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I've been following the debates on this thread and the one that budded from it with great interest. In addition to a wealth of knowledge about ground attack operations and the spring 1918 offensives, a larger point has also been made. By the summer of 1917, the GAF seems to have lost the initiative, and other that the occasional resurgance, never regained it. Rumani has done a wonderful job explaining the doctrine/organization and the physical travails of the GAF and gives these as explanation for the GAF defensive posture. While these have great importance and contributed to the GAF failure, others, most notably Russ and Bristol, argue that an overlooked factor was the aggression and competency of the RFC/RAF. Faced with a skillful and tenacious foe, the GAF found it's ability to infuence the ground battle severly limited. The Jastas still defended vigorously, the aerial losses on both sides in summer and fall of 1918 show that, but the RFC/RAF had gained a position of unarguable domination mainly through their own efforts, not because of some resource difficulties faced by the GAF. This is what I've taken from the posts of Russ and Bristol. Have I got your arguments right gentlemen?
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