Jasta 52 and the Pfalz D.IIIa

[Kirk R. Lowry]

Bonjour mes amis

The topic under consideration, that of establishing strategy by implementing tactics will be limited by available documentation and affected by personal prejudice, thus, even the learned opinion will be discounted by, well, those who intend to disagree!

Be that as it may ... Would there be an essence of truth in stating that intention of those in command of the Squadrons was to maximize aggression and of the Jastas to maximize advantage? If so were both combatants applying the correct strategy to the situation? Though having to admit a limited knowledge of the subject I suspect that the answer is yes. Vast masses of aircraft patrolling within the lines would have meant that the tremendous efforts of the British and Commonwealth in respect of training and manufacturing were put to limited use. Hurling the limited numbers of airmen and aircraft available to the German forces at every target would have been a squandering of resources.

Perhaps a simplistic view, but, some seem to ignore the notion that military men can learn from a situation ... of course history, The Great War in particular, is replete with the folly of mistakes repeated, but, I suspect that policy applied to the air services on either side of the front was actually determined after realistically considering the situations.

Salut
Kirk

[Kirk R. Lowry]

Originally Posted by RussGannon

Trying to compare relative claims is difficult due to the many vaguries of claim & loss reporting of both sides. However one constant which allows a window are the fatal losses. I number crunched these once and for the period of late 1917 when the Allies were clawing back German air accendency (over their own side) - the RFC/RNAS still had two fighter pilot fatalities for each German fighter fatality in air combat. On these grounds one might think the German's were twice as good, but in reality the discrepancy has more to do with the dispersal phase which allowed the German pilots, by dent of fighting over their own side, a far greater chance of surviving dogfights. One might say double the chance. In truth few if any German pilots of any longevity, were not downed more than once along the way. Few British pilots ever got a second chance.

This in turn leads to the stress factor. Allied pilots in both wars, had tours of duty, as compared to the Germans who fought until they dropped (or were rested when visibly stressed). But in truth the Allied pilot's lot was more taxing with all the stress & strains of having to fight over enemy territory. Pilots came and went more frequently - VM Yeates called them 'here today gone tomorrow folk.' This was less evident in the Jasta's and novice pilots often got a what de Ridder called a 'birthday present' - shot down but unscathed. As a consequence there were more experienced pilots in Jasta's than the average British squadron - and novices were the easiest prey of experienced pilots. That said many British units - particularly SE5's - had flights with high numbers of experienced pilots - McCudden's B Flight is a good example - and they often called the tune over the German side of the lines.

Cheers Russ

Bonjour Russ

I very much enjoy reading the posts to the thread, but, wish that the information was on paper between covers ...

Are you still typing as a fiend in the library while the sand runs through the glass?

While not believing that a German airman was superior to a British or Commonwealth airman I wonder if, in fact, on the whole, capable pilots were to be found in greater numbers as a percentage in the Jastas than in the Squadrons. We know that often the man arriving to the Jasta had prior experience as a pilot in active service and it would seem that the application of the scientific tactics described would offer a greater chance of survival for those who limited flying to the eastern side of the front. When entering combat for the first time would not a Squadron pilot be at risk of encountering an enemy possessed of prodigious skills?

The stress factor is difficult to quantify. Based on reports and contemporary writing one could state that moral was relatively high for the air services of both the British and the Germans. Notions of suffering tremendous casualties or fighting relentlessly for victory that could never be achieved are to be found in memoirs written after the fact.

Confound it! I have to head off to work. Salut!
Kirk

[FlyXwire]

No doubt Kirk, that the dictates of air doctrine derived from the effort to gain air superiority over the front lines, which was in the main, but not exclusively tied to supporting operations on the tactical battlefields during WWI. The debate continues still today whether the RFC/RAF's doctrine of pursuing a continuous air offensive on the enemy's side of the lines was worth the higher toll it took of their scout pilots, but if this policy is seen in the context of its intention of extending the operational air zone beyond the front lines, and into German-controlled airspace, and in order to gain greater control of the airspace over the immediate battlefield(s), then the logic behind an air doctrine of continuous offensive can be appreciated.

It has been stated many times that the Luftsteitskrafte did not lose the air war over the Western Front, but neither did it win it either, and in a war of attrition both on land and in the air, Germany was not strategically positioned well to win a protracted struggle.

In the subsequent evolution of air war tactics, the seeds for German Blitzkrieg warfare were laid during the Great War, with the creation of Schlachtstaffeln, the ground-attack arm of the Imperial German Air Force, and this was to become the integrated weapon of future offensive thinking developed by Germany between the wars. As has been prostelitize by military minds for centuries, and has been embodied in air offensive doctrine since WWI, the effort to gain air superiority, and eventually air supremacy is ultimately to be won through offensive action, and remaining on the defensive merely a precursor to resuming the attack. The mobile and elite Jagdgeschwadern were indeed utilized to achieve temporary control of the air over the principle German offensives of the last year of WWI, but the tactical mindset of the Luftsteitskrafte's fighter arm remained defensive in nature, and largely fought so in the air.

[R Gannon]

Kirk, Dan San & FlyXwire

Just some quick general points.

Stress factors - contrary to the popular view, SE5's could break up when diving - the loss of Capt Prothero of 56 Sqn was one such incident. I also get the feeling the Sopwith Tripe was a frail machine judging by the relatively high fatality rate in regards losses.

Kirk - my view is that as far as courage & commitement there was no difference between the men of both sides. But certainly the Germans were able to field & maintain higher levels of experienced pilots. I do however feel stres did take its toll. Back in the 90's I ran up a detailed 1 Sqn history which due to conflicting interests never saw the light of day in either of the two premier journals. However one point that came through, was that a high percentage of posted in Flight commanders went down ill. That is to say pilots who had survived (though sometimes wounded) an earlier tour, who were then rested for 6 months or so, then promoted to Capt and returned.
The most successful flight commanders were those who were promoted to the job during their tour. My feeling is that having survived a tour and then experiencing several months of knowing that you would certainly live out the day, ultimately took its toll on many pilots when they returned to the front. They went down ill - cracked up so to speak.

FlyXwire - I spent 14 years of my 20 years in the Aust Army working directly on Tanks (German made Leopards) and my appraisal was derived from the firepower, protection & mobility thing. But as to that point about offensive V defensive and the often truped notion that the German air service won in the air - or at least did not lose. Its an interesting argument which time will prevent me from waxing all my views. But in a nut shell, I don't believe the winner can be determined from a body count - which is the popular Germanophile take. The war in the air was not separate from the ground - and the winner, was the air service who gave the best help and support to those on the ground. And in this I think the British won hands down. the Jastas & the much vaunted JG's NEVER denied German airspace to the British - they could make it costly, but they never really impacted on the support given to the BEF on the ground. Even in the darkest hour of Bloody April (and March for that matter) I can provide exerpts from German regimental histories bemoaning the RFC's dominance over the German front lines and the seeming lack of presence of their own air service. But there's more to this which I will leave to another day. Interested in your views one & all.

Cheers Russ

[Dan_San_Abbott]

Flyxwire:I have wondered at the German mind set, in WW1 and WW2, German pilots remained at the front with periodic leaves until he was, badly wounded and could no longer fly operations or the war ended.* Allied pilots flew tours and was returned to the home front for a period, of res. Then did did a tour as an instructor, with about 6months at home before returning to combat.* The German pilot did his duty the hard way.Blue skies,Dan-San P.S. I actually saw clouds today framed in blue skies!!

[Thomas Trauner]

Well, I´m not really good informed about the differences between the officers and backgrounds in WWI.
But coming to experience for the German side: It indeed was unthinkable just to have "a tour of duty", that´s one point, may be.
But I think that the chain-of-command was different. Esp. in the German army the officer "on the front" had wide ranges of own thinking an decisions. (Contrary to popular belief)
Some of the most "useful" tactics did not came from the staff, but from the frontofficers, even front-NCOs (Stormtroop-tactics, Anti-tank-tactics etc.)
So I think that even an average German officer had much earlier in his career a personally more indepented approach to his "job". As far as I unterstand the bits an pieces I know from the biographies, they indeed very often saw themselfes as the "ringmaster" but of course knowing, there was not much chance to win on the strategic level.
This is at least my way to explain to myself, why there was such a gap between the often told "tactical sucess" the Fliegertruppe had and their strategical defeat.

But I have to add: I really don´t see any difference between the Allied and the Central-Power soldiers. They did what the could and they suffered all.

Thomas

[FlyXwire]

Thanks Dan, their sim is coming along nicely.



As far as the tactical mindset I was referring to above, was the contrast observed between the British and later the American air doctrines employed, and being different to that practiced by the German scouts during the war, of pursuing combat beyond the front lines to project air power into enemy airspace. This was the original concept of screening ground and air operations by pushing fighter patrols forward of the zone of battle, and/or sweeping the airspace ahead of the tactical mission flights they were supporting. In contrast, when the German Army was on the offensive, had achieved breakthroughs, and when the initiative and numbers were often in the favor of the supporting Jagdgeschwadern and Jagdgruppen, these formations were advised not to pursue combat beyond the immediate battle zone, this akin to making barrage patrols of the lines:

(From Manfred v. Richthofen's Air Combat Operations Manual): Meanwhile, the only possibility is to hunt freely in order to make life easier for the infantry. It is understood that hunting freely does not include scouting (for targets) in the areas of neighbouring Armees or in the support area behind the Front; rather, a destruction of the enemy within the closest area over the infantry battelfield and to fly as frequently as it can be done only with one's own Staffeln.

As Russ has also put it (as a critique of German air strategy):

Originally Posted by RussGannon

But in a nut shell, I don't believe the winner can be determined from a body count - which is the popular Germanophile take. The war in the air was not separate from the ground - and the winner, was the air service who gave the best help and support to those on the ground. And in this I think the British won hands down. the Jastas & the much vaunted JG's NEVER denied German airspace to the British - they could make it costly, but they never really impacted on the support given to the BEF on the ground. Even in the darkest hour of Bloody April (and March for that matter) I can provide exerpts from German regimental histories bemoaning the RFC's dominance over the German front lines and the seeming lack of presence of their own air service. But there's more to this which I will leave to another day. Interested in your views one & all.

[R Gannon]

"Our airmen nowhere in sight and the English are cheeky as the devil."
Regimental History II Guards Fusiliers during Second Battle of Bullecourt 5-8 May 1917.

Dan & Dave & all.

My feeling is that because the German 'fighter' approach was defensive, then their pilots were under less stress than their Allied counterparts. The reason being as I highlighted earlier; that formation wise they were in a far better position to avoid formation combats under unfavourable conditions, and even if caught out, the individual could - to use the modern idiom - bug out almost with impunity. The Allied fighter pilots & fighter recon crews first had to negotiate Flak on crossing the lines and then had to accept combat when offered. Moreover when things got ugly, to bug out could be as dangerous as staying and fighting. Then of course it was a return flight back through the angry archie! And this on average two & three times a day. I'm certain it would shred nerves. Add to this the increasing call for Low missions with dangers from both below & above! The Jagdstafflen were never called on for any low or offensive work. So in my view the life of the German fighter pilot, whilst never 100% safe, would have been more endurable.

And again Allied pilots were automatically rested if they survived their tour. But in truth German pilots were rested (usually sent to Kastas) when they showed dangerous signs of strain.

And again I would suggest the 'tactical success' of the Fliegertruppe is largely illusionary based on the blinkered rational of the body count - for in truth they were hard pressed to maintain even air parity over their own airspace. They were often fighting over their own aifields - and in the final months, the RAF were conducting deverstating Wing attacks on those aerodromes with near impunity.

Cheers Russ

[R Gannon]

Guys

Here is a little example which underscores the questionalble tactical success enjoyed by the Jagdstafflen. On 7 Jun 17 the British successfully attacked and captured the strategic Messines Ridge. The artillery preparation for this attack began on 21 May 17 and intensified the week 1 - 7 Jun 17. During the latter British Corps aircraft directed fire on 231 German battaries, conducted 225 trench bombarments and responded to and directed 716 'Zone Call' for artillery support from the infantry. Yet during this whole period the 5 resident Jastas on the sector only attacked Corps aircraft on two occasions (both on 2 June) and did not shoot down a Corps aircraft until the day of the battle - a battle in which German own figures ( 1-7 June)recorded 25,000 cas with 7,000 mia! And in the week 21 May-30 May Gruppe Wytscaete suffered 1,963 cas! The 5 noted Jasta's were involved in much airfighting with fighters & fighter recon - one might say they had their hands full - which I would say represents a British tactical success and a German tactical failure on the part of the Jadgstafflen - who's primary duty was to their own troops on the ground! Who were suffering under artillery fire directed by unchallenged Corps aircraft! But of course if one only looks at the air war in isolation, as is so common in Germanophile circles, then one would not see this, as the balance sheet in the air is tilted towards the Germans.

Cheers Russ

[R Gannon]

For those who are interested.

Another issue on which the tactical success of the Jagdstafflen can be brought into question, is in relation to RAF Wing attacks of late 1918. Mounted with 4 squadrons - three fighter & one Bristol - totalling some 60 aircraft these were launched from 16 July 18 against German areodromes, causing considerable confirmable damage and totally unopposed in the air.

16 Jul 18 - 22 Wing RAF attacked Foucoucourt home of JdGp 10 with Js 34 recording destruction of 2 machines whilst rest damaged - damage to Js 37 not known.

1 Aug 18 - 13 Wing attacked Epinoy home of JdGp 8 a total of 13 a/c destroyed and all but three of the rest damaged (Js 23, Js 32 & Js 35)

13 Aug 18 - 61 Wing attacked Varssenaere home of Marine JG resulting in 17 DVII's dest or severely damaged as well as 6 pilots killed or wounded.

16 Aug 18 - 80 Wing attacked Harbourdin home of JdGp 3 (Js 43 & Js 61) - at least 4 aircraft destroyed and rest damaged. Js 43 out of action until 3 Sep 18.

17 Aug 18 - 80 Wing attacked Lomme and claimed 17 DVII destroyed - Js 40 had 4 DVII destroyed & Degelow states the other Jasta was also badly hit.

19 Aug 18 - 10 Wing attacked Phalemphin resulting in all of Js 30's machines destroyed or damaged!

In effect over 10 Jastas were put out of action for almost nil loss on the British side. Surely if all the contemporary hype surrounding the Jadgstafflen and DVII were to be believed, then one has to ask why these Wing attacks were not confronted - and surprise cannot be used as an excuse, as the Germans had a fairly good early warning set up. Similarly there is no German precident of Jasta's & Schlacta's assailing British aerodromes in a like manner - what little success there was on this score, was achieved at night by the BG's. But it was clear that the lesson was learned in the inter war years, as the Luftwaffe certainly assailed French, British & Russian airfields during the Blitzskriegs.

Any sensible comments welcome.