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Originally Posted by RussGannon
Old Man - I wasn't taking a shot, merely using your comment as a springboard to push the point that the air war was inexorably linked to the ground war. Although I try to keep away from the higher politics of WW1 - I pretty well concur with most of what you write.
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Understood, Sir. I did want to clear it up, though, particularly as your favorite 'fighting word' had been employed. I quite agree with you about the scale of the aerial losses by compare to what the men on the ground suffered, and I expect that was felt by many of the airmen themselves. Many airmen's memoirs show a keen appreciation for the predicament of the infantry, and sometimes even a tinge of embarrassment at their own greater comfort in comparison.
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Originally Posted by RussGannon
One thing about September was that whilst RFC losses were indeed high, the fighters & fighter recon did far, far, more real damage to the Fleigertruppe than in April. And if I remember correctly, there was an argument between some in KOFL 4 and MvR around Sep 17 as to whether barrage patrols should be mounted to deny the RFC German airspace. Because its was all very nice for the gentlemen of of the Jadgstafflen to scoring victories, but these are worthless if they fail to relieve the pressure on their hard fighting ground troops by denying the RFC free reign over German territory.
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I have one of Mr. Kilduff's books on the Rittmeister, Sir, and your comment jogged me into digging it out. Apparently this was an on-going conflict with a Hauptmann Otto Bufe, the aviation attache on 4th Armee staff, from the arrival of Richthofen and his new Geschwader on that front. Mr. Kilduff cites at length a letter of 18 July written by Richthofen from hospital to a confidant on the Kogenluft staff, complaining of Bufe's orders for barrage patrols, and how these are being pressed on the acting commander of JG1 during his absence. It should be remembered that from Haupt. Boelcke on down, the 'sperreflug' was considered a discredited tactic among active German fighter pilots, and they regarded it as something only a man clinging to the past would set the slightest stock in. Richthofen was being a perfectly orthodox fighter pilot in decrying this, the only difference being he had the prestige to disregard the orders, and press directly to higher headquarters for their suppression. It is worth noting that in his initial address to the staffel leaders of JG1, Richthofen reportedly stated the unit's priorities would be "annihilation' of enemy trench-strafers, single-seaters, and bombers. That would seem to be well in line with what you feel they ought to have been doing, and perhaps had he not been sidelined by Lt. Woodbridge, shooting from a 'pre-historic packing crate' only a few days later, Richthofen might have set an example during that summer that would have altered the pattern of German fighter operations somewhat.
I agree with your point, though, that some German fighting leaders and pilots may have placed too much emphasis on the rewards of prestige reaped by simple number of victories. Of course, it would be easy to believe that any destruction of enemy machines must work to the assistance of the men in the trenches, so the thing could readily co-exist with a feeling of doing every bit of their duty to their infantry comrades. Certainly the French had some similar problems with their fighter pilots, perhaps exacerbated by the fact that it was not just medals but sometimes money awards from private funds that were secured by a tally of victories (at least until the end of 1917 when the practice was abolished).