as the R.F.C. WAS army) This resulted in an offensive doctrine which was without doubt Trenchards---but which linked seamlessly (how could it not) with overall army tactics, and indeed Strategy."
This applies to German aerial operations, and jagdstaffel operations, as well. German orientation on the Western Front was defensive, as the Germans had gains in hand from the very beginning, and Allied forces were doing a very good job of bleeding themselves white in futile offensives. German aerial practice linked seamlessly into overall tactics and strategy as well. English airmen did what they were ordered and organized to do, and so did German airmen.
It should be appreciated that division of labor in the German air service differed somewhat from that in the R.F.C., and entailed more division into specialities. The jagdstaffel were conceived as interceptor units, to rise and meet and defeat penetrations into German territory. Escort and ground attack work was handled by different formations, equipped with two-seat machines, eventually of the CL class, which were equivalent in performance and handling to single-seat machines, in the style of the Bristol Fighter. Just because jagdstaffel were not performing these tasks does not mean they were not being carried out, and with some effectiveness.
In any case 'trench fighting' was extremely hazardous for the airmen. It has been a while since I read through Mr. Gould-Lee's memoir, but I recall his account of ground attack work at Cambrai describes being shot down several times, and confesses that the work scared the dickens out of him. It was determined by studies during the war that four hundred feet was the optimum height for a man on the ground with a rifle or machine gun to shoot accurately at an aeroplane, and in ground attack work, a pilot was pretty much operating right around that 'sweet spot'.