[Old Man]

Originally Posted by bristol

Hi Old Man,
I am always disinclined to 'take with a pinch of salt' the words that were said at the time, and the disparaging remarks regarding the French aircrew ought not to be dismissed as entirely the result of race hatred going back to Napoleonic times.
Dave.

I think, Sir, that you underestimate here the power of official views and cultural predisposition in shaping the views of persons enclosed by them. History abounds in instances where the descriptions of participants concerning events are not borne out by cooler examination of the circumstances at some distance in time, employing accounts from all sides and facts on record unavailable to the participating commentators. I repeat that French fliers' accounts of German airmen describe them as unwilling to cross the lines, unwilling to engage save at great advantage, and liable to break off combat at the slightest provocation, and in short accuse them of cowardice and a character quite inferior to the French. I am no more inclined to take these comments as definitive in that direction than I am in the other.

Originally Posted by bristol

The very reasons you use to explain lower French casualties can also be used to puzzle over their lack of aggression------French fighters not out-performed should have enabled many more French pilots to become 'aces'-----especially as you mention that from the Somme offensive German fighter strength (and quality) was 'concentrated against the English'-----yet the battle of Verdun was hotly contested until December! surely, given real aggression on behalf of the French in their not out-performed aeroplanes it would have been harder for the Germans to transfer squadrons onto the Somme front-----Dave.

I would dispute your main point here, Sir, that Verdun was 'hotly contested until December'. That is not the case, either on the ground or in the air. Verdun was an offensive on the part of the Germans, and by July had clearly failed in its execution. Once it was obvious the battle was not going to achieve the general collapse of French forces that was its goal, the German command attached a far higher priority to maintaining the line at the Somme than to holding the inconsequential ground gained at Verdun, and the latter was starved of reinforcements and equipment of all sorts. Bitter fighting still occurred on the ground, as the French placed a high premium of rolling back those German gains, but it was a subsidiary matter from the German point of view, and wholly written off at the strategic level by August.

Treating simply the aerial element, the concentration of German air equipment at the Somme, largely an English show, left the French airmen somewhat short of opponents in their areas of responsibility. Superiority of equipment, even high aggressiveness, will not produce a great many victories in such a situation. To illustrate from an extreme situation some years later, Japanese fighter pilots operating over China in 1939 and 1940 scored relatively few aerial victories, though they had greatly superior equipment and operated in a highly aggressive style: there simply were not that many Chinese aircraft left, and these actively attempted to avoid engagements.

Another point which should be recognized is the great expansion of the air arms and increased tempo of aerial operations as the war progressed. The air elements deployed to Verdun while it was active were much smaller than those concentrated even at the later stages of the Somme, and dwarfed by later concentrations. Air forces in 1917 were much larger than in 1916, and stupendously larger in 1918.

Originally Posted by bristol

I don't feel you should be reticent about calling it a Mutiny, as opposed to 'soldiers strike'--and i don't agree that the French army was 'fully recovered'.
Dave.

I am not reticent about referring to the events of spring and summer in 1917 as a mutiny, but employed 'soldier's strike' in my second reference because it seems as accurate a description as well. One of the main slogans of the rebellious soldiery was 'we'll hold the line but we won't attack!' Personally, Mr. Bristol, I have a great respect for the French mutineers, and view their action as one of the bright spots of the human spirit in the carnage of the Great War. The incompetence of French military leadership, and the high-handedness with which discipline was enforced, can only be described as murderous in degree. They squandered lives to no purpose and shot men out of hand for no good reason to cover their systemic bungling. The men were right and the officers wrong. To rise against the whole of military discipline is not an act of cowardice, but rather a great display of courage. What those men rebelled against had to be checked.

Originally Posted by bristol

No one is castigating the French aircrews---but i feel some stronger efforts might have gone a long way towards easing the burden on the R.F.C./R.A.F.----it was after all a coilition war
.Dave.

It was indeed a coalition war, Sir, and the coalition was an uneasy one. Common French comment on the English effort, certainly in the first half of the conflict, would curl your hair: among other things, it was widely felt the English held back in hopes of seeing France bled white so that it could after the war take advantage of French weakness. Even a man of the force of M. Clemenceau could not wholly disregard the widely felt popular bitterness toward England in his war policy. Deployment of the French air service to direct support of English efforts would have had to have been a decision at the highest levels of government; it was not even within the reach of the chief of the air service. Domestic politics would not have allowed it; the government which ordered it would have been collapsed within the week.

Originally Posted by bristol

Perhaps that doctrine of aggression worked after all for the 'fool hardy' British.

Dave.

Let me take this as an opportunity, Sir, to clarify both my interests in and my views on this larger subject of operational doctrine. What interests me most about aerial operations in the Great War is that they posed a wholly new problem, for which there were no obviously relevant precedents to look to for guidance. The major combatants each came up with different solutions, and these were subjected to the trial of combat. I am not so much interested in who came up with the 'right' solution, but in why each felt at the time it had the 'right' solution. Thus I will try and present the circumstances around the various decisions, and the reasoning behind them, to the best of my understanding, anyway, rather than attempting to press a case that one or another was clearly right or clearly wrong. At the time, I do not think that was very clear, whatever clarity may have emerged subsequently on the question. For certainly the real 'air power' war, the Second World War, did largely demonstrate the validity of the operational pattern of the English, at least in regards to fighter operations. Although an impish inclination to devil's advocacy moves me to point out that the first pure air battle of that war, the Battle of Britain, was won by the R.A.F. employing an operational pattern much more reminiscent of that employed by the Germans in the Great War than that of the Royal Flying Corps....