The ANZACs- myth and reality

[Pete Hill]

Two years ago, Australian author Les Carlyon published 'The Great War', a history of the Australian army's campaign on the Western Front 1916-18. This was the follow-up from his previous companion volume 'Gallipoli', published in 2000, now acclaimed as one of the best books on the Dardenelles campaign.
'The Great War' is a wonderfully written book and Les, who also works as a journalist and commentator on economics and politics down here, has a great gift for bringing people alive in history. The final line of the book surprised me and then made me think. When finally summing up the soldiers of the AIF, he concludes '...and we never really knew them.'
Les has raised an important point. Too often, in this country, the realities and truths of the ANZACs experiences has been clouded, distorted and over-bombarded by legend and myth-making. The industry responsible for the latter is still going strong and every year, on Anzac Day (April 25th), the media still repeats the same tired myths and grand-standing it has been ever since 1918.
Les, in stark contrast to too many other Australian historians, has put the experiences and achievements of Australian troops in proper context, also outlining the same of the other Allied troops. Far too many Aussies still believe that Australian troops were the only ones at Gallipoli, ignoring the fact that French, Indian and English troops suffered far more casualties than we did.
The Anzac legend has built up the Australian soldier of the Great War as being a kind of superhuman and natural-born warriors with no need for any professionalism or spit and polish. One writer, writing in the 1980s, stated with a straight face that the Australians at Gallipoli had proved themselves to be 'the best assault troops in all history'. As one brave critic noted, if that was the case, why did we lose?
One of the cornerstones of the Anzac legend is the incredible conceit, promoted more by journalists and historians than the soldiers themselves, that Australians were the best allied troops of the war. In the late 1990s, one of the last surviving veterans of the Western Front had his thoughts on the war published in one of our major newspapers. The statements he made were ill-informed, arrogant, conceited and xenophobic. He referred to the French as 'cowardly', the English Tommies as 'useless' and the Americans as 'Johnny-come-latelys'. He then went on to claim that the Australians and the Scots were the only soldiers feared by the Germans. Were an international historian to make such statements, he would be shot down in flames quicker than an FE2. But because he was an Anzac (and old), we were required to bow our heads before his words.
Legend and truth rarely like each other. Legend fears truth because it fears the latter takes away all that is worthy of admiration and respect. Not true. You can get a fuller picture of history and still love and admire the people for what they endured. Many of the realities don't match the legend and these are often conveniently not mentioned. Such as the fact that nearly half of the Anzacs who landed at Gallipoli on April 25th 1915 were European-born, mostly from the UK. Another is the fact that the most famous hero of the battle, Private John Simpson who carried wounded men under fire on his little donkey, was actually a Cockney from London's East-end who had only lived in Australia for 4 years before the war started. Another is that the first crucial few hours of the April 25th landing met only light resistance from a small company of Turks and it was confusion, in-experience and hesitation that prevented the Australians from gaining more than a small toe-hold that first day.
If we were such natural warriors, why did the Australian public vote 'NO' in two referendums held during the war on whether we should introduce conscription. Many young men of military age in Australia never joined up and happily endured the hostile stares from passers-by and the white feathers in the mail. By 1918, the flow of replacements to France was down to a trickle and by October, the five Australian divisions were all seriously under-strength. If the war had progressed into 1919, we would have run desperately short of infantry.
The Anzac legend lives on, stronger than ever. Heres to more books like Les' so that we can better understand the real experiences of these men and come to see them as humans like ourselves, not some mythical super-warriors. Maybe we will someday get to know them.

[NeilE]

Hi Peter;

I agree with your interesting post. One of the great challenges of Great War history, whether on the ground, in the air, or on water, is to separate the myths from the facts and realities.

Whilst Les' books are great reads and well researched up to a point, he does a pretty good job peddling quite a few of the old ANZAC myths himself (Particularly in "Gallipoli").

Myths of the fighting qualities of the Aussies, their 'legendary resourcefulness', the impact of the Australian war effort, the contributions of other Commonwealth troops in 'Australian' actions, and others are put forward for the reader with little comment at times. Carylon tends to rely on popular resources, particularly C.E.W. Bean's works.

I like Les' books, they are a great popular introduction to the topic, but they are not that deeply researched.

Some others I like are the following:

"Rural Australia And The Great War" - John McQuilton. A great study of the rural home front - excellent analyses of the dynamics of recruitment, the conscription debates, and impacts on one area in rural Victoria.

"ANZACS, The Media, And The Great War" - John F. Williams. Williams examines in great detail the role of the wartime media - newspapers primarily, in the creation of the ANZAC myth.

"Dinkum Diggers" - Dale Blair. A great in depth study of the First Division from Gallipoli to the end of the war. Blair examines the popular ANZAC myths in contrast to the reality of the men of the division and explodes most of them. Dale also examines C.E.W. Bean's role in creating the ANZAC myth.

"Somme Mud" - E.P.F. Lynch. Lynch was an Australian private and front line infantryman who served on the Western front 1916-1918. Lynch wrote his memoirs in 1921, couldn't get them published, and they sat in a shoe box until recently. Harrowing reading at times, its one of the best accounts of the front line infantryman's experience. Not to be missed!

There are other interesting works out there of course but these all take off where Carlyon leaves off.

As for the comments of the old digger, some of those old men's views often became influenced by the popular mythologies and cultures about the ANZAC's that proliferated after the Great War. Plus the average digger of 1914-1918 was often an insular Anglocentric xenophobe. Some of the accounts of Australian interactions with the Egyptians at Suez and others are not edifying reading.

Keep on reading!

Cheers

Neil

[Pete Hill]

Hi Neil,
thanks for that. I actually own and have read the books by Blair & Williams that you mentioned and I especially enjoyed the former. The book 'Somme Mud' sounds very good, I will track down a copy.
I think my interest in finding out what lies beneath the Anzac legend was first sparked by the Chris Master's ABC-TV documentary- 'Gallipoli: the fatal shore', broadcast about 1990. When he mentioned how C.W Bean's diaries written on the night of April 25th at Anzac Cove had mentioned the confusion and disorganisation of the landings and the many men that were seen heading back down to the beach and milling around aimlessly, I saw that the real story had more grey area than the legend-making industry usually allows.
You only have to look at the memories of the US Civil War to see how they can distort the true picture. Compare the contemporary photographs of Matthew Brady of the gruesome dead scattered about the bleak, empty battlefields and compare them to the romantic vision of the war that sprang up decades later as the dead were neatly buried and trauma and grief were slowly but steadily replaced by nostalgia and glory. Movies like 'Gone with the Wind' and painters like Don Trioani depict the war through a romaticised, glorified eye. Likewise our society has preferred to remember the popular image of the Digger as a cheerful, laid-back, self-assured and grizzled warrior who can charge through any battlefield with his roll-your-own glued to his lower lip. How many books and pictures of Australian military history have a photo of a sun-bronzed, cheerfully scruffy Digger grinning at the camera.
Might I recommend a fine history "The First World war' by British historian Hew Strachen which sets the Great War in its truly global context and devotes equal space to all the theatres, moving away from the 'Anglo-centric' (as he puts it) vision of the war where it always focusses just on the Western Front in France. Like many recent British historians, he is evidently weary of the Anzac legend-puffers. He also challenges some conventional wisdoms of the war. Contrary to the popular perception of the 'hell' of trench warfare, he argues that the trench system actually reduced the potential death-toll of infantry, highlighting the fact that, in terms of rate of casualties, the worst month, for both the German and French armies, was September 1914 when the war was still being fought out on the open countryside. Although Verdun is usually remembered by most as being akin to Dante's inferno, the rate of loss was actually less than the less-remembered actions of the first months of the war.
For the most sharp criticisms of the Australian military I have ever read, try Max Hastings new book 'Nemisis' which deals with the last 2 years of the pacific war in WW2- 1944-45. The chapter on Australia sees him describe the Australian forces as 'virtually disappearing' from the conflict as the few adequate fighting units were regulated to strategically irrelevant backwaters and minor mopping-up operations. He also highlights the break-down in morale, discipline and motivation of many Australian units during this period and how very large numbers of able-bodied men idled in militia units and non-combatant roles in Australia. Hastings has particular dislike of Australian trade unions, especially the dockyard workers whose strikes and slow work rate delayed the flow of supplies and reinforcements to the combat zones. Re; this last point, keep in mind Hastings was editor of the UK Daily Telegraph and is a known Tory supporter so his dislike of our unions probably smacks of personal bias. Hastings makes a point of praising the Australian contribution in the early years of the war namely in the Middle East, Bomber Command and in New Guinea but then says that the latter part of the war was an anti-climax for our forces. Methinks the bookshop at the War Memorial won't be stocking this title anytime soon.
For anyone who is outraged by Hastings book, I could give them a copy of Australian author John Laffins 'British Butchers & Bunglers of WW1' in which he virtually accuses English Generals of instituting a deliberate policy of genocide with their careless sacrifice of Australian lives. Our writers have dished it out to others in the past, perhaps we cannot grumble when the latter fire some shots back in our direction.
For other books that offer an 'alternate' view of the Great War, ie challenge conventional perceptions, might I recommend:-
'Forgotten Victory' by Gary Sheffield- a re-examination of the British army's performance on the Western Front. Sheffield believes that the defeat of the German army in 1918 was one of the British army's greatest but most forgotten triumphs.
' The First of the Few' by Denis Winter- the best book of the WW1 air-war I have read. Of the RFC's 14,000 deaths, 8,000 were the result of accidents in training !
' Legend, memory and the great war in the air'- the book of the Smithsonian museum's controversial 1993 exhibition of the WW1 air-war
'The Western Front' and his most recent book 'Tommy' by Richard Holmes.
Cheers, Pete

[NeilE]

Hi Pete;

Yes Mr Bean... its interesting the differences between Bean's private diaries and what he wrote later - and what he didn't write also (that he knew later from the research for his history).

Strachen's theses regarding the 'benefits' of trench warfare are interesting. The casualty rates from 1914 were certainly more intense than later and forced the adoption of trenches for protection but the perception of trench warfare as 'hell' has more factors to it I think there is more than its relation to casualty rates. Casualties in The Great War were far beyond those ever experienced previously in recent wars, and the constant hemorrhaging of casualties on a day to day level and the casualty figures (fudged though they often were by both sides) in major battles/campaigns (Verdun, The Somme etc) were almost beyond the imagination of Europe at the time. Add to this the concentration of artillery barrages, gas, the infantryman's feelings of helplessness under barrage usually experienced, sanitation, smell etc ect and you have the popular perception trench warfare as 'hell'. (and really maybe it wasn't really that far from that notion)

Also given that The Great War extended the experience of war to class groupings that normally were not exposed to the bloodiness of warfare, it is no surprise that the experience - normally the lot of the working/peasant class and the aristocracy - was interpreted as hell. In the Great War, the reality of war was 'everybodies experience' (not really but it was far wider than ever before) and its no surprise that it became interpreted as 'hell' by 'ordinary' 'civilian'-soldiers who were exposed to the randomness of death and a range of sights etc far beyond their normal experience - which had no templates or lore to interpret these experiences.

As actual memory fades and is replaced by interpretation and myth drawn from popular culture, the propaganda icons of each nation's fighting men begin to replace the reality of the situation. Writers like Blair, Winter, and the oral historians work to recentre the human factor in the history of the Great War.

Talking of Winter, I thought his earlier work on the experience of the British Infantryman in The Great War, "Death's Men" was a far superior work. I always thought "The First of The Few" to be a bit of a quickie knock off following on the popularity of "Death's Men". Its been critiqued here a fair bit. I haven't read it for a while but I remember I felt his lack of in depth research in it meant he inadvertently fell into adopting many of the popular stereotypes of the RFC - Something he didn't do in "Death's Men". Also on Winter, his "Haig's Command - A Reassessment" - Winter's answer to the Haig/British Army revisionists is a good read. Its methodology has been criticised in some circles but the truth of the matter can't be ignored. he makes lots of reference to Bean as he used Bean's research notes and letter held at the AWM as part of his research into Haig and the British High Command.

Have a look at Winter's "Haig's Command" and see how Sheffield's work stands up. There has been a lot of revisionist work over the past few years re-examining the role of the British Army in The Great War. Its interesting but it tends to be more assertion than based on documented evidence - particulary the notion that the British Army 'evolved' to a modern force by 1918 (Thanks to Haig et al!). Generally though this assertion doesn't hold up when compared to document based evidence. Many of the facts and sources presented are selective and others that contradict that assertion are ignored or downplayed. Still, I haven't read the Sheffield work so I should give it a look before I comment on it.

Max Hastings? Hmmm... he reminds of Niall Ferguson for some reason. Ferguson's neo-conservative historical revisionism in relation to the Great War has always struck me as being of very limited value as it is just too ideologically driven to be useful. I haven't read Hasting's work but a lot of the reviews from here have been less than complementary. I think his theses have some value by the sound of things. Look at Kokoda for example - whilst it would be easy to think this was a massive battle, the reality was it was really a small scale action involving small quantities of troops (relative to the size of other WW2 actions that is). The Japanese didnt expend large numbers of troops invading New Guinea (because they basically couldn't) and the Australian forces were no more than two brigades. "The Legend of Kokoda" however elevates this series of small infantry actions to heroic proportions. Kokoda did stop a Japanese probe towards Port Moresby but it was hardly a full scale invasion by WW2 standards. I'll see if I can borrow Hasting's book from the local library - I don't feel like giving Max my money!

What did you think of Dale Blair's work? (also not the most popular person at the AWM).

Its good to hear from someone else interested in the unsaid aspects of Australian military history. I think generally we are beginning to see a wider questioning of the popular historical myths regarding Australian experience in The Great War and World War II.

Whereabout in Oz are you from Pete?

Cheers

Neil

[confused]

Interesting post. The Digger wasn't infallible but pound for pound were among the elite of the commonwealth forces and cut to bits everyone that the enemy threw at them - including Waffen SS in Greece and Fallschirmjaeger and Gebirgsjager in Crete.

They had the misfortune to be always placed in positions where the powers-that-be said that they should go - usually hopelessly untenable but still did the best of them all. ie Greece, Crete , Rabaul, Malaya and Java. Don't forget it was the 9th Division held Tobruk for months against Rommel until withdrawn for a rest.

You might be interested to know that after the fighting retreat down the Kokoda Track, which saw the Japanese whittled down to nothing with a butcher's bill of huge casualties, General Blamey addressing the survivors said
"It's not the rabbit that leaves his hole that gets shot by the man with the gun, it's the rabbit that runs." Meaning that the AIF ran away!! At a 7th Division address Blamey actually had rifles pointed at him by some listeners for making that little remark - it wouldn't have taken much more for the trigger to have been pulled. A 2/27 battalion digger who was there told me that in all seriousness.
Where the Digger excelled was that generally his frequently rural lifestyle in civilian life meant he was better suited to living rough in the field. The NZ'ers were the same. It's easy to sneer at the legend when we weren't there, but the achievements speak for themselves.

Remember these words to the tune of "A Policman's Lot!" (Gilbert & Sullivan)

When you're British not a thing can ever hurt you , ever hurt
you.
When you're safely standing at the back, at the back.
And you'll find Australian soldiers won't desert you, won't desert
you.
When you send them off to face the fierce attack.
At Gallipoli, our motives were no purer, were no purer
When we let the Aussies frolic in the mud, in the mud
And we sent them up the front in Singapora, Singapora,
Thus preserving quite a bit of British blood.
So when the Mother Country tests her Atom Bombs, Atom Bombs
The Australians stand much closer than the the Poms!!
(Max Gillies, Maralinga the
Musical)
And please note, despite what I've written here , I REALLY DO have the greatest admiration for the British soldier. Everything we are and have been, we learned from them!!

[Pete Hill]

Hi Neil,
I actually live in Victoria's Wimmera region- very flat, very dry and at this time of year, everything looks dead and faded. I long for a bit of green sometimes!
Re: Max Hastings, I admire his books especially 'Overlord', 'Bomber Command' & 'The Korean War'. I know he is not popular in the United States, especially amongst US historians in relation to his assertion on the man-for-man superiority of the German army in WW2 and his criticisms of the American army in WW2 and Korea. Stephen Ambrose and Max Hastings are two blokes you would be unlikely to meet in the same room unless you wanted to watch a fist-fight. Ambrose has scoffed at Hastings' admiration for the Germans in the Normandy campaign on numerous occasions. Whilst Hastings has taken a thinly-disguised swipe at his US counter-part's awe and reverance for the US Army- 'he doesn't write history, he writes monuments!'
To Confused, I should point out that I do not criticise the Australian soldier, rather than the legend and propoganda-machine that has been built up around him and still today continues to be maintained, even reinforced. One thing I admire about the average Aussie soldier is his modesty, and relatively few of them have welcomed or enjoyed the bombastic praise and legend-manufacturing that occured after the wars. Just as most surviving Battle of Britain veteran pilots were often bewildered and not a little resentful at the notion that they were somehow a breed-apart & legendary knights of lore. I will never forget hearing a US veteran talking about his WW2 experiences. After a bloody battle in Italy, his battered unit was taken to a morale-boosting USO-show where actor John Wayne, dressed as a cowboy, complete with guns and holsters, strode onto the stage. The veteran described how he and his buddies began to boo. They booed until an embarressed Wayne was forced to exit.
That is reality behind myth and legend. I wonder how surviving veterans today in Australia feel when every Anzac Day, baby-faced TV presentators suddenly and patronisingly start using the words- 'Digger' and 'Mate' for a couple of days and then forget about them for another year.
The 9th Division was one of the best Allied units of the war and the siege of Tobruk was an epic of defence. The ill-equipped and ill-trained soldiers who staved off disaster at Kokoda did us proud and many of the Australian air-crews in Bomber Command were amongst the elite. But were they all like Chips Rafferty and Paul Hogan and take everything on the chin and still give an iconic grin? I want to dig below the surface of the legend and find out more about the Australian soldier as an individual, not a generalised stereotype.

[CivvyCivvy]

I've been reading the posts in this thread with some fascination. I've read most of the Max Hastings books mentioned (except Nemesis of course), and have enjoyed every one. You do have to remind yourself that he once edited the Daily Telegraph though (re the Australian dockers). The Australian fighting man, has had and I hope still does have his own nationalistic traits. Just as every other nationality does. I must admit that I was a bit taken aback when, after being brought up on boys comics such as The Victor, The Lion and the Commando books etc, as well as various Elstree Studios war films, my adult reading helped it dawn on me that the British fighting man was not the best in the world. But this realisation happens as the events slowly slip into history.
My paternal grandfather was at Gallipoli with the Royal Horse Artillery, and told my father "Don't forget, it wasn't all bloody Anzacs out there". No resentment toward the troops, just at the way the media at the time, and afterwards, wove the myths.
Great input on the subject lads, I'd better start adding to my library.

[NeilE]

Confused:

Whilst the Australian infantryman in World War II was a hard, dogged, and sometimes ruthless soldier, your comments that "we cut to bits everyone the enemy threw against them" way overstates the case and reflects a lot of the mythology regarding the fighting prowess of the 2nd AIF and that of the Australian soldier in general.

Whilst we were at times able to make an effective rearguard action during the retreat from Greece and were able to inflict significant casualties (at times) on the advancing Germans (As did British and New Zealand troops) there were certainly times where we took a serious beating from the self same Germans. The same goes for Crete. Well sited defensive positions in these actions were anther factor in these actions with the kill ratios being higher for the attacker than for the defenders.

The defence of Tobruk was a mighty achievement but there were plenty of examples prior to El Alamein where the Afrika Korps inflicted significant losses (of lives, material and ground) on our troops, .

Pretty much the same scenario exists in relation to The Great War. Many of our finest moments in that war were in fact defeats. But both defeats and victories in that war involved heavy losses brought about by a well trained and determined opposition who on many occasions was able to throw us back or fight us to a standstill.

Australians were trusted assault troops but they certainly were not the key assault troops of the Commonwealth forces. That honour clearly went to the Canadians. Canadian successes and thorough planning led to the Canadian Corp becoming an independent force under Gen. Curry with its own command from April 1917. It was this force that was responsible for the successes at Vimy Ridge, Messines, the final battle of Passchendaele and others. The Australians didnt achieve that independent status until mid 1918. Even at Amiens the Canadians played a key role in the planning and execution of that battle.

Australian planning, preparation and training was always inferior to that of the Canadians though I believe the fighting qualities of both groups were very close - though the Australian infantryman was considered more slapdash in their approach than the Canadians.

One thing I find again and again in reading Australian accounts of Australian actions in The Great War is the blinkered nature of much of it. Australian successes are always emphasised but the performance of other troops in the same battle (unless they are British and unsuccessful) are rarely mentioned. Take Amiens for example - reading many Australian accounts of the battle, you'd think that the Battle was conducted by primarily Australian troops with a few unsuccessful British troops (holding back the left flank until a few Australians come and help them) with a few admiring Americans along for the ride. What is never mentioned in these accounts is the fact the Canadians had the right flank and advanced farther than the Australians during the push.

Thsi happens time and again. Villers-Bretoneaux is a similar story. The Australians were very successful in their attacks but the role of the British troops in the action is rarely mentioned.

I've heard that Blamey story before. Blamey was not well liked by any of the troops under his command. Most likely he only retained his position because he was one of MacArthur's yes men.

One other point, the myth that the fighting qualities of Australians was due to his tough living rural background is by and large a myth originally constructed by C.E.W. Bean. Statistically both in The Great War and WW2, the majority of Australian troops were from urban backgrounds. This was as true in 1915 as it was in 1918, and the same for the 2nd AIF and Militia.

There is no doubt that the achievements of the Australian fighting men and women should be recognised and celebrated. But this needs to be done realistically so as to avoid creating uncritical panegyrics such as other countries pass off as the history of their achievements in the two World Wars. That sort of military history can teach us nothing about the nature of our fighting men and women, their experiences, and how those things translate to us as modern Australians.

Cheers

Neil

PS I don't remember that Gillies piece, it looks as if he was (as usual) being pretty satirical in it.

[NeilE]

[quote]

Originally Posted by Pete Hill

Hi Neil,
I actually live in Victoria's Wimmera region- very flat, very dry and at this time of year, everything looks dead and faded. I long for a bit of green sometimes!

Re: Max Hastings, I admire his books especially 'Overlord', 'Bomber Command' & 'The Korean War'. I know he is not popular in the United States, especially amongst US historians in relation to his assertion on the man-for-man superiority of the German army in WW2 and his criticisms of the American army in WW2 and Korea. Stephen Ambrose and Max Hastings are two blokes you would be unlikely to meet in the same room unless you wanted to watch a fist-fight. Ambrose has scoffed at Hastings' admiration for the Germans in the Normandy campaign on numerous occasions. Whilst Hastings has taken a thinly-disguised swipe at his US counter-part's awe and reverance for the US Army- 'he doesn't write history, he writes monuments!'

... That is reality behind myth and legend. I wonder how surviving veterans today in Australia feel when every Anzac Day, baby-faced TV presentators suddenly and patronisingly start using the words- 'Digger' and 'Mate' for a couple of days and then forget about them for another year.

The 9th Division was one of the best Allied units of the war and the siege of Tobruk was an epic of defence. The ill-equipped and ill-trained soldiers who staved off disaster at Kokoda did us proud and many of the Australian air-crews in Bomber Command were amongst the elite. But were they all like Chips Rafferty and Paul Hogan and take everything on the chin and still give an iconic grin? I want to dig below the surface of the legend and find out more about the Australian soldier as an individual, not a generalised stereotype.

I agree Pete. Maybe there are some elements of truth to the stereotypes but the truth is much wider than that. A lot of them were quiet and unassuming men who did their duty no matter what. I think it was "Until A Dead Horse Kicks You" (Robert Crack) that goes into the author's life before and after the war. I like that book as it shows just an ordinary bloke who did his bit and went on to a quiet, mostly uneventful life after the war. And many were like that. Some were greatly traumatised, sure, but many just went on with their lives afterwards, passing their legacy and lessons on.

Cheers

Neil

[Pete Hill]

Hi again, Neil.
The interesting thing about the generations of the two world wars is that they were probably better at accepting whatever life dealt to them. Back then, pain was something you had to endure. Today, we seek a fast cure and instant relief. It is a common myth that veterans of the Vietnam war were somehow unique in that they suffered more trauma from their experiences than men who fought in previous wars. This is not true, there were proportionally just as many highly traumatised veterans from the world wars who came back home and struggled to fit in, without a fraction of the support networks that Vietnam vets eventually received.
I work as an aged care nurse and I have a friend who works in a nursing home in Melbourne who has described one of her residents. A veteran of the New Guinea campaign and now heavily afflicted with dementia, the gentleman will not go to sleep unless pillows are stacked on both sides of him as he says that his sandbagged trench has to be deep in case 'the Nips go at us with mortars like they did last night!'.
I have just finished reading Richard Holmes' 'Tommy' which is about the British soldier of the First World War. In his introduction, he talks about the current controversies surrounding historicial interpretations of the war, namely the battles between the revisionists and, for want of a better term, the traditionalists. Some have called the former 'Retro-Imperialists'. Holmes admits that he sits somewhere in the middle. Judging by his writings, Holmes does agree with other historians such as Gary Sheffield and Hew Strachan that the First World War was not a meaningless or a pointless conflict as it is often remembered. (Strachan calls the war a 'victory for liberialism'). Holmes also agrees with Strachan's assertions that popular memory and perceptions of the conflict have been shaped by a very small minority of those who took part, namely the poets and novelists. Regarding the latter, Holmes believes that their views were not typical and did not reflect the attitudes of the common soldier. As Captain Flashart says in Blackadder Goes Forth, "Don't you think I get tired of this damned war...the mud, the blood....the endless poetry!"
Holmes also challenges popular myths such as the popular image of the pompous over-fed generals sitting safe behind the lines in their warm chateaus whilst the PBI suffered in the trenches. He cites the fact that far more high-ranking British officers were killed in the Great War than there were in WW2.
However Holmes still agrees with the other side of the line, namely the traditional viewpoint of the Great War being a uniquely terrible and cruel conflict that left many scars on western civilisation.
I have also read Neil Hanson's "To the Unknown Soldier' which describes the entombment and dedication of the unknown soldier in the UK in what was the first Remembrance Day service in 1921. Hanson describes the event in vivid detail. And we thought Princess Diana's funeral was big! The entire country came to a halt, nearly every vehicle stopped, every worker laid down tools, every pedistrian paused for the first awesome minute of silence for a nation experiencing enormous grief. A passenger plane which happened to be airborne at 11am cut its engines and glided in silence for the full minute. A courtroom trial stopped in mid-session and even the prisoner in the docks willingly stood at attention. I almost wept when I read about the service in Westminster Catheral where, surprisingly for class-conscious Britain, a selection of the general public had been allowed in to sit amongst the more well-to-do. They had had to submit letters of request in order to be chosen. One little boy whose father had been listed as missing on the Western front wrote a letter saying he wanted to come to the dedication because 'it might be my Daddy in that box'. He was one of the people chosen to attend. Compare that to the UK in 1982 when wounded and disabled veterans of the Falklands war were forbidden by Prime Minister Thatcher to march in the Victory Parade. And we think we have progressed!
I also read the book- '11th Month, 11th Day and 11th Hour' by US writer Joseph Persico which is about the last day of the war on the Western Front. That book sits firmly in the traditional camp! It describes the US generals who committed their units to attacks, knowing full-well that the ceasefire was only hours away. Future US President Harry Truman, commanding an artillery battery, ordered his crews to keep firing even after the ceasefire came into effect at 11am, such was his determination to wipe Germany from the map. The book also describes how the ceasefire order took some time to reach parts of the Front and how hundreds of casualties were inflicted on both sides even after 11 o'clock.