Originally Posted by Old Man
This conversation, Gentlemen, has taken a turn which requires me to rise in defense of l'Aviation Militaire.
First, some raw casualty figures. French flying personnel killed or missing totaled 5,533, it being unclear whether 'missing' here means still missing after the war or posted missing during it. Working with some partial figures, it seems a reasonable estimate about a quarter of the deaths ocurred away from the front. Men posted missing roughly equaled men known dead at the front, and what proportion of that number might have survived in captivity is hard to estimate, but is likely to be less than a fifth of the total, judging by the proportion of survivors in the tallies of various well-known ace fighter pilots. In the last six full months of fighting (May to October, 1918), 589 French flying personnel died at the front, and 539 were posted missing, or fully a fifth of the total French losses, and likely a quarter of all French aviation losses at the front.
I am inclined to regard some of the German airmen's comments regarding the French with a dubious eye, for several reasons. German propaganda lines during the Great War treated England as the chief enemy, and France as her dupe and tool. German popular and military culture subsequent to the Franco-Prussian War regarded France and Frenchmen as inferior to Germans, and in doing so built on patterns of hatred solidified in the Napoleonic period and dating back to even earlier enmities and times when German lands were the battlefields of French wars and many German princes French pawns. Where statements jibe closely with cultural predispositions and official lines, it is best to take them with a bit of salt. Certainly Udet's account of his time opposing French fighters early in his career does not reflect the tone of the statements adduced above, but rather is positively doom-struck in its somberness. It is worth point out, too, that any number of English or French fliers can be quoted describing German fliers in similarly disparaging terms: if all this is to be taken at face value, everyone but the English were cowardly, and the English fool-hardy to a ludicrous extreme.
Several reasons why French casualties in the air do run somewhat lower than those of the English can be readily discerned.
One is simply that the French never operated at the sort of technical disadvantage that hampered the English from the latter months of 1916 into the middle of 1917. French fighters in that period were outgunned, but they were not out-performed, and this certainly translated into lower losses both for fighters and reconnaisance machines, even though in this period French corps reconnaisance machines certainly were as obsolete as the English.
Another is that, commencing with the Somme offensive, German air strength was concentrated against the English. With the Mutiny following the collapse of Neville's Chemin des Dames offensive, and the consequent cessation of offensive activity in French sectors for many months, this tendency solidified. Obviously, where there is less opposition, there will be fewer casualties, and for that matter, fewer victories, and that would be the case even if very aggressive behavior was displayed: it would mostly strike empty air.
A further reason is that French tactical patterns differed from the English. The English were alone in their aerial doctrine of deep offensive patrols, and even those who agree this brought benefits worth the price will not deny the great price paid in casualties for those benefits. French fighter escadrilles divided their efforts into long-range patrols and escort flights and barrier flights, a pattern regularized with separate sections within the escadrille. During the quiescent period of 1917, very little deep reconnaisance penetration was undertaken, as there was no purpose to it.
A more subtle reason, perhaps, is the French practice of creaming off their best fighter pilots into elite units. There is no denying this practice has a detrimental effect on the average fighting efficiency of regular units, leaving them with less aggressive and less skilled personnel, and this will tend to result not only in less victories, but in less casualties.
The significance of the casualty figures given above for the period of May to October, 1918, however, seems to me that these reflect a period in which the French army was fully recovered from the 'soldiers' strike' of mid-1917, and actively engaged in battle, including major offensive actions. That the French air arm was similarly engaged seems borne out by its butcher's bill....
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