Jasta 52 and the Pfalz D.IIIa

[Kirk R. Lowry]

Bonjour mes amis!

Fascinating comments!

I am particularly interested in the summary of assumed tactics used by Jasta pilots, Russ, which corresponds with descriptions given by R.F.C. and R.A.F. pilots of the frustrations experienced.

As for the specifics of the effectiveness of Jasta 52, I suspect that it was the skill of Billik, rather than the traits of an Albatros or a Pfalz, that were responsible for success achieved.

Salut!
Kirk

[Doug Baumann]

the Brits GAVE a glowing endorsment of the Pfalz DIII and wondered why the Germans didn't use them more. I wonder what the English seen in the PFALZ that the Germans didnt see??? One English pilot said I never seen a enemy plane dive so fast and steeply and was not out of control!! Did the pfalz have a good roll rate which made direction change faster but lower turn rate just like the fw190?? well just a though

[Akaalias]

I originally posted this thread because I was curious to find out why Jasta 52 was reasonably succesful with the Pfalz D.IIIa and if tactics played a part in determining success in jastas with a complement of Pfalz and Albatros, as distinct from jastas with a single type of aircraft.

From what I've picked up so far, it would seem that the Pfalz wasn't at a disadvantage when appropriate tactics were adopted - examples were given by Russ and JG. These tactics could be applicable if a jasta contained both Pfalz and Albatros, although it would seem that Billik of Jasta 52 was the major driving force of his jasta's success, rather than the mix of aircraft he had under his command. However I'm still not sure where the agility of the Alabtros (and the supposed lack of agility of the Pfalz) fits into the scheme of things for the tactics advocated in earlier posts.

It does appear that a mix of aircraft wasn't all that important.

Does this sound feasible, or am I barking up the wrong tree?

Cheers,
A

[RussGannon]

Hi guys

Kirk I think I meant to get back to you in regards another thread. Apology for that. Certainly Billik was the driving force - after he was captured, you could be excused for thinking the DVII equipped Jasta 52 shut up shop. Indeed Billik downed more quality opposition than MvR & Voss combined! Unlike those champions of the 'happy time' of late 16 early 17, in mid 1918 he and his Pfalz unit had to fight with cunning for their victories. Of course he had a good aprentieceship with Js 12 & Js 7.

Cheers Russ

[Kirk R. Lowry]

Russ

I had hesitated to comment on the subject under consideration believing that, while the aircraft had different attributes, neither was outright superior to the other. Yet Billik must be regarded as a superior airman. An unusual (though not uncommon) situation: a superb record, but, a lack of celebrity.

Ironically Billik is probably most renown for not earning the Pour le Merité!

Once again Russ I applaud the observations made on tactics employed by the Jastas. Frankly the difference in the perception of combat in the later days of the conflict between the opponents has proved baffling at times ... how could each be correct ... the analysis provided would seem to support both visions. It would be most interesting to find documentation of the development and application of such methods ...

Salut mon ami!
Kirk

[RussGannon]

Kirk

Good points. The problem as I see is that the extant German record is rather one dimensional - the loss of so much of their official record leaves too few accurate windows to the German side of the air war. Barely 150 CR's, (MvR, Boelcke, Goering, Jacobs & a few more), a few great diaries like those of Jacobs, Strahle & Rausch, bits of Mai's flight log, letters by Tutschek & Bohme etc, etc. A lot of the inter war stuff - by Stark, Udet, Lothar, etc is too coloured and tainted by hindsight to be considered truly accurate windows. Beyond that just lists of victories and incomplete lists of losses. Together it can, and I believe has, led to an unrealistic 'Hollywood' style perception, often presented in near banal terms of good guys & bad guys. The German's very much being the 'good guys' in the eyes of many north American enthusiasts. I wrote a piece to OTF back about 1996 called the 'Jasta Myth' in which I expounded my views, that the then prevailing Germanophile perceptions of the air war where based on incomplete German records and consequently well wide of the mark. I mean you would read people extolling Jasta 11; stating it shot down 350 Allied aircraft for the loss of only 17 pilots! It's earned me eternal damnation.

As a consequence, as I see it, the better preserved 'original' British record (CR's SRB's & Communiques) which provide the best and most insightful window to the airfighting. Sure the British & Dominion pilots overclaimed (made too many over optimistic damage assessments), but this is no reason or justification for ignoring the British record - as some Germanophiles I know, are want to moot (largely because it does not sit well with their romanticised perceptions).

And even at times, when it might seem to a perochial eye, that I have an axe to grind with the Germans - this is not correct - you should see some of my research projects - want to know anything about Panzer Divisions? I really respect their efforts air, land & sea in both wars. But these efforts need to be placed in perspective and not trumped up by those who fall prey to hero worship. That is my axe to grind.

Cheers Russ

[FlyXwire]

As a sidenote, in the short years that computer flight simulations have been attempting to replicate the air war over the Western Front, and with varying degrees of success, some German fighters have not faired well when combat engagements have approach neutral terms. As an example, the Fokker Dr.I, by virtue of its comparatively lower top speed and reduced range, has faired poorly when virtual pilots have attempted to use it as an intruder. Without the Fokker Triplane being used within the doctrinal limits prescribed, its deficiencies as a balanced fighter became apparent. This in turn set forth efforts to 'correct' those parameters that were perceived to have been incorrectly configured within the Triplane's computer flight modeling, so that the aircraft could perform up to the renown of its historical reputation. The fact is, the Fokker Dr.I was being fought in simulations without respect to the tactical realities of the period, and as dictated by historical, doctrinal, and performance limitations prescribed.

It has often been said that an average combat aircraft flown by a superb pilot could best a superior performing aircraft flown by a less accomplished opponent, and this is undoubtedly true. To a degree though, this spoke to the discipline of the expert pilot of knowing how to fight his aircraft to its fullest, but even more so, in his knowing how not to fight his aircraft to its disadvantage. However, in virtual simulations, where grinding circles and chasing after an enemy's tail offered the simplest test of man against man, and machine against machine, the art of vertical air fighting; the use of the slashing diving attack became less practiced. In this regards, it can be demonstrated how important tactical training became in the later years of the Great War, as formation flying and engagement routines required as much discipline of a unit's pilots to adhere to, as learning how to skillfully dogfight their aircraft to the fullest might have been desired.

In an era where the differential in the maximum aircraft speeds (on the level) of the protagonist fighters was on the order of 20-25 mph, the ability to close with the enemy was going to be determined more by gaining altitude superiority over ones opponents, and using the energy of diving to get within firing range. As has been mentioned already in this thread, the Entente fighters such as the S.E. 5a, the Spads, the Bristol Fighter, and the Camel were all robust enough to practice diving attacks without undue worry of airframe integrity. Combined this with good straight line performance and operational range, and it can be appreciated how the British, American, and to a lesser extent the French routinely pursued the enemy, and on his side of the lines.

[RussGannon]

FlyXwire

Your comments are very interesting. They tend to confirm what I have deduced looking at the DR1 in a fight by fight basis. That the Dr1 was not overly successful in traditional dogfights against fighters like SE5's & Camel's. As noted previously, its greatest success against fighters, was over those on low missions.

I'm not into computer games in a big way - though I have dabbled. As I see it from a purely historical stance; fighters have three atributes - firepower, horsepower (power to weight) and maneouvrabilty. However I feel the last is given too high priority in the minds of our fraternity in regards scoring victories. I think it was more of a defensive asset. Firepower & horse power mixed with tactics was the key. And the desired tactic was to bounce one's enemy - surprise from above. And when you read contemporary reports patrols of both sides spent quite a lot of time & effort in trying to bounce the opposition.

In line with this I like to pose that there were three phases to a fighter v fighter dogfight. The attack, the dog-fight and the dispersal. And in my view the greatest amount of 'real kills' were gained in the first and last phase. Once the dogfight proper started it was difficult to remain on anyone's tail for long enough to deal the fatal blow. The dispersal phase overlaps the dogfight phase and entails aircraft that left the fighting.

This is the phase which in my view causes the problems with modern perceptions. For the Jasta pilots fighting over their own lines, it was easy to quit the fight when hit, or simply outfought, by diving or spinning away - Lothar I think uses the euphamism of 'going down stairs'. As state in an earlier thread, they knew they were unlikely to be followed. This in turn led to the plethora of OOC by the British. Likewise they were unlikely to be finished off. You might say an OOC was half a victory. For the British pilot the opposite was true - if they dropped out through damage or wounds or simply outfought - they would most certainly be followed down and often finnished off if they continued to make for Allied lines.

Trying to compare relative claims is difficult due to the many vaguries of claim & loss reporting of both sides. However one constant which allows a window are the fatal losses. I number crunched these once and for the period of late 1917 when the Allies were clawing back German air accendency (over their own side) - the RFC/RNAS still had two fighter pilot fatalities for each German fighter fatality in air combat. On these grounds one might think the German's were twice as good, but in reality the discrepancy has more to do with the dispersal phase which allowed the German pilots, by dent of fighting over their own side, a far greater chance of surviving dogfights. One might say double the chance. In truth few if any German pilots of any longevity, were not downed more than once along the way. Few British pilots ever got a second chance.

This in turn leads to the stress factor. Allied pilots in both wars, had tours of duty, as compared to the Germans who fought until they dropped (or were rested when visibly stressed). But in truth the Allied pilot's lot was more taxing with all the stress & strains of having to fight over enemy territory. Pilots came and went more frequently - VM Yeates called them 'here today gone tomorrow folk.' This was less evident in the Jasta's and novice pilots often got a what de Ridder called a 'birthday present' - shot down but unscathed. As a consequence there were more experienced pilots in Jasta's than the average British squadron - and novices were the easiest prey of experienced pilots. That said many British units - particularly SE5's - had flights with high numbers of experienced pilots - McCudden's B Flight is a good example - and they often called the tune over the German side of the lines.

Time running out so I must wind up.

Cheers Russ

[Dan_San_Abbott]

Russ Gannon;
I like your definitions of a combat, "Attack, dog fight and dispersal." Captain René Fonck and Captain E.V.Rickenbacker were exponenents of Attack and dispersal. Niether believe it was wise to engage in a dog fight. In the words of Captain E.V.Rickenbacker, when asked if he engaged in dogfights, he said, "No, the German might be a better pilot!" Hit and run, you live longer.
Slightly blue skies,
Dan-San

[FlyXwire]

Russ,

You could also consider "durability" as one of your fighter attributes. In WWI this would speak directly to airframe strength (such as an aircraft's ability to perform high-G maneuvers like the diving pull-out), and for the WW2 era and later periods to strengths such as armor protection, self-sealing tanks, and things like back-ups for control systems. This also segues nicely into how other weapon system's are judged, such as how armored fighting vehicles are rated; by mobility, firepower, & protection.

Whenever I get the opportunity, I always try to link the online article Aerial Fighting, a short paper written by Captain Arthur Cobby, Australia's leading WWI ace of the Great War. What I find illuminating about Cobby's explanation of air combat tactics, is how he illustrates his own evolution from early dogfighting novice, to that of the deliberating hunter. The article hosted on the Australian Flying Corps website is certainly a good read, and it details an early dogfight where Cobby was engaged in combat with a Pfalz D.III-type too.

Aerial Fighting, by Capt. Arthur Cobby