"A formation battle this side of the lines is often more successful, because an enemy can be forced to land. Formation fights on the other side are the most difficult, especially with an east wind. Then, the commander must not stick ridgidly to his plan, for he will face great losses."
Manfred von Richthofen
Never a truer word, and of course it was the lot of the RFC/RNAS/RAF to fight formation battles on the German side with the prevailing west wind.
Old Man - I wasn't taking a shot, merely using your comment as a springboard to push the point that the air war was inexorably linked to the ground war. Although I try to keep away from the higher politics of WW1 - I pretty well concur with most of what you write.
As to point on losses April & Sep 17 - I think we all need to remember that individual battalions on the ground were suffering more casualties in one day of these offensives than the RFC / RNAS were to suffer during the these months as a whole. This might sound a little cold, but when viewed from this perspective, then it is clear that the men at the top were prepared to take the air losses, when balanced against the fruits of their operations.
One thing about September was that whilst RFC losses were indeed high, the fighters & fighter recon did far, far, more real damage to the Fleigertruppe than in April. And if I remember correctly, there was an argument between some in KOFL 4 and MvR around Sep 17 as to whether barrage patrols should be mounted to deny the RFC German airspace. Because its was all very nice for the gentlemen of of the Jadgstafflen to scoring victories, but these are worthless if they fail to relieve the pressure on their hard fighting ground troops by denying the RFC free reign over German territory.
Another problem with the later 1917 battles is that the German's claiming standards on 4 Armee front were lower than those on 6 Armee front during Mar - May, which I feel deluded them into believing they were doing more damage than they actually were. That they were somehow still prevailing as they had in April (actually March - May) when in reality they had surrendered the inituative.
And if I may I will offer a personal critism of the Jadgstafflen - I get the feeling that too many of its pilots were seduced by the personal prestige gained by scoring victories, at the expense of doing their duty in regards supporting their hard fighting ground troops.
Steve - Although in his orders, Ludendorff called on the Jadgstafflen to operate offensivly on the Allied side during the Spring offensive - I can assure you that the Jadgstafflen never intuated even one formation battle over the British side of the lines.
Cheers Russ.