are aces important?

[steven brown]

As I read more books on WW1 aviation, I occasionally come across an argument that as the war went on, aces became less important. Numbers, organization and technology were the critical factor in 1918. Artillery spotting and photographic reconnaissance were the air forces' contribution. Also to achive air superiority, enemy aircraft needed to be shot down and whether this was done by one man shooting down 40 or ten men shooting down 4 each, made no difference.
I agree with this except for the air superiority component, which during WW1 was only achived locally and temporarily. In most air wars, around 5% of pilots scored about 40% of the victories, and in WW1 this proportion was more extreme. Shooting down airplanes is not easy and only a few of the many can do it. I'm sure the aces in WW1 got more that 40% of the victories which is why they were important.
Does anyone have any thoughts on this?

[Epee]

Looking at the figures it seems that the nation which produced the highest scoring and the most aces of both world wars, Germany; also lost both wars both in the air and on the ground therefore:

Strategically aces are unimportant; leaders are of minimal importance.

Operationally aces are moderately important; leaders are moderately important.

Tactically aces are important; leaders are extremely important.

Apart from the number of aircraft they destroy, which is realitively small, aces are good for the morale of the other 90% of the airforce.

[Kilian]

Hmmm.....but the German aces faced a larger numbers of enemies in late war. At one point you can't outwit larger numbers even if you are the better pilot therefore this argument is not so valid i would say. Which also may be a reason why more aces were produced because of the ratio.

[Old Man]

This question, Sir, admits of several answers, as there are different ways of gauging importance.

As you observed, the real business of the air arms in the Great War was reconnaisance and artillery work. Aces seem to have had no impact on this over-all; indeed, fighter operations do not seem to have managed ever to put a significant dent in it, no matter how many casualties were inflicted. Even 'Bloody April' does not seem to have blinded either English planning staffs or gunners at Arras. Probably the nearest thing to an 'aerial blackout' ever achieved in the Great War was managed by the Germans in the run-up to Verdun, by the much-maligned 'barrage patrols', which did largely prevent French strategic reconnaisance in that area during early 1916, but even then, sufficient information was obtained to have rumbled the plan; it was simply mis-interpreted by the G.Q.G. intelligence staff, to fit their preconceptions of the situation. Aerial activity by the attacker could be a tip-off to impending operations, and the elaborate preparations made for shooting by map by the Germans early in 1918, which contributed much to the surprise achieved by the 'Michael' offensive that spring, were undertaken to avoid giving the enemy that 'tell' rather than being something Allied success against German aerial reconnaisance operations had imposed on German planners.

Even in the early period, it is hard to detect much material effect achieved by aces against reconnaisance operations. During the so-called 'Fokker Scourge', the R.F.C. seems to have been writing off more aeroplanes to age and decrepitude than enemy action. Before that, in what could be called 'the pre-history' of aerial fighting, when machine-gun equipment on aeroplanes was an Allied monopoly, it does seem to be true that German airmen were somewhat cowed by the potential danger of a thoroughly unequal combat, however unlikely, should they venture over Allied lines. French attacks on the ground, however, continued to be consistently smashed, and so the German war effort came to no harm from this.

Aces do seem to have had considerable moral effect, however. France and Germany in particular found air aces a valuable tool in rallying popular enthusiasm in the face of the difficulties of the stalemate on the ground. The term in fact seems to have originated with the French, brought in from sporting slang, where it had been applied to successful racing pilots, as well as to foot-ballers and jockeys and boxers and such. M. Pegoud was an 'Ace' in French parlance long before he had engaged in any aerial combat, and reports of some of his exploits flying Moranes with a sharp-shooting observer attached the term to victorious airmen in the war.

Perhaps the most important effect of aces, though hardly a direct effect on military operations at the time, flowed from this cultivated popular enthusiasm for their early exploits. Aces established the air services as important things in the popular mind, and so had a great effect down the coming years on the development of air forces, and the establishment of air power as a separate sphere of military endeavor. This had a great deal of effect on the history of the twentieth century, and continues into the present day.

[Vin]

Originally Posted by Epee

...Strategically aces are unimportant; leaders are of minimal importance.

Operationally aces are moderately important; leaders are moderately important.

Tactically aces are important; leaders are extremely important.

....

Extremely important for 21st century computer cowboys.

[Epee]

Nobody asked about fun!

[josquin]

Well done, Old Man. You state your case exceedingly well.
So well, in fact, that it is the finest brief assessment of
the overall significance of aces and observation/reconnaissance
operations that I have encountered. As you noted, the
Germans benefited handsomely from the preconceptions
of the French General Staff on more than one occasion!

Regards

Josquin

[steven brown]

Thank you for the thoughtful responses, gentlemen. And I second josquin. Old Man's comments were brilliant.

[Barrett]

I recall in the early 1990s when the National Air & Space Museum had a GW aviation exhibit that said (in just about so many words) that aces were self-aggrandizing egotists. The late Don Lopez, who was one, grinned and said, "Well, some of us are, you know!"

As has properly been noted here, SOME aces were significant as leaders and innovators (think Boelcke before MvR) but even their contribution to creating smoking holes in the ground can be overstated. By actual computation, war by war among US services, "Tillman's 10-30 Rule" applies: 10% of the scoring pilots accounted for 30% of the total credited victories. That's because the total number of pursuit/fighter/whatever pilots is semi-impossible to know.

(Repeat after me: "A kill is a victory but not all victories are kills.")

[Nacho]

I would say that this was due mostly to the fact that by 1918 most of the decorated aces from the war like Guynemer, McCudden, Ball, Mannock, etc. were dead. 1918 also saw more bombing than aerial fighting and the aces at the time had about 12 or less victories and couldn't compare to the aces that the public adored in the previous years.