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If one wanted to play devil's advocate, one could argue that the German strategic and tactical approaches to air power in WWI were fundamentally flawed in that the German High Command showed little or no interest in innovation in this regard. With the exception of the Ostend Carrier Pigeons and their successors (who were, IMHO, badly handled on a tactical level), the Germans introduced no new ideas during the war. All of their tactics were reactive, and this in spite of having taking the offensive with more success during the first two years of the war.
Almost all innovative practises from the Great War were brought about by the Allies. (And while I admire the organizational skills that created and manned the jastas and schlastas, remember that both the formation of exclusive single-seater units and the use of aircraft in support of ground attacks were pioneered by the RFC.)
This in no way disses the German airmen, who performed admirably under difficult circumstances. But even if, as I do, you argue that air power had next to no real impact on the war, it seems obvious on close study that in most aspects of strategy and tactics the Germans were followers, even if they did improve on many of the ideas they borrowed.
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