Most Combat Over German Lines?

[stephen]

Not long ago we had a bit of a discussion about the locations of combats, and the contention that the majority of engagements were over German lines. The Kogenluft records and several other sources were cited to demonstrate that this was not necessarily the case.

I'd like to know who has pursued this further with original sources, as opposed to the secondary book sources that I have to rely on, and what conclusions you arrived at and why. Many thanks.

Dear Stephen,
(By the way, today if Frank Luke's birthday&#33
While I haven't checked the Kogenluft records, I have come across, primarily in old issues of Cross & Cockade from the 1960's, one account after another of combat by USAS pilots, usually over German lines... It gets to the point where the pilots refer to those parts of France which are German occupied as "Germany"!

The only exceptions to this-- where combat would be over French-American lines-- are when 1) Fokkers or the occaissional Pfalz bring down a balloon, 2) Halberstadts-Hanoveraners doing God-knows-what over the American lines (ground strafing? recon? the accounts just don't say), and 3) high-flying, as in HIGH-FLYING, Rumplers on recon missions...

We have one account of Lufbery's "motivation" behind his last flight (from Norman Archibald's Heaven High, Hell Deep)-- that since all of his victories had fallen into Germany (see what I mean about German-occupied France?), he wanted to get one on his side of the lines, to finally see the results of a kill face-to-face...

Another variation is the well-known New York Times article on Frank Luke (the one recounting his exploits of 18 Sept), that he landed close by his Hanoveraner to make sure his victims "didn't get away" (I kid you not). As you probably know, he landed because he was almost out of fuel...

There are, of course, accounts from the USAS of their balloon losses, and while some of these units were actually on the front lines of the Meuse-Argonne offensive, they certainly weren't in German-held territory when they fell or were attacked. (Interestingly enough, and depending on one's point-of-view, the Germans used the same tactics that the USAS used: one or two planes do the attacking, four or more planes provide the top cover)...

Rumplers were a special case. That they overflew French-American territory was an accepted fact of life; I have yet to come across a USAS account where one was successfully stalked-- at high altitude-- and then downed. They simply flew too high for the USAS to intercept them, either because the N.28 rotary engines' compression was too low, or the SPAD's Hispano-Suiza was too heavy (at least, that's the reason that some USAS pilots gave).
Of course, if the Rumpler was injudicious enough to fly at a lower altitude, they were usually downed, as was Douglas Campbell's 5th confirmed victory (the famous one where the observer stood up-- "defiantly"?-- in the plane; now he, too, belongs to the ages)...

Lastly, we have those accounts, characteristically at war's end (and I do mean the last few days), of Germans landing at USAS aerodromes. The two accounts that I have come across have one thing in common: both crews, whatever their stated reason for landing, at some point admitted that, for Germany, "the war is lost"...

Again, I'm not that familiar with Kogenluft's side of the story, but I have often wondered, if the French were not as "sporting" as the Germans would have us believe, then what accounts for their high scores, particularly in light of their stringent confirmation requirements? Obviously, those Huns had to fall somewhere...

Hope this is of help to you-- and happy birthday, Frank, whether it's in heaven, or Valhalla, or wherever the world's youth go to when war steals them from us... perhaps you really did "go West"...

VBR,
Captain Lewis

[Dan_San_Abbott]

Stephen:
In October 1915, meetings were held between Commandant Du Peuty of the French Aviation Militaire and Col. Hugh Trenchard of the RFC. After a series of meetings they agreed on th policy of offense, that was defined as the "Strategic Offensive". This doctrine was adopted by both services and was simply carrying the air offensive to the enemies rear area. In this commitment they acknowledged that it would incur higher losses. Both contended they had the means of replacing equipment and personnel promptly.
This poicy resulted in the German Fliegertruppe going on the defensive and forced Germany to protect the rear areas from attack. the German response was the commit the Kasta and Fl.Abt. to flying "barrage patrols" flying up and down the front in an effort to prevent the British and French aircraft intruding on the German air space. It was a dismal failure, in that the "barrage patrols" failed prevent allied aircraft from intruding on German Air Space. Further it strained German aircraft and engine industry to promptly replace their losses in personnel and equipment. All the aircraft production programs failed to meet the delivery requirements and trained aircrew.
The French commitment diminished after the mutinies in early 1917. The RFC and/RAF continued the doctrine of the Strategic Offensive to the end of the war.
That is why the air war was over German occuppied France and Belgium. Suggessed reading, "War inthe Air", Vol.II, Chapter 111, pp 154 to 168.
Blue skies,
Dan-San

Hi Stephen,


I can only state that with the fighting in Verdun during the summer of 1917, the French units seemed to lack the offensive spirit of the British. Case in point, Eduard Ritter von Schleich scored a total of 25 victories during this same period, with most of his victories listed as 'jenseits' (in enemy territory). Reading from his citation for the Military Max Joeph Order, one of the prime reasons mentioned for the award was that von Schleich had fought on the Verdun front where the Frenchmen, unlike the British, would not aggressively seek out combat. This therefore meant that they had to be 'visited' behind their own lines.

regards

[Dan_San_Abbott]

Wingedwarrior:
The Aviation Militaire like the French Army after the 1917 mutinies refused to take any offensive actions against Germany and collectively agreed they would only take defensive actions against attack by Germany. What has amazed me about this is the British leadership did not know about the French atitude.
The French Army finally went on the offense on 18 July 1918.
Blue skies,
Dan-San

[Immo_Frese]

The fact, that the Britons followed an offensive strategy doesn't leed automatically to the conclusion, that the german Air Force's ability to act offensive was permanently hold down.

I came to the conclusion that most of the fighting between the allied air forces and the german Jastas took place directly over the front lines.

A lot of the german Jasta pilots were KIA over enemy territory. There defenetily was a great percentage of airfighting by german fighters east of the lines. I therefore agree with Wingedwarrior. Ritter von Schleich is a good and promint example, although he scored mostly against the more defensive acting french pilots.

Just to name a few of the better known aces, which came down west of the lines, either dead or alive: Manfred von Richthofen, Erwin Böhme, Werner Voss, Carl Menckhoff, Victor Pressentin von Rautter, Eduard Ritter von Dostler, Walter Göttsch, Hans von Keudell, Hans von Haebler, Rudolf Windisch or Johann Janzen. Of course there were a lot more of the lesser known pilots who lost their lives west of the lines.

May be this is some food for thought...

Immo

[Barrett]

Dan-San: Most interesting about the Aviation Militaire's part of the mutiny. Don't think I'd ever heard reference to it before. I wonder how extensively documented it was, and whether any aviation units or individuals were prosecuted. Certainly it's unlikely that any such assets were executed pour encourage les autres.

[Dan_San_Abbott]

Barrett:
In several of the bios on German pilots have regarded being transferred to French front as going on "R&R".
I think after the mutinies, the French leadership acceeded to the demands of the French soldier and the French army as a whole took a big step backwards. I have often wondered why the Germans never took advantage of this situation. I find it hard to believe the German leadership did not know of the mutinies in the French Armies through various avenues of intelligence collecting.
Blue skies,
Dan-San

[Dan_San_Abbott]

Immo:
In 1915 the Fliegertruppe was able to control the skies with the Fokker and Pfalz types, however they were restricted from flying past the front-lines into Allied front areas in order to prevent the Allies getting the secrets of the Fokker synchronizer system.
In 1916, the control of the shifted to the Allies with introduction of the DH-2 , F.E.2b and the Nieuport fighters 11 ,16 and 17.
Late in 1916,with the establishment of the Jasta and the 2 MG Alb.D.II and D.III, Germany regained control of the air through the first half of 1917. With the introduction of the S.E.5, S.E.5a, Sopwith Camel and the Spad VII control of the air began to shift to the Allies.
With each of the German offensives of 1918, from @21 March to 18 July 1918, the Luftstreitkräfte held aerial supremacy of the front and controlled the RFC/RAF and the Aviation Militaire until the French and British air forces could respond and move squadrons and Escadrilles from other Armies to reinforce the attacked Army squadrons and Escadrilles in the affected British and French Armies. When the reinforcements arrived and the balance of power shifted to the Allies, the aerial combat was over and behind the German front-lines of the British and French controlled air space. The Luftstreitkräfte, though smaller than the combined Allied air strength were able to maintain par in combat by concentration of aerial forces At any point in time that the Luftstreitkräfte held control of the air or aerial supremcy, the fighting took place in allied front and rear areas.
From January 1917, Germany controlled the air over the French front too July 1918. The control of the air over the British Front ,went back and forth with the technical advances in equipment and organization of the two air forces. It is difficult to be aggressive, if your force is inferior in equipment or numerical strenght. The Fokker D.VII, in latter half of 1918, was the balance to make the aerial forces, equal or better than equal.
Blue skies,
Dan-San

I can't speak to the question of whether or not Trenchard knew that the Aviation Militaire was reluctant to take offensive action following the failure of the Nivelle Offensive. But that the French armies could no longer be depended on for offensive action was certainly known to British GHQ. It was one of the reasons behind Haig's persistence with Third Ypres.

Incidentally, it was during Third Ypres, was it not, that Guynemer was killed behind German lines. So obviously some French airmen continued to maintain an aggressive stance.