U.S. Air Service Operational Plan

[Dan_San_Abbott]

Ladies and Gentlemen:
I recently purchased the four volume set of "The U.S. Air Service in World War I". It is the official history, like the RFC/RAF history "War in the Air".
I thought I was very well up on the history of the U.S. Air Service, but, after reading these four volumes, i have come to the conclusion, that I knew very little. After reading some very interesting things, I thought I would ask some of the informed Forumites a few questions.
1. What was the bombing plan established for the U.S. Air service?
2. Who established this plan an when?
3. How many U.S. squadrons where planned?
4. What was the mix of these squadrons, Observation, Bombing and Pursuit?
5. What organization was deemed the smallest self sustaining organization?
6. What was the changes in the number of squadrons?
7. What was the number of squadrons in the final organization of the U.S. Air Service, and the number of Observation, Bombing and Pursuit Squadrons.
8. What happened to the planner?
9. What caused the plans to fail?
Blue skies,
Dan-San

[joegertler]

Hi Dan-San.
Most of your questions are clearly answered with exact numbers and stats in the book "The War With Germany-a statistical summary" by Leonard P. Ayres, Cheif of the Statistics Branch of he General Staff, Gov Printing office 1919.
It gives number of planes, number of engines, type, of planes and squadrons, and even WHERE they were and which battles they were moved up for etc. and much more. AND-it gives those statistiscs and numbers for each month! US was in the war, from beginning to end, and gives separate figures for A.E.F and U.S.A . Also numbers of flying officers etc etc by month, AND production figures by month with totals. I won't go through the entire statitistics for all months, but for a start..
American Air squadrons in action as of April 1918 was 3 day bombing; 2 observation and 1 pursuit. And at end of war in November 1918 there were 45 squadrons. 1 night bombing; 6 day bombing; 18 Observation, and 20 pursuit.
Service planes sent to the zone of advance (with details in text) weere 2698 planes in Nov. 1918 of which 667 were American made and 2032 were from foreign sources.
During last two weeks of July the flying time was more than 1000 hours per week. The week of the St Mihiel offensive it rose to nearly 4000 hours. There is a numerical chart and graph for hours spent in the air each weeek by American Service planes at the front. A very handy, easy to read book and WELL organized for fast fact-finding.. Hope this helps. *YOUR type of book!

[Patrick]

And it's available as a free pdf download, too

The War with Germany: A Statistical ... - Google Book Search

[Dan_San_Abbott]

Joe Gertler:
I have read throught "The War with Germany, A Statistical Summary". While it gives information pertinent to Americas part in the War, it does not answer my questions. Reread my questions, I am asking questions about America's bombing plans.
blue skies,
Dan-San

[Dan_San_Abbott]

Patrick:
Thank you I have downloaded "The War With Germany".
Blue skies,
Dan-San

[joegertler]

Originally Posted by Dan_San_Abbott

Joe Gertler:
I have read throught "The War with Germany, A Statistical Summary". While it gives information pertinent to Americas part in the War, it does not answer my questions. Reread my questions, I am asking questions about America's bombing plans.
blue skies,
Dan-San

Dan-San; I thought it Specifically answered your questions (with the Official U.S, Govt numbers):

4. What was the mix of these squadrons, Observation, Bombing and Pursuit?
6. What was the changes in the number of squadrons?
7. What was the number of squadrons in the final organization of the U.S.Air Service, and the number of Observation, Bombing and Pursuit Squadrons.

And if "I" did not give the FULL list of the changes in number of squadrons. The book lists the numerical change for each type of squadron (Including bomber squadrons) and ALL squadrons for EACH month.

4. The mix changed from month to month and it gives the exact number of BOMBING SQUADRONS for each month, to end of war.

6. & 7. Same as above. the number of squadrons changed by month from I pursuit; 2 Observation; and 3 DAY BOMBER sqdns in April 1918 to
20 Pursuit; 18 Obsercation; 6 DAY BOMBING; and 1 NIGHT BOMBING sqdn for total of 45 sqdns equipped with 740 planes, at Armistice.
I am wondering if the Internet download version contains all 154 pages and all 70 Lists of diagrams; 14 Tables and 12 maps?
I mentions bombing as part of the St. Mihiel battle. and
"Day bombers whose work was the dropping of bombs on railways or roads." and
"Night bombers carrying heavier bomb loads for the destruction of strtegic enemy works."
another mention about "Day bombers ,,,were forced to fly low on account of fog (during St. Mihiel offensive)which hampered all the day operations"

Just Trying to help with some official numbers I thought WERE pertinent to 4,6 & 7. in the most friendly and respectful way.

[Kilian]

I this context i have a diffrent question. After losing the Naval battle at Falkland islands. Germany had to produce more and more bombs with Ammoniak synthesis and other replacements. In how far were these also used by allied nations? or did they go on with the salpter?

Hope this is not spoling the thread.
Maybe answer me with PM.

regards
Kilian

[Patrick]

Dan, the best reference I have found in my library for this topic is The Great War In The Air: Military Aviation From 1909 to 1921 by John H. Morrow, Jr. There's a lot to what you ask; I'll take a stab at the first of the questions:

1. What was the bombing plan established for the U.S. Air service?

That question assumes that an organized effort to plan a bomber force was undertaken; I don't think it unfolded quite like that. The bombing plan evolved in three steps. The first step was to obtain Congressional funding to build up an air corps. The second was to mobilize American industry to build aircraft on a large scale. The third, and rather disjoint step, was to determine how best to use the aircraft operationally. The first step was actually not that hard, even prior to war being declared. In fact, the funds allocated by Congress for aviation in 1916 far exceeded the capacity of industry to produce the planes and the War Department to organize them into a fighting force.

The second step was not based so much on a strategic conception that was implemented by targeted production, but on the more general problem of how to build airplanes on a huge scale. In other words, the American approach was to first develop the industrial capacity for vast production runs of airplanes of all types, then concern themselves with exactly what kind of plane to build later. Early on, the decision was made to jumpstart production by using as much licensed design as could be obtained.

The following is directly from Morrow:

[In May, 1917, the Secretary of War, Newton Baker], decided to send a mission abroad to determine the best European material for production in the United States and to coordinate a production program for the Allies. Maj. Raynal C. Bolling, former chief counsel for United States Steel Corporation, who had helped lobby the Congressional appropriations, led 11 military, naval, and industrial experts, including army aeronautical engineers Capt. V. E. Clark and Capt. E. S. Gorrell. They sailed from New York on 17 June to spend nearly five weeks visiting England, France and Italy.

. . .

The mission's final report of 15 August suggested . . . The United States would provide material first for its own training program, then for a tactical force for the AEF, and finally for special air forces comprising 37.5 percent fighters, 25 percent day bombers and 37.5 percent night bombers, the last of which he believed "might determine the whole outcome of military operations" through large-scale and continuous operations.

It appears that the genesis of the US bombing plan was the Bolling report, which set in motion a number of procurement, production and mobilization activities.

[Dan_San_Abbott]

Ladies and Gentlemen:
The answers to my question are:
1. The plan was the Strategic bombing of Germany war industry.
2. The plan was proposed in detail by Lt.Col. Edgar S. Gorrell. It was presented to Brigadier General Benjamin D. Foulois, Chief of thr Air Service. AEF. Brig.Gen. Foulois approved the plan and placed Lt. Col. Gorrell as head of Strategical Aviation, Zone of Advance, AEF.
3. The number of squadrons were established on 17 July 1917 with 15 Corp and 24 Army Observation Squadrons, 15 Pursuit Squadrons and 5 Bombardment Squadrons, making a total of 59 total squadrons. This was amended on 18 September 1917, increasing the Observation squadrons by
41, the pursuit Squadron were increased to 120 squadrons and bombardment squadrons were increased to 60. These increases were for Strategical Aviation. ( These increases were before the plan.)
The squadron plan was amended on 1 January 1918, to establish a ratio in the make up of the squadrons, by ratio of 2 Observation squadrons to 6 pursuit squadrons to 1 bombing squadron with a total of 100 squadrons.
The number of planned squadrons was amended on 6 February 1918 adding 20 more bomb squadrons for a total of 120 sqadrons. These plans were to be completed by December 1918.
On 5 June 1918 the planned number of squadrons were increased to 260 squadrons, 15 Corps, 24 Army observation squadrons, 120 pursuit squadrons, of which 40 were single seater and 80 were two seat fighters,
41 day bombardment and 60 night bombardment squadrons.
4. On 29 July 1918, the Squadron plan was again amended raising the total to 358 squadrons, of which 49 were Corp and 52 were Observation Squadrons, 147 pursuit squadrons, 55 day and 55 night bombardment squadrons.
The Final number of squadrons were established on 16 August 1918, at 202 Squadrons. 49 Corps and 52 Army observations, 60 pursuit squadrons, 14 day and 27 night bombardment squadrons.
These plans from 5 June on were to be completed by June 1919.
All were over optimistic.
5. Lt. Col. Gorrell in his studies of the organisation of Brigade, Wing, Group and Squadron, determine the smallest self sustaining organization was the Group.
6. G.H.Q. AEF felt the U.S. Air Service, did not wish to put any restraints on its growth and felt it should grow as rapididly as possible and left the growth planning to the HQ. U.S.Air Service, AEF.
7. The final size of the U.S.Air Service at the end of the war was 45 Squadrons, 18 Observation, 20 Pursuit, 6 Day bombardment and 1 night bombardment Squadron.
8. On 21 January 1918 Lt. Col. Edgar S. Gorrel was releaved as Officer in Charge of Stategical Aviation Zone of Advance, AEF and reported to the the General Staff as Air Service Officer for duty in the Operations Section G-3.
9. Production failures in the USA for aircraft, engines and everything else and over optimism as what could be done.
Blue skies,
Dan-San

[Jim]

Is there a list of which squadrons those 45 were and what dates each began flying combat missions?