Recruiting, training, and quality of pilots: Allies vs Germans

[Romani]

WARNING: Long rambling ahead!

A basic question, I know. I have an overall impression of how the air services got the men to fly the airplanes, and want to confirm some points:

- Flying was a voluntary assignment. The ground crews were conscripted, but one had to volunteer for flying duty. Correct? Or was some poor blighter conscripted to fly as observer or gunner in a bomber?

I suppose there was never a shortage of volunteers, so no compulsory assignment was ever needed.

- After joining the air service, could one go straight to flying school or had to serve first a stint as an observer? In the German service observers were qualified professionals, so was every observer in a German 2-seater an officer? or at least somebody that had qualified for the observer badge? (yes, the upcoming Osprey book on German air services will answer these questions, but I can't wait)

- I suppose the observer qualification was only a recquirement for reconaissance aircraft. For the ground attack missions of the Schlachta and gunner positions in bombers, it would seem a willingness to get onboard an aircraft and knowing how to shoot a MG would suffice. Correct?

- After flying school, could one choose the assignment (fighters, recon, ground attack, bombers..) or was one sent to wherever the service demanded? Was there any selection process so the best went to fighter school while the less skilled went to other duties?

I ask because I have read accounts that the British in 1917 rushed pilots through flying school and straight into fighter units with little training, while the French would accept anyone (otherwise Guynemer might have been rejected on medical grounds) and the US tried to make a very selective process with high standards.

It seems that it was enough to have two arms, two legs, and being dumb / suicidal / brave enough to want to fly, considering how several German aces wore eyeglasses, or how Mannock managed to get into despite being blind in one eye.

On the German side it seems there was an "on the job training" policy. One became observer, then went to flying school, and then flew 2-seaters, and later if that's what he wanted, asked for a transfer to fighters, wich could be accepted or refused. In an account of a 2 seater crew late in the war the writer mentions that his transfer to fighters was rejected because experienced 2-seater crews were scarce and more valuable.

Summing it up, what I want to get at is gauge how much or how little trained were fighter pilots on arrival to the front. On seeing those training manual aids for American pilots showing acrobatics with a SPAD, I scratch my head in puzzlement wondering how could the USAS pilots receive such a pasting in september 1918. After all, German flight training must have suffered a lot due to lack of fuel and other shortages.

In a similar situation, in WWII, the majority of German pilots were ill trained and knew little more than taking off and landing (the infamous "goose flocks" or to use the german term "idioten reihe" ) with an ever diminishing hard core of experten scoring most of the victories.

So what should have happened in 1918 is that the Allies should have swept the Germans from the skies shooting them down in droves, and that didn't happened. Even if outnumbered, they continued to put up a fight until lack of fuel grounded them.

In 1918 the Allies with superior numbers of aircraft and training resources could afford to give their fighter pilot recruits a better training and the Allied services should have had a quality edge over German crews. But that didn't happen, or if it did happen, it had not a significant impact, much more decisive was the superiority in numbers it seems.


I can come up with the following explanations:

1) Extensive pilot training came too late

Thorough training only came late in the war. So in the last months even if well trained, the German opponents found in the air were mostly battle hardened, seasoned pilots. I assume that the Germans allocated the scant fuel and replacement machines to the best pilots, grounding the greenies.

2) Germans learned on the job before joining a Jasta

German fighter pilots had practical experience as 2-seater pilots before joining their staffel wich was more or less equivalent to the specialized training an Allied fighter pilot receive.

3) Training of german fighter pilots was given priority

German fighter schools were given priority in resources in detriment of others, to maintain a minimum standard of proficiency for fighter pilots comparable to the Allied opponents.

Of course 2) and 3) mean that German 2-seater flyers got shortchanged and predictably were shot down in droves. The victory/losses ratio of fighter units on both sides indicate that the bulk of the casualites suffered by all the air services were 2-seaters. Of course, recon, bomber and other planes far outnumber fighters so that's only logical, and without knowing the percentage of casualties I can't say wich branch had a more dangerous job. And probably neither had it as bad as the foot soldiers in the trenches, despite the popular perception of flying as extremely hazardous duty. Without diminishing the risks flyers endured, this perception has more to do, I believe, with the fragility of the aircraft , the lack of crew protection, the fire hazard, and of course, the lack of parachutes. I would still take my chances as a British flyer during "Bloody April" than as a British Tommy going over the top.


Option 3) could be a rational allocation of resources. If 2-seater crews have low survival odds anyway, and training is not going to improve things much, is wasteful to give them anything more than strictly neccessary. I don't believe that the attrition rate was so high as to consider them "expendable", so that's not the answer.

On the other hand, flying a 2-seater is less demanding than a fighter, involving taking off, navigating to the target and getting back, and landing. No need for acrobatics or attack maneuvers so 2-seater pilots trainees could do with less.

4) Flight training alone doesn't make a fighter pilot, that can only learned by experience

I think the key may lie here (plus any other combination of the other factors). I found hard to believe the account were some green American pilots were taken on a practice flight and they were blissfully unaware of what went around them, to the point that they didn't even realize flak was firing at them and one of them didn't know his plane had been hit!

After trying a flight simulator, I understand. Knowing how to fly your machine helps, but it's not enough. Developing "hunter eyes" or in modern parlance "situational awareness" that can only be acquired by experience. Not to mention how to actually shoot down an airplane.

5) The nature of air combat in WWI

This is a complex one involving several things:

Most effective way of scoring a victory involved in sneaking around to make a surprise attack. Since the Germans adopted hit and run tactics to avoid getting entangled in dogfights with better allied aircraft (until the DVII arrived) and in general, to avoid fighting against superior numbers, a higher quality level would not make much of a difference in this situation. German tactics seem to have been to have the bulk of the pilots support the leader in his attack run. That way, the veterans that have already mastered how to shoot down aircraft can go on scoring, and it doesn't matter much if the wingmates are poorly trained as long as they cover the ace tail.

The other common situation was the dogfight. I have noticed that in those large melees involving 20 airplanes or more, very few aircraft were shot down, because pilots spent a lot of effort in avoiding a collision in detriment of getting on an opponent's tail, and when they did, they were soon forced to break up pursuit because another foe had tailed them in turn.

Under these conditions and in general, in any turning fight much of the better flying skill edge is given up. Banking hard to make a tight turn doesn't recquire much skill and is the most instinctive response. For acrobatics and dive and zoom tactics one needs room.


6) The Fokker DVII factor

On paper and due to our modern understanding or air combat revolving around "energy fighting" and all that, the SPAD XIII should have been the best fighter of the war. Yet that was not the case. Theoretical advantages in speed and climb were lost in turning fights. Getting the most of planes such as the SPAD and SE5a recquires more skill than simply banking and turning as tight as the airplane will allow without stalling, such as a Camel (broadly speaking, please don't nitpick). What I want to get at is that the Fokker DVII was easier to fly and could be more efficiently used by the average pilot, while its opponents needed more skill to use their full potential. So the conclusion is that if German pilots were worse trained than their enemies, the DVII compensated for it.


So that's all. These are all thoughts I have been pondering for a time to try to understand how the Germans could still maintain a good victory/loss ratio from the summer of 1917 to the introduction of the DVII flying inferior Albatros and Pfalz against superior Allied aircraft, and how they still managed to keep a battleworthy airforce until nearly the end, instead in degenerating into a bunch of flying targets like it happened to the Luftwaffe and the Japanese in WWII.


And please don't be too harsh in your argumentation. I do not really know what I am talking about, so I am making wild guesses just to give food for thought

[rammjaeger]

Hi Romani,

(if you did not do it already) you should read “Training in the German Air Force 1914-1918” in Cross & Cockade Number 2 and 3 in 2003.

Here some remarks to your text from the German side:
- “Flying was a voluntary assignment. The ground crews were conscripted, but one had to volunteer for flying duty.”
Yes, but especially in the early time of the war were many many more volunteers than demanded. Therefore often volunteers for flying came to the ground service and sometimes later got a chance to transfer to the flying personnel (example: Hartmuth Baldamus). As well also volunteers for flying duties had often to serve with the “Baukompanie” (construction unit) of a FEA at first. In some cases pilots did fly with air mechanics or other ground personnel but possibly more often in test flights than combat flights.

In fact there was no shortage of volunteers in the “Luftstreitkräfte” but other arms like the infantry hated to lose their officers or experienced NCO to the air arm. Therefore sometimes orders had to be given to the other arms they should not prevent the transfer (what often happened).

- “After joining the air service, could one go straight to flying school or had to serve first a stint as an observer?”
You could directly go to flying – an earlier observer job was not necessary – but it was necessary to pass the tests for becoming a pilot.

“In the German service observers were qualified professionals, so was every observer in a German 2-seater an officer?”
Early in the war observers were officers. Since 1916 the observer badge required some successful combat missions – therefore the observer badge could not be a requirement in this time. Many pilots and observers died without holding the badges. The lack of officers resulted also in the use of some NCO for the observer job but I do not think that occured too often.

- “I suppose the observer qualification was only a requirement for reconaissance aircraft.”
Gunners trained for use in ground attack airplanes did not need a full observer training. Nevertheless they should also be able to report about observations of the battle on the ground - therefore they should know a lot more than only their MG and got also other lectures.

- “After flying school, could one choose the assignment (fighters, recon, ground attack, bombers..) or was one sent to wherever the service demanded?”
The demand of the air arm was deciding but applicants had their own wishes and officers often tried to use friends in higher positions to achieve their dream job. Fighter schools came into being rather late in war. Until Fall (?) 1917 was a requirement (exceptions confirm always the rule) to use former double seater pilots for fighter pilot training (I think this experience and the special fighter training gave many German fighter pilots a good advantage against enemy pilots in this time). Later the increasing demand and losses resulted also in the use of freshly trained fighter pilots in 1918. Just now I do not remember documents confirming that these late (direct) pilots were selected among the better trainees but I would expect a selection here.

The German aviators had to pass medical examinations but the high war demand for aviators would obviously nullify many medical standards, e.g. you can find many aviators with badly damaged legs (Motto: He can´t walk but that is not needed because he flies.) etc. etc. The Army had repeatedly to give orders that not only badly damaged officers/soldiers should be allowed to transfer to the Air arm!

I stop here because I have to do some other things today too but let me have a last word concerning the “Fokker D.VII factor”:

For your conclusions in this matter you should consider also the following points (and maybe some more):
- Not every German pilot was so lucky to get a Fokker D.VII – many had to fight with older or lower performing airplanes until EOW. Especially the newcomer would get the latter airplanes – making them an easier target.

- The lack of fuel and Fokkers did often result in a "splitted flying": “Old hands” would do even more missions but newbees would not so often get permission to fly.

- We can not speak about “The Fokker D.VII” or “The SPAD” or “The SE5”. Different versions with different engines/performance influence the picture of the matter as well. A good tactical leader would put the high altitude performance of the Fokker D.VII with BMW engine to very good use – especially in energy fighting!!

And by the way if you are used and able to fly an older training airplane with wooden tires and “Schwerbenzin” in the German homeland then you will feel an enlightenment to fly a “real” fighter with "Leichtbenzin".

VBR
Rammjaeger

[TomVrille]

Originally Posted by Romani

I ask because I have read accounts that the British in 1917 rushed pilots through flying school and straight into fighter units with little training, while the French would accept anyone (otherwise Guynemer might have been rejected on medical grounds) and the US tried to make a very selective process with high standards.

Greetings Romani!
Just a few comments, hopefully none too harsh!

It is true that British training early in 1917 was ineffective with regard to fighter pilots, but it must be remembered that until well into 1916, air fighting was not deemed a priority. Reconnaissance was thought to be the primary function of aircraft, and it was only after fighter aircraft came to be seen as the best means of denying aerial reconnaissance to the enemy that fighter training was given emphasis.

Equipment was a problem. Prior to 1917, most training was done on either the Maurice Farman (70hp Renault), or Avro (80hp Gnome). Neither type was suitable for the type of flying that would be required in a fighter squadron. This situation was resolved in the summer of 1917 when Major R. R. Smith-Barry demonstrated the superiority of the 100 Monosoupape Avro with dual control for training in aerobatics. Smith-Barry was at the time commanding the No. 1 Training Squadron at Gosport. The School of Special Flying was set up at Gosport, consisting of the Nos. 1, 27, and 55 Training Squadrons. What came to be known as the "Gosport system" of training represented a major upgrade in the quality of fighter pilots reporting to the front.

Medical standards for flight duty were not well understood at the time, and it was fairly common for people (e.g. Guynemer) who had been declared unfit for ground duty to show up in the various air services. The assumption seems to have been that all that pilots did was sit on their backsides and twiddle a stick, so fitness was less important than other subjective criteria such as skill in horsemanship! The USAS did try to set up selective standards, but these quickly led to the Lafayette Escadrille pilots, and many of the Lafayette Flying Corps pilots, being declared unfit for flight duty when they attempted to join the USAS. Fortunately, common sense prevailed (never a sure thing in the military services of the time), and these flyers lent some much-needed experience to the fledgling USAS.