July-Dec 1917

[steven brown]

Russ,
Again I only have time for a quick response. What do you think changed around April 20th or so? The change from the Jastas running roughshod over the British with a 5 to 1, and then the drop off in claims and increased Jasta losses, seems very abrupt. Equipment had not changed around the end of April. Tactics maybe?

[RussGannon]

Steve

56 Sqn and SE5's had become operational - 48 Sqn with Bristol's finding their feet - 1 Naval & 8 Naval with Sop Tripes being ever agressive. Pup merchants of 3 Naval, 54 Sqn & 66 Sqn hadn't been particuklarly mauled and certainly did not patrol in fear of Albatri. 60 Sqn and to lesser degree 29 Sqn with their Nieuports had a rough time, but 1 Sqn, 40 Sqn & 6 Naval were doing reasonable job and both 29 Sqn & 60 Sqn came back strong in May & June.

Most of damage had been done to obsolete BE2's, FE2b's & Sop Strutters whom up till this time had only been for the most part protected by equally obsolete but none the less brave DH2's & FE8's. It must be rembered that the Albatros DI, DII & DIII had greater horsepower and indeed forward firing firepower than any of these. Indeed it is a credit to the DH2 & FE8 merchants that they actually achieved a handful of 'hard kills' against Albatros fighters.

Remaining FE's post April were now the more powerful and more armed FE 2d's. Indeed 20 Sqn with their FE2d's proved more than a handful for the Jagdstafflen over Ypres during summer & early autumn.

I would suggest the Jagdstafflen became increasingly 'Sopwith' shy over the summer and over Ypres salient - I dont mean Camels as such, but 'Sopwith' was used by German's for any tractor British biplane, just as Tommies was used as general term for soldiers on ground. Up till about the beginning of Aug 17 it is evident that Jasta formations would not refuse combat with British fighter patrols - but as Aug turned into Sep it is clear that they were increasingly wary - only engaging with height & numbers advantage or indulging in shaddowing with dive & zoom attacks with hope of causing and or picking off stragglers. I think the turning point were the big dogfights over Polygon wood 12, 17, 26, 27 & 28 July. Both British and German fighters were up in force and the Germans got as good as they gave.

The British had always been offensive (even with DH2's & FE 8's) they after all flew 'Offensive Patrols' - often attacking when situation was not in their favour; with inevitable costs. particularly as pretty well all scout fighting took place over German side - even in the darkest moments of early Apr 17.

It would be fairer to say it was the Germans who changed tactics - became to use RFC slang - more Hunnish - what VM Yeates more tactfully called 'scientific fighting.'

Cheers Russ

[steven brown]

Russ,
It seems that the Jastas were contesting for the initiative shortly after receiving enough Albatri. I've read that in December 1916, of the 27 British planes shot down, 17 fell on the British side. And then of course German claims increased every month until April 1917. Possession of the initiative seems to have hung in the balance for a few months. The Germans, at some point realized, after all they weren't fools, that the British were not going to back down regardless of losses. Could it be that the Germans felt they could not fight at such a level of offensive effort? As Old Man pointed out some time ago, the Jastas were conceived as intercepters, not intruders. Rightly or wrongly, the Germans believed that contesting the initiative was beyound them and prudently adopted a defensive stance, trying to get the most victories for the least losses.

[RussGannon]

Steve

Yes at the hieght of the Albatros superiority, they were willing to pursue and even attack British Corps aircraft JUST over the line. But again one should be wary of Jenseits (other side) claims - when put under microscope they are not a whole lot more reliable in regards 'hard kills' than British OOC claims.

And yes I agree prudence in operations - I would use the term German pragmatism - they knew fully well that they would incur far greater losses fighting an offensive war than a defensive one - disabled planes and pilots would come down Allied side and would be a total loss rather than a temporary loss as was the case fighting defensively. And I'm certain German industry could not easily make good the higher attrition rates. Pilots and crew would not be a problem but training standards would no doubt drop and this in turn would lead to further casualties.

But getting the most victories for the least loss will not win you an air war. I probably sound like a record with a scratch in it - but it is the support an air force gives to its ground forces that really counts. As interceptors the Jasta's should have been denying British & French planes free reign over German air space. Thuis they never did - not even in the darkest moments of Mar-Apr 17. And I always find it amazing that Jasta commanders were routinely happy to let bomber and fighter recon units reach their targets before attacking when they attempted to regain their lines (pointedly low of fuel and ammo). Indeed many a mission went un-attacked even though they were shaddowed by Jasta formations. It was if they would not attack without all the advantages of height, numbers & position of sun. This in my view is no way to win an air war and no way to support ones troops on the ground. It all looks geared for the scoring of 'safe' victories and personal prestige - what one might call the 'Sanke Card' syndrome.

Now in some sense as the Germans on the Western Front were on the defensive in second half of 1916 and all 1917, then this state of affairs was acceptable - but when they went on the offensive in the spring of 1918 they should have also gone on the offensive in the air. Indeed this is what Ludendorf demanded:

"Pursuits flights should appear at the same time as Battle Flights, their duty, by pushing forward over the line, to destroy the enemy over his own ground and prevent his reconnaissance from establishing the main lines of our attacks."

This simply never happened on British sector or the French sector where British IX Wing opperated!!!!!!

The Jagdstafflen seemed stuck in their 'safe' defensive posture of 1917. And again the excuse of numbers cannot be used.

To put it bluntly, neither the Jagdstafflen or the Schlastas really rose up to the challenge. There would have been heavier losses but the prize was victory and not the humiliation of the Armistice. At the end of the day performing 'admirably' was not good enough.

Cheers Russ

[steven brown]

Russ,
I find myself in complete agreement with your last post. The Germans needed to limit their losses, but they took it too far. As both you and I have said in other posts, preserving your force is futile if you lose the war. At any rate, I find the last half of 1917 very interesting, both for the tactical evolution and the fact that the writing was on the wall for the eventual German defeat.

[bristol]

The three of us agree on it Steve--as my posts 37 and 47 here--and loads on the 'sister' thread make clear.

I just can't understand that this view has not been endorsed more!

Dave.

[RussGannon]

"When the show started we all thought we had better do something a little special, so we fairly slapped it across him. The Corps brought down 50 or more that day, didn't they? Then the dear old 'Arch-Hun' puts in his official - 'Our airmen maintained their usual supremacy.' And these fat heads started swanking about their conquered territory." Diary Gwllym Lewis, 40 Sqn, 30 Mar 18.

Steve & Bristol

Now Gwllym Lewis fought the German Air Service over the Somme in a DH2 in 1916 and was then fighting them again over same territory in an SE5A. There is much in the above statement. Not that Lewis did not respect the Germen airmen, nor if anyone reads did the likes of JTB McCudden, Tich Rochford, or any of the scores of other Brit & Dominion (and volunteers from ex colonies) airmen icluding Mannock (see his diary) who have had their thoughts put into print. But they were most certainly not in awe of them. And my 30 year projectof building a day by day air war log leaves me with the same opion - respect but not awe.

I'll try to put this tactfully - This is the problem with the present wisdom of the air war, there is a heavy leaning towards holding the German Air Service in awe and swallowing without question the assertions of contemporary German propaganda in regards the the conduct of the air war - which results in a glaringly partisan perception, which gives almost no credit to those on the other side of the hill. The first casualty of this approach being historical truth and accuracy. Indeed in more recent times there has been a drive in a certain circle, to promote this unilatteralism and worse still place it above criticism.

My aim in my posts is to promote a more even handed understanding of the air war - which by necessity requires being a little harsh on the German Air Service in order to get the message across. A bitter pill no doubt for some. That is not to say that people should not be interested in things German, only that if one wants to dwell on the operational aspects, then one needs the clarity of looking at both sides of the hill.

That said Steve, I find the air fighting over the Ypres salient as the most rivetting - it was fiercly contested by both sides and did indeed see the RFC slowly gain the upper hand. But that in no way is to say the Germans were defeated; only that they no longer called the shots.

Cheers Russ.

[steven brown]

Russ,
When I said that the writing was on the wall, I was refering to the ground fighting and I fear I overstated. The British were evolving the elements of the all arms battle during this period which was the answer to the defence of the time. In the summer of 1918, the British tactics would be proven. It could be argued that the GAF was never defeated, but they certainly would have been if the war had lasted a bit longer.

[RussGannon]

Steve

Yes some would argue the GAF was never defeated - but if one is able to mount Wing attack after Wing attack - unopposed - on German airfields; then I would suggest that was a clear sign of defeat. And of course as I hope I have demonstrated - these Wing attacks did indeed do great damage to German units on the ground and certaily had the war gone into 1919 and these attacks continued then the GAF most certainly would have been beaten.

Too much is made of German claiming in the last months - that with the DVII the Jasta's were fighting back as strongly as ever. However Jasta performances were very uneven in these last months - some Staffelfuhrers I suspect, saw that the end was near and were unwilling to needlessly sacrifice their pilots. Also quite 40 % of the claims of this period are invalid if one is looking for 'hard kills'. It was more the illusion of an heroic last gasp effort.

The star performer in final months was JG III even allowing for their overclaiming. They most certainly fought it out to the end.

Also to tidy up a point - for Dec 16 - I make it only 4 'hard kills' west of line and 10 'hard kills' east of line on British sector. Another 8 'confirmed' Luftseiges can only be given question marks. And for what its worth the RFC look to have downed at least 10 German machines in return.

Yes you are correct that the tactics that the British had been developing in 1917 were indeed proven in 1918. It is worth pointing out that British Third and Fourth Army's attacking with far less divisions than the German's in March 18 - recaptured most of the lost ground in 9 attacking days during August 18 - to a line roughly that of 23 Mar 18. Together with First Army -taking big chuncks of what had elluded the Arras offensive of April-May 16 - they captured 64,263 POW's at cost of 106,712 cas. And of course in Sep & Oct they crunched through the Hindenberg line to the green fields beyond.

Cheers Russ

[bristol]

AS usual Russ i agree with all of your points.
Your last paras. are indeed dear to my heart and confirm what i have always said------this was indeed an artillery war, indeed THE artillery war, and by 1918 British artillery were masters of the art. I am allowing for Bruchmullers expertise--but the Germans never mastered the considerable art of the creeping barrage and British artillery work was predicated (by 1918) on sound mathematical principles-----predicted fire was the norm now and ---quite simply---could batter and take any defensive position assigned.

Superior Gunnery----no limit to shells, etc. Battle hardened soldiers---well equipped AND FED,-----and Generals who knew the decisive moments were at hand---and a flying service dedicated to supporting the soldiers on the ground at whatever the cost---these are the things that brought the British army to a peak of ability and made the storming of the Hindenburg lines a feat the like of which has never been bettered in the long and illustrious history of the British army.

Cheers,
Dave.