Quote:
Originally Posted by bristol
Well----let me see now,
Whilst not accepting your thoughts on my estimating abilities--and feeling very strongly that you yourself underestimate my breadth of historical Knowledge and perspective-------i never once used the word--nor did i imply it, nor did i ever allude to your 'definitive'.
I merely used words (hence thoughts) like "ought not to be dismissed" !
On Verdun, well as late as October (24th.) a 'massive French blow, using170,000 men, 711 guns and 150 aircraft retook fort Douaumont---that must have been ---something!
Then again--now December (15th.) in three days of bitter fighting, on a six mile front, the French took 11,000 prisoners, 115 guns and hundereds of machine guns and mortars----sounds pretty 'hot' ---and this is December---Verdun 'officially' ended on December 18th. How was it that the German air services were able to concentrate on the Somme---a bit more French aggression--mirroring what was happening on the ground, could not have hurt the British hard pressed, with not that many aircraft that were 'not out-performed' ?
As for notions that the men knew better than the Generals--well that is one of the 'futility' myths that are so prevalent still---for some obscure reason! I have heard it in many guises--the private--or worse still, the corporal bellyaching about how the war (any war) is being run--and how, if 'they' would only consult him--it would all be sorted out, in victory of course, in double quick time! Or (in a later war that you mention) how a junior officer like Douglas Bader could 'intrique' against his superiors with his notions on how to fight the Battle of Britain. I have heard it in Industry---who, working in that, or similar environments has'nt heard the shop floor worker recounting to anyone who will listen, how he knows better than the management how to do things? Any argument based on 'the men were right and the officers wrong' 'squandering the lives of their men does not go very far indeed in my book!
As for 'holding the line but not attacking' which i know of of course---well, what did that mean--leave the Germans in possession of most of your country until.....what? Until the Americans come in sufficient numbers to save us--which is exactly what the British are already bleeding trying to do...? I don't have much respect for an attitude that amounts to 'youv'e raped my wife and are living in half my house---but if you don't attempt to rape her again anytime soon, or try to take the little bit of my house left to me, i won't try to push you out!!!!!
And one might be forgiven for imagining that as it was France that had an occupying enemy on it's ground, and notwithstanding the fact that of course France shouldered the main burden from 1914 to16 (a point i never get tired of mentioning here) France nevertheless knew fine well that Britains tiny peace time army could involve itself only in smaller actions until the 'new' armies were up and running--and Britain and it's Dominions thereafter gave that 'last full measure' right up to the end.
The Battle of Britain was fought in a way that was, in a very real sense, dictated by the simple fact that France surrendered and German bases suddenly, and almost overnight, superceded the French ones----indeed the very architects of that defensive victory were very quickly ousted for what was deemed a more 'offensive reaching out' doctrine---and we need look no further than Montgomery's victory in the western desert to realise that it was massively aided and abetted by fighter, fighter/bomber and light bombers selfless heroism in attacking Rommels lines, and communications.
Indeed a straight, and short journey back to those trench strafers of the R.F.C./R.A.F.
Dave.
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I meant nothing personal nor disparaging by the comment, Sir. We put different weights on things, in several areas, and all I meant was that I place more weight on the shape culture imposes than you seem to. Obviously, I feel I am correct in this, just as you feel your weighting of such factors is the correct one. You would be correct to infer from my closing comment above that I do have a weakness for devil's advocacy, and am engaged on this line partly because someone has to present a case for the French air service here. There remains a sizeable void, certainly in English, regarding French aerial activity in the Great War, making it difficult to assess in the round.
Regarding the final stages of Verdun, the actions you mention were major French offensive efforts, but were not major German defensive efforts. They were delivered against a fought-out force. Douamont, by the time it was retaken, was a shattered shell, wrecked by an explosion of its magazines caused by careless handling of munitions, rather than a functioning fortification. These attacks were what made Neville's reputation, and in their artillery preparations particularly set the pattern for the debacle at Chemin des Dames.
While we certainly will not come to agreement on the value of the French offensives in the early period of the Great War, I do stand by my characterization. They gained nothing; worse, they contributed mightily to the wreck of the French army while gaining nothing. The doctrines and attitudes of the French high command at the start of the war were nothing less than ludicrous; military leaders who decide in essence that the supreme weapon is the bayonet at the same time the machine-gun and the heavy howitzer are going into mass production cannot be castigated too strongly. The idea that offensive action must succeed, and that if it does not, that is due solely to lack of ardor among the troops, is simply criminal in its blindness and foolishness. I agree with you that the French soldiery displayed admirable, almost transcendent fighting spirit in the early years of the war, and I blame the G.Q.G. for squandering that, to the point that what was left of it took for its proper target its own leaders.
I will close by adducing a few more figures relating to French aerial combat (like the others above, taken from "A History of French Military Aviation" by Christienne and Lissarrague).
The first is the official French compilation of combat results for the immediate period of the Chemin des Dames offensive, between April 6 and April 25, 1917. In this span of time the French claimed to have shot down 72 German aeroplanes, while losing 33 of their own. Of the German machines claimed, 63 were fighters, and 43 of those were said to have come down 'within French lines', while of the 9 observation machines claimed, only one was said to have come down in the French lines. Of the French losses acknowledged, 17 were fighters, with 10 of them going down behind the German lines, and 16 were observation machines, with 6 of these going down behind the German lines. I take the number of claimed German fighters with considerable salt, and have no explanation for the high proportion said to have come down within French lines: someone with more expertise than I on German fighter operations may perhaps weigh in here. I do, however, consider it worth noting that among the French fighter losses, which figures probably are accurate, a solid majority were lost in German territory.
The second set of numbers are overall figures for the Group de Chasse 15, commanded by Maj. Menard, during April and May of 1917 at the Chemin des Dames and vicinity. In this period, the several escadrilles of the unit flew 3,000 sorties, and reported 700 combats, two thirds of these over German territory. 52 victories were claimed, and 21 pilots lost. Again, I have no idea what the victory claims are worth, but feel reasonably sure the reports of the locations of combat are reliable.