Jens
From S F Wise’s "Canadian Airmen and the First World War", pages 264-268:
The first major operation, which falls into a special category, was the raid of 12 October. On 3 September the commander of the French aviation service, Lieutenant-Colonel Barés, ordered Capitaine Happe, commanding the French bombing squadrons now at Luxeuil, to bomb the Mauser rifle factories at Oberndorf. Wing Captain Elder agreed to participate with all the aircraft and pilots then available. The French squadrons were not ready to undertake so ambitious a project until 11 October, however, so 3 Wing was able to accumulate more strength while it waited for the French and to engage in intensive training for the operation.
The 220 miles of cross country flying was a particular challenge for the pilots. They were given a route direct to Oberndorf, returning by way of Schlettstadt and Corcieux (a French aerodrome). The wing had been organized into Red and Blue Squadrons, each broken up into two flights of bombers with escorting fighters. Two pilots who had flown to Mülheim in July, the Canadians J.A. Glen and E.C. Potter, were the only members of the wing who had first hand knowledge of some of the terrain. Both flew bombers in 'A' flight of the Red Squadron. Red Squadron consisted of Sopwith 1˝ Strutters; Blue Squadron had one flight of 1˝ Strutters and one of Bréguet Vs. Both French and British aeroplanes took off in their flights at fixed intervals, circling to rendezvous above the aerodrome before setting course for the target.
The mixture of obsolescent Bréguet Vs and the relatively up to date Sopwith 1˝ Strutters in the wing created a number of problems. The Sopwith was an impressive machine for its day, even though the two seater fighter versions on the Somme had finally met their match in September. The synchronized Vickers gun on the engine cowling and the ring mounted Lewis gun in the observer's seat provided an unusually strong armament. The single seat bomber version, fitted with internal tandem carriers designed to carry two 112 1b bombs but also capable of carrying four 65 lb bombs when the vanes were cut down, had a slower rate of climb than the fighter (over twenty four minutes to 10,000 feet compared to seventeen minutes, fifty seconds) but could maintain slightly better speed. The Bréguet V was so radically different from either version of the Sopwith that it was clear to Wing Commander R. Bell Davies he could not hope to mount a co-ordinated bombing strike without exceptional allowances. The outdated Bréguet took twice as long as the Sopwith to reach altitude (forty nine minutes to 10,000 feet) and was about 15 mph slower than the British machine. It was unstable fore and aft, slow on turns, and almost impossible to fly on instruments. This lumbering machine did have one virtue, however, a good arc of fire from the forward nacelle. Perhaps remembering the performance of FE2bs in combat, Bell Davies thought that if the squadron could meet an attack without breaking formation some measure of safety could be achieved. He was prepared to test the theory in action, provided fighters escorted each Bréguet flight.
What kinds of formation could best protect bombers against enemy fighters, faster, more manoeuvrable, and perhaps better armed than they? The solution adopted was the first British attempt to come to grips with this fundamental problem of bombing operations. In a formation of six, including a single fighter escort, the Sopwiths were staggered in height, increasing by 150 feet towards the rear, with the fighter about 750 feet above the leader in the opening of the 'V' behind the formation. The Bréguets, in flights of six, formed a triangle with the machines staggered downwards in height so that they could cover each other. The formation gave these slow aircraft the maximum amount of mutual protection, buttressed by two or more fighters stationed behind and above them.
Much effort had gone into practising the rendezvous and formation, which were essential to success. For the two flights of the Red Squadron the process was completed without incident. They proceeded to the target according to plan but on the return journey one of the bombers was attacked by an enemy machine. Flight Sub Lieutenant
Raymond Collishaw recorded how 'When at 12000 [feet] 10 miles across the Rhine, dived at a Hun with full engine, firing machine gun, to protect Butterworth from attack. When closing the enemy my motor cut out completely, veered away and got my motor again a 900 revs, recrossed the lines at 600ft. and returned to Luxeuil. Shot down one Fokker over Rhine.’ A subsequent inspection of his engine revealed that the distributor was damaged and that the lead to one plug had broken. As for flight Sub-Lieutenant C.H.S. Butterworth, of Ottawa, his bomber was hit in the engine by the Fokker D-II that attacked him, but he was able to glide to a landing at a German airfield at Freiburg. By the time Blue Squadron took off, heavy banks of clouds had moved in. The Sopwiths failed to rendezvous. One crashed at Faucogney twenty-five minutes after take off; the other three eventually returned independently to the landing field. Flight Sub Lieutenant L.E. Smith of Mystic, Que., part of the Bréguet's escort for this flight, joined Wing Commander Bell Davies and Flight Sub Lieutenant R.F. Redpath of Montreal, who were awaiting the Bréguets above the clouds. After an anxious delay, Davies 'saw a disturbance in the white layer below and the top plane of a Bréguet appeared. The machines came out one by one looking like a string of hippos emerging from a pool.’
The raid was an instructive experience. German air defences were perhaps more effective than anticipated. The first allied flights reached Oberndorf without being intercepted, but later French flights were attacked by German aircraft, including slow reconnaissance machines. The Bréguets, which bombed Donaueschingen, thinking that it was Oberndorf, lost two of their number to German air attacks over Alsace. Had it not been for the watchfulness of their fighter escorts, all of them might have had to land in Switzerland, where their crews would have been interned. Bell Davies thought they were drifting over the Swiss border as they flew home and Flight Sub Lieutenant Redpath apparently recognized the terrain. He flew out in front of the formation and made a sharp turn, leading the bombers back to a safe course. The four surviving Bréguets had to land in pitch darkness, but they all reached friendly territory.
The Board of Admiralty derived much satisfaction from the initial reports. '... I trust a good start has been made,' wrote the Third Sea Lord:
These raids should have the result of withdrawing large numbers of enemy's machines from the front as well as men and munitions just as the Zeppelin raids have accomplished against us; & this quite in addition to actual damage which may be caused to important works.
Incidentally, the lighting of German Towns is now being restricted & special prayers in 21 the Churches, so there is immense moral effect as well.
The First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Henry Jackson, pointed out that such raids, having 'a strategical value & also a moral one,' should be kept up as long as weather permitted and opportunities arose. The First Lord, A1. Balfour, noted these comments with apparent approval.
French reaction was quite different. For them, the raid had been a disaster. Two out of twelve Farman XL IIs and four out of seven Bréguet Michelin IVs had been shot down; a Bréguet V borrowed from the RNAS had met with a similar fate. The famous Escadrille Lafayette had provided a measure of protection, but the limited endurance of their Nieuports had prevented them from remaining with the bombers for very long. Consequently, even a humble German AGO C 1 aircraft was able to shoot down one of the Bréguet IVs. 'It is permissible to state,' ran the French report, 'that raids of a very great distance can be carried out with very few losses if the [Farman and Bréguet] Squadrons ... could be transformed into Sopwith Squadrons and could work with the English.’ Whatever the results at Oberndorf (these proved to have been disappointing), and whatever the weather, so long as French aircraft did not improve further opportunities for raids like this one were not going to arise. It was this realization that led directly to the next phase of 3 (Naval) Wing's operations.
Graeme