Quote:
Originally Posted by steven brown
Old Man,
Once again a comment of yours has cleared the muddle of my half informed impressions. Until now it had escaped my attention that the purpose of the Jastas was to be intercepters defending the rear areas. That would explain MvR's comment about letting the customer into the shop, and also explain the Jastas not penetrating British airspace on a regular basis. I guess my next question would be wheather this strategy changed in 1918. I believe that the German army adopted a defensive stance from the end of Verdun until the spring of 1918 when they went over to the offense. Would it be true to say the same for the Jastas?
Your debate with Bristol about the overall picture of the war is quite interesting. I think I'll wait for the two of you to break a few more lances before I foolishly express my opinion.
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Mr. Bristol and I will break no more lances on the matter, Sir. He is quite right that we will neither persuade the other, nor find much common ground. The question broke governments when it was a current matter, and we will not settle it here, and so should agree to disagree and leave it at that.
I appreciate your kind words towards my comments, which I consider to be pretty general, and which are based on secondary sources and the usual memoirs only. There are certainly people here vastly better informed than me on most any topic, and certainly on German fighter operations.
The principal aerial feature from the German side during their offensives in the spring of 1918 was intense activity by the ground attack units, the Schlachtsaffeln, equipped with CL class machines by Halberstadt and Hannoveranner. These operated in mass formations of a couple of dozen machines (at least that was the doctrine), and down low enough that standard stick grenades were their usual 'bombs'. Their 'beatings up' of ground troops had appreciable effect, and their actions were every bit as aggressive as anything done by English fighters during the retreat of their forces.
The operations of the jagdstaffeln must have altered to some degree in the fluid situation. During the static period, they were wired in to a system of front-line observers who reported the appearance of Allied aeroplanes by telephone to their fields. This system must have broken down during the advance, and flights towards active patches would seem indicated instead. On the other hand, the need to conserve fuel must have provided a check to flights 'on spec' that might not encounter anything. There must have been a great deal of improvisation and muddle, whatever the orders and doctrines were. Rapid advance can be nearly as disorganizing as rapid retreat, especially when all involved are used to immobility.