On which side does the ignorance lie?

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Another dart to the heart of the myth that the prewar military hierarchy was too conservative, unimaginative and just plain stupid to appreciate the value of military aviation.
The book "The Luftwaffe's Way of War- German Air Force Doctrine 1911-1945" contains prewar writings of Helmuth von Moltke, Erich Ludendorff and Wilhelm Siegert in which they recognize "heavier than air" aircraft as already being (in 1912-1913) the primary source of battlefield intelligence and absolutely necessary in the direction of long range artillery. They also predicted that in a short period of time aircraft would be developed into an offensive weapon and that control of the skies would be the first condition of victory in conventional warfare.

Weldboy: I think there is danger here in speaking in absolutes. First, the military command structure in each country was not monolithic. Some officers and officials recognized the value of aviation, while others didn't. Some recognized the value, but they didn't have the personal power to move their brother officers or officials to their way of seeing. Some recognized the value of aviation to one point, yet failed to recognize the dynamic nature of air combat and could not move to the next level. Many officers saw peacetime demonstrations, yet the mistrust or simply ignoring a "toy" was going on well into the war. I think it was Maurice Hankey who suggested to David Henderson that old navy aircraft be used in conjunction with tanks. Henderson rejected the idea. The job of the RFC was recce. Sefton Brancker wanted stability so pilots could focus on collecting information; the cost was performance. Could you have both? Yes, but it took a while for those in command to figure that out. Also keep in mind that one hallmark of the war was the huge shift in technology and, some would argue, the slowness in the learning curve. Of course, there are those who say that is rubbish. Commanders were figuring things out much faster then we give them credit for. The knowledgable folks here and on other sites have taught me it was far too easy for me to be an armchair general and to make general statements. The truth--as I am seeing it emerge--seems to be much more complex.
DD

Weldboy: I think there is danger here in speaking in absolutes. First, the military command structure in each country was not monolithic. Some officers and officials recognized the value of aviation, while others didn't. Some recognized the value, but they didn't have the personal power to move their brother officers or officials to their way of seeing. Some recognized the value of aviation to one point, yet failed to recognize the dynamic nature of air combat and could not move to the next level. Many officers saw peacetime demonstrations, yet the mistrust or simply ignoring a "toy" was going on well into the war. I think it was Maurice Hankey who suggested to David Henderson that old navy aircraft be used in conjunction with tanks. Henderson rejected the idea. The job of the RFC was recce. Sefton Brancker wanted stability so pilots could focus on collecting information; the cost was performance. Could you have both? Yes, but it took a while for those in command to figure that out. Also keep in mind that one hallmark of the war was the huge shift in technology and, some would argue, the slowness in the learning curve. Of course, there are those who say that is rubbish. Commanders were figuring things out much faster then we give them credit for. The knowledgable folks here and on other sites have taught me it was far too easy for me to be an armchair general and to make general statements. The truth--as I am seeing it emerge--seems to be much more complex.
DD

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Denny,
Very well put and of course 100% correct. I suppose what compelled me to make the post above is the fact of my own surprise at finding so much support for aviation from so many of the more thoughtful and/or less political officers in the prewar. Be they German , French, UKers, etc.
The military is , was and probably always will be like any other large, established institution. Attempts to progress or even to adapt can often be like trying to sprint to the end zone in a foot of mud.
Still, though they suffer the consequences of human nature (unavoidable in human institutions)
the military is not somehow more dogmatic, more slow witted, less adaptable than other organizations of similar size. They are mirrors of their place and time.