July-Dec 1917

[R Gannon]

jsontag

These quotes should say it all:

"I have scarcely met an Englishman who refuses a fight, whilst the Frenchman prefers to avoid every encounter with the enemy."

Manfred von Richthofen

"Across from us are the English. Young, sharp boys, they take on anybody and usually hold out to the final decision."

Ernst Udet.

"The French and the English fight completely differently. The Frenchman attacks only when he has superior numbers or when he has the tactical advantage; otherwise he tries to avoid fighting and thinks only of his own safety. The English always attack and fight to the end."

Heinrich Kroll.

"I was posted to Jagdstaffel 6 based near Courtrai in Flanders. Now I first noticed the real difference between the British and the French in the air. The British regard the whole business as a sport and were very dashing; the air fights we had with them were dangerous affairs where we got as much as we gave."

Johann Janzen

One can have bigger battalions but they are are next to useless, if they lack offensive spirit.

Cheers Russ

[jsontag]

Dave and Russ, thanks for the info. I never knew all that stuff about the French in World War I. Like I said, I'm new to World War I history and the info I have received from you two and everyone else here has been eye opening to say the least.

James

[Old Man]

This conversation, Gentlemen, has taken a turn which requires me to rise in defense of l'Aviation Militaire.

First, some raw casualty figures. French flying personnel killed or missing totaled 5,533, it being unclear whether 'missing' here means still missing after the war or posted missing during it. Working with some partial figures, it seems a reasonable estimate about a quarter of the deaths ocurred away from the front. Men posted missing roughly equaled men known dead at the front, and what proportion of that number might have survived in captivity is hard to estimate, but is likely to be less than a fifth of the total, judging by the proportion of survivors in the tallies of various well-known ace fighter pilots. In the last six full months of fighting (May to October, 1918), 589 French flying personnel died at the front, and 539 were posted missing, or fully a fifth of the total French losses, and likely a quarter of all French aviation losses at the front.

I am inclined to regard some of the German airmen's comments regarding the French with a dubious eye, for several reasons. German propaganda lines during the Great War treated England as the chief enemy, and France as her dupe and tool. German popular and military culture subsequent to the Franco-Prussian War regarded France and Frenchmen as inferior to Germans, and in doing so built on patterns of hatred solidified in the Napoleonic period and dating back to even earlier enmities and times when German lands were the battlefields of French wars and many German princes French pawns. Where statements jibe closely with cultural predispositions and official lines, it is best to take them with a bit of salt. Certainly Udet's account of his time opposing French fighters early in his career does not reflect the tone of the statements adduced above, but rather is positively doom-struck in its somberness. It is worth point out, too, that any number of English or French fliers can be quoted describing German fliers in similarly disparaging terms: if all this is to be taken at face value, everyone but the English were cowardly, and the English fool-hardy to a ludicrous extreme.

Several reasons why French casualties in the air do run somewhat lower than those of the English can be readily discerned.

One is simply that the French never operated at the sort of technical disadvantage that hampered the English from the latter months of 1916 into the middle of 1917. French fighters in that period were outgunned, but they were not out-performed, and this certainly translated into lower losses both for fighters and reconnaisance machines, even though in this period French corps reconnaisance machines certainly were as obsolete as the English.

Another is that, commencing with the Somme offensive, German air strength was concentrated against the English. With the Mutiny following the collapse of Neville's Chemin des Dames offensive, and the consequent cessation of offensive activity in French sectors for many months, this tendency solidified. Obviously, where there is less opposition, there will be fewer casualties, and for that matter, fewer victories, and that would be the case even if very aggressive behavior was displayed: it would mostly strike empty air.

A further reason is that French tactical patterns differed from the English. The English were alone in their aerial doctrine of deep offensive patrols, and even those who agree this brought benefits worth the price will not deny the great price paid in casualties for those benefits. French fighter escadrilles divided their efforts into long-range patrols and escort flights and barrier flights, a pattern regularized with separate sections within the escadrille. During the quiescent period of 1917, very little deep reconnaisance penetration was undertaken, as there was no purpose to it.

A more subtle reason, perhaps, is the French practice of creaming off their best fighter pilots into elite units. There is no denying this practice has a detrimental effect on the average fighting efficiency of regular units, leaving them with less aggressive and less skilled personnel, and this will tend to result not only in less victories, but in less casualties.

The significance of the casualty figures given above for the period of May to October, 1918, however, seems to me that these reflect a period in which the French army was fully recovered from the 'soldiers' strike' of mid-1917, and actively engaged in battle, including major offensive actions. That the French air arm was similarly engaged seems borne out by its butcher's bill....

[bristol scout]

Originally Posted by Old Man

This conversation, Gentlemen, has taken a turn which requires me to rise in defense of l'Aviation Militaire.

First, some raw casualty figures. French flying personnel killed or missing totaled 5,533, it being unclear whether 'missing' here means still missing after the war or posted missing during it. Working with some partial figures, it seems a reasonable estimate about a quarter of the deaths ocurred away from the front. Men posted missing roughly equaled men known dead at the front, and what proportion of that number might have survived in captivity is hard to estimate, but is likely to be less than a fifth of the total, judging by the proportion of survivors in the tallies of various well-known ace fighter pilots. In the last six full months of fighting (May to October, 1918), 589 French flying personnel died at the front, and 539 were posted missing, or fully a fifth of the total French losses, and likely a quarter of all French aviation losses at the front.

I am inclined to regard some of the German airmen's comments regarding the French with a dubious eye, for several reasons. German propaganda lines during the Great War treated England as the chief enemy, and France as her dupe and tool. German popular and military culture subsequent to the Franco-Prussian War regarded France and Frenchmen as inferior to Germans, and in doing so built on patterns of hatred solidified in the Napoleonic period and dating back to even earlier enmities and times when German lands were the battlefields of French wars and many German princes French pawns. Where statements jibe closely with cultural predispositions and official lines, it is best to take them with a bit of salt. Certainly Udet's account of his time opposing French fighters early in his career does not reflect the tone of the statements adduced above, but rather is positively doom-struck in its somberness. It is worth point out, too, that any number of English or French fliers can be quoted describing German fliers in similarly disparaging terms: if all this is to be taken at face value, everyone but the English were cowardly, and the English fool-hardy to a ludicrous extreme.

Several reasons why French casualties in the air do run somewhat lower than those of the English can be readily discerned.

One is simply that the French never operated at the sort of technical disadvantage that hampered the English from the latter months of 1916 into the middle of 1917. French fighters in that period were outgunned, but they were not out-performed, and this certainly translated into lower losses both for fighters and reconnaisance machines, even though in this period French corps reconnaisance machines certainly were as obsolete as the English.

Another is that, commencing with the Somme offensive, German air strength was concentrated against the English. With the Mutiny following the collapse of Neville's Chemin des Dames offensive, and the consequent cessation of offensive activity in French sectors for many months, this tendency solidified. Obviously, where there is less opposition, there will be fewer casualties, and for that matter, fewer victories, and that would be the case even if very aggressive behavior was displayed: it would mostly strike empty air.

A further reason is that French tactical patterns differed from the English. The English were alone in their aerial doctrine of deep offensive patrols, and even those who agree this brought benefits worth the price will not deny the great price paid in casualties for those benefits. French fighter escadrilles divided their efforts into long-range patrols and escort flights and barrier flights, a pattern regularized with separate sections within the escadrille. During the quiescent period of 1917, very little deep reconnaisance penetration was undertaken, as there was no purpose to it.

A more subtle reason, perhaps, is the French practice of creaming off their best fighter pilots into elite units. There is no denying this practice has a detrimental effect on the average fighting efficiency of regular units, leaving them with less aggressive and less skilled personnel, and this will tend to result not only in less victories, but in less casualties.

The significance of the casualty figures given above for the period of May to October, 1918, however, seems to me that these reflect a period in which the French army was fully recovered from the 'soldiers' strike' of mid-1917, and actively engaged in battle, including major offensive actions. That the French air arm was similarly engaged seems borne out by its butcher's bill....

Hi Old Man,
I am always disinclined to 'take with a pinch of salt' the words that were said at the time, and the disparaging remarks regarding the French aircrew ought not to be dismissed as entirely the result of race hatred going back to Napoleonic times.
The very reasons you use to explain lower French casualties can also be used to puzzle over their lack of aggression------French fighters not out-performed should have enabled many more French pilots to become 'aces'-----especially as you mention that from the Somme offensive German fighter strength (and quality) was 'concentrated against the English'-----yet the battle of Verdun was hotly contested until December! surely, given real aggression on behalf of the French in their not out-performed aeroplanes it would have been harder for the Germans to transfer squadrons onto the Somme front-----and then a bit later, that Quiescent 1917 on the French front was not at all the same on the British front.

Your feelings about 'creaming off their best pilots finds ready agreement, and it has already been mentioned at some depth, here or on the concurrent thread on more or less the same general topic.

I don't feel you should be reticent about calling it a Mutiny, as opposed to 'soldiers strike'--and i don't agree that the French army was 'fully recovered'.

No one is castigating the French aircrews---but i feel some stronger efforts might have gone a long way towards easing the burden on the R.F.C./R.A.F.----it was after all a coilition war, and certainly the British proved that massive (albeit costly) intervention in the happenings on the ground ably assisted those happenings----the French did not, and their ground forces mutinied---the Germans did not and their ground forces were beaten in the field--the British did...........

The German army was not defeated at home, did not mutiny, was not stabbed in the back, most certainly did not fail because it's props had been knocked away (it was indeed Germany who was 'propping up' those so called 'props') it was beaten on the battlefield. Perhaps that doctrine of aggression worked after all for the 'fool hardy' British.

Dave.

[Old Man]

Originally Posted by bristol

Hi Old Man,
I am always disinclined to 'take with a pinch of salt' the words that were said at the time, and the disparaging remarks regarding the French aircrew ought not to be dismissed as entirely the result of race hatred going back to Napoleonic times.
Dave.

I think, Sir, that you underestimate here the power of official views and cultural predisposition in shaping the views of persons enclosed by them. History abounds in instances where the descriptions of participants concerning events are not borne out by cooler examination of the circumstances at some distance in time, employing accounts from all sides and facts on record unavailable to the participating commentators. I repeat that French fliers' accounts of German airmen describe them as unwilling to cross the lines, unwilling to engage save at great advantage, and liable to break off combat at the slightest provocation, and in short accuse them of cowardice and a character quite inferior to the French. I am no more inclined to take these comments as definitive in that direction than I am in the other.

Originally Posted by bristol

The very reasons you use to explain lower French casualties can also be used to puzzle over their lack of aggression------French fighters not out-performed should have enabled many more French pilots to become 'aces'-----especially as you mention that from the Somme offensive German fighter strength (and quality) was 'concentrated against the English'-----yet the battle of Verdun was hotly contested until December! surely, given real aggression on behalf of the French in their not out-performed aeroplanes it would have been harder for the Germans to transfer squadrons onto the Somme front-----Dave.

I would dispute your main point here, Sir, that Verdun was 'hotly contested until December'. That is not the case, either on the ground or in the air. Verdun was an offensive on the part of the Germans, and by July had clearly failed in its execution. Once it was obvious the battle was not going to achieve the general collapse of French forces that was its goal, the German command attached a far higher priority to maintaining the line at the Somme than to holding the inconsequential ground gained at Verdun, and the latter was starved of reinforcements and equipment of all sorts. Bitter fighting still occurred on the ground, as the French placed a high premium of rolling back those German gains, but it was a subsidiary matter from the German point of view, and wholly written off at the strategic level by August.

Treating simply the aerial element, the concentration of German air equipment at the Somme, largely an English show, left the French airmen somewhat short of opponents in their areas of responsibility. Superiority of equipment, even high aggressiveness, will not produce a great many victories in such a situation. To illustrate from an extreme situation some years later, Japanese fighter pilots operating over China in 1939 and 1940 scored relatively few aerial victories, though they had greatly superior equipment and operated in a highly aggressive style: there simply were not that many Chinese aircraft left, and these actively attempted to avoid engagements.

Another point which should be recognized is the great expansion of the air arms and increased tempo of aerial operations as the war progressed. The air elements deployed to Verdun while it was active were much smaller than those concentrated even at the later stages of the Somme, and dwarfed by later concentrations. Air forces in 1917 were much larger than in 1916, and stupendously larger in 1918.

Originally Posted by bristol

I don't feel you should be reticent about calling it a Mutiny, as opposed to 'soldiers strike'--and i don't agree that the French army was 'fully recovered'.
Dave.

I am not reticent about referring to the events of spring and summer in 1917 as a mutiny, but employed 'soldier's strike' in my second reference because it seems as accurate a description as well. One of the main slogans of the rebellious soldiery was 'we'll hold the line but we won't attack!' Personally, Mr. Bristol, I have a great respect for the French mutineers, and view their action as one of the bright spots of the human spirit in the carnage of the Great War. The incompetence of French military leadership, and the high-handedness with which discipline was enforced, can only be described as murderous in degree. They squandered lives to no purpose and shot men out of hand for no good reason to cover their systemic bungling. The men were right and the officers wrong. To rise against the whole of military discipline is not an act of cowardice, but rather a great display of courage. What those men rebelled against had to be checked.

Originally Posted by bristol

No one is castigating the French aircrews---but i feel some stronger efforts might have gone a long way towards easing the burden on the R.F.C./R.A.F.----it was after all a coilition war
.Dave.

It was indeed a coalition war, Sir, and the coalition was an uneasy one. Common French comment on the English effort, certainly in the first half of the conflict, would curl your hair: among other things, it was widely felt the English held back in hopes of seeing France bled white so that it could after the war take advantage of French weakness. Even a man of the force of M. Clemenceau could not wholly disregard the widely felt popular bitterness toward England in his war policy. Deployment of the French air service to direct support of English efforts would have had to have been a decision at the highest levels of government; it was not even within the reach of the chief of the air service. Domestic politics would not have allowed it; the government which ordered it would have been collapsed within the week.

Originally Posted by bristol

Perhaps that doctrine of aggression worked after all for the 'fool hardy' British.

Dave.

Let me take this as an opportunity, Sir, to clarify both my interests in and my views on this larger subject of operational doctrine. What interests me most about aerial operations in the Great War is that they posed a wholly new problem, for which there were no obviously relevant precedents to look to for guidance. The major combatants each came up with different solutions, and these were subjected to the trial of combat. I am not so much interested in who came up with the 'right' solution, but in why each felt at the time it had the 'right' solution. Thus I will try and present the circumstances around the various decisions, and the reasoning behind them, to the best of my understanding, anyway, rather than attempting to press a case that one or another was clearly right or clearly wrong. At the time, I do not think that was very clear, whatever clarity may have emerged subsequently on the question. For certainly the real 'air power' war, the Second World War, did largely demonstrate the validity of the operational pattern of the English, at least in regards to fighter operations. Although an impish inclination to devil's advocacy moves me to point out that the first pure air battle of that war, the Battle of Britain, was won by the R.A.F. employing an operational pattern much more reminiscent of that employed by the Germans in the Great War than that of the Royal Flying Corps....

[bristol scout]

Well----let me see now,

Whilst not accepting your thoughts on my estimating abilities--and feeling very strongly that you yourself underestimate my breadth of historical Knowledge and perspective-------i never once used the word--nor did i imply it, nor did i ever allude to your 'definitive'.

I merely used words (hence thoughts) like "ought not to be dismissed" !

On Verdun, well as late as October (24th.) a 'massive French blow, using170,000 men, 711 guns and 150 aircraft retook fort Douaumont---that must have been ---something!

Then again--now December (15th.) in three days of bitter fighting, on a six mile front, the French took 11,000 prisoners, 115 guns and hundereds of machine guns and mortars----sounds pretty 'hot' ---and this is December---Verdun 'officially' ended on December 18th. How was it that the German air services were able to concentrate on the Somme---a bit more French aggression--mirroring what was happening on the ground, could not have hurt the British hard pressed, with not that many aircraft that were 'not out-performed' ?

As for notions that the men knew better than the Generals--well that is one of the 'futility' myths that are so prevalent still---for some obscure reason! I have heard it in many guises--the private--or worse still, the corporal bellyaching about how the war (any war) is being run--and how, if 'they' would only consult him--it would all be sorted out, in victory of course, in double quick time! Or (in a later war that you mention) how a junior officer like Douglas Bader could 'intrique' against his superiors with his notions on how to fight the Battle of Britain. I have heard it in Industry---who, working in that, or similar environments has'nt heard the shop floor worker recounting to anyone who will listen, how he knows better than the management how to do things? Any argument based on 'the men were right and the officers wrong' 'squandering the lives of their men does not go very far indeed in my book!

As for 'holding the line but not attacking' which i know of of course---well, what did that mean--leave the Germans in possession of most of your country until.....what? Until the Americans come in sufficient numbers to save us--which is exactly what the British are already bleeding trying to do...? I don't have much respect for an attitude that amounts to 'youv'e raped my wife and are living in half my house---but if you don't attempt to rape her again anytime soon, or try to take the little bit of my house left to me, i won't try to push you out!!!!!

And one might be forgiven for imagining that as it was France that had an occupying enemy on it's ground, and notwithstanding the fact that of course France shouldered the main burden from 1914 to16 (a point i never get tired of mentioning here) France nevertheless knew fine well that Britains tiny peace time army could involve itself only in smaller actions until the 'new' armies were up and running--and Britain and it's Dominions thereafter gave that 'last full measure' right up to the end.

The Battle of Britain was fought in a way that was, in a very real sense, dictated by the simple fact that France surrendered and German bases suddenly, and almost overnight, superceded the French ones----indeed the very architects of that defensive victory were very quickly ousted for what was deemed a more 'offensive reaching out' doctrine---and we need look no further than Montgomery's victory in the western desert to realise that it was massively aided and abetted by fighter, fighter/bomber and light bombers selfless heroism in attacking Rommels lines, and communications.

Indeed a straight, and short journey back to those trench strafers of the R.F.C./R.A.F.

Dave.

[Old Man]

Originally Posted by bristol

Well----let me see now,

Whilst not accepting your thoughts on my estimating abilities--and feeling very strongly that you yourself underestimate my breadth of historical Knowledge and perspective-------i never once used the word--nor did i imply it, nor did i ever allude to your 'definitive'.

I merely used words (hence thoughts) like "ought not to be dismissed" !

On Verdun, well as late as October (24th.) a 'massive French blow, using170,000 men, 711 guns and 150 aircraft retook fort Douaumont---that must have been ---something!

Then again--now December (15th.) in three days of bitter fighting, on a six mile front, the French took 11,000 prisoners, 115 guns and hundereds of machine guns and mortars----sounds pretty 'hot' ---and this is December---Verdun 'officially' ended on December 18th. How was it that the German air services were able to concentrate on the Somme---a bit more French aggression--mirroring what was happening on the ground, could not have hurt the British hard pressed, with not that many aircraft that were 'not out-performed' ?

As for notions that the men knew better than the Generals--well that is one of the 'futility' myths that are so prevalent still---for some obscure reason! I have heard it in many guises--the private--or worse still, the corporal bellyaching about how the war (any war) is being run--and how, if 'they' would only consult him--it would all be sorted out, in victory of course, in double quick time! Or (in a later war that you mention) how a junior officer like Douglas Bader could 'intrique' against his superiors with his notions on how to fight the Battle of Britain. I have heard it in Industry---who, working in that, or similar environments has'nt heard the shop floor worker recounting to anyone who will listen, how he knows better than the management how to do things? Any argument based on 'the men were right and the officers wrong' 'squandering the lives of their men does not go very far indeed in my book!

As for 'holding the line but not attacking' which i know of of course---well, what did that mean--leave the Germans in possession of most of your country until.....what? Until the Americans come in sufficient numbers to save us--which is exactly what the British are already bleeding trying to do...? I don't have much respect for an attitude that amounts to 'youv'e raped my wife and are living in half my house---but if you don't attempt to rape her again anytime soon, or try to take the little bit of my house left to me, i won't try to push you out!!!!!

And one might be forgiven for imagining that as it was France that had an occupying enemy on it's ground, and notwithstanding the fact that of course France shouldered the main burden from 1914 to16 (a point i never get tired of mentioning here) France nevertheless knew fine well that Britains tiny peace time army could involve itself only in smaller actions until the 'new' armies were up and running--and Britain and it's Dominions thereafter gave that 'last full measure' right up to the end.

The Battle of Britain was fought in a way that was, in a very real sense, dictated by the simple fact that France surrendered and German bases suddenly, and almost overnight, superceded the French ones----indeed the very architects of that defensive victory were very quickly ousted for what was deemed a more 'offensive reaching out' doctrine---and we need look no further than Montgomery's victory in the western desert to realise that it was massively aided and abetted by fighter, fighter/bomber and light bombers selfless heroism in attacking Rommels lines, and communications.

Indeed a straight, and short journey back to those trench strafers of the R.F.C./R.A.F.

Dave.

I meant nothing personal nor disparaging by the comment, Sir. We put different weights on things, in several areas, and all I meant was that I place more weight on the shape culture imposes than you seem to. Obviously, I feel I am correct in this, just as you feel your weighting of such factors is the correct one. You would be correct to infer from my closing comment above that I do have a weakness for devil's advocacy, and am engaged on this line partly because someone has to present a case for the French air service here. There remains a sizeable void, certainly in English, regarding French aerial activity in the Great War, making it difficult to assess in the round.

Regarding the final stages of Verdun, the actions you mention were major French offensive efforts, but were not major German defensive efforts. They were delivered against a fought-out force. Douamont, by the time it was retaken, was a shattered shell, wrecked by an explosion of its magazines caused by careless handling of munitions, rather than a functioning fortification. These attacks were what made Neville's reputation, and in their artillery preparations particularly set the pattern for the debacle at Chemin des Dames.

While we certainly will not come to agreement on the value of the French offensives in the early period of the Great War, I do stand by my characterization. They gained nothing; worse, they contributed mightily to the wreck of the French army while gaining nothing. The doctrines and attitudes of the French high command at the start of the war were nothing less than ludicrous; military leaders who decide in essence that the supreme weapon is the bayonet at the same time the machine-gun and the heavy howitzer are going into mass production cannot be castigated too strongly. The idea that offensive action must succeed, and that if it does not, that is due solely to lack of ardor among the troops, is simply criminal in its blindness and foolishness. I agree with you that the French soldiery displayed admirable, almost transcendent fighting spirit in the early years of the war, and I blame the G.Q.G. for squandering that, to the point that what was left of it took for its proper target its own leaders.

I will close by adducing a few more figures relating to French aerial combat (like the others above, taken from "A History of French Military Aviation" by Christienne and Lissarrague).

The first is the official French compilation of combat results for the immediate period of the Chemin des Dames offensive, between April 6 and April 25, 1917. In this span of time the French claimed to have shot down 72 German aeroplanes, while losing 33 of their own. Of the German machines claimed, 63 were fighters, and 43 of those were said to have come down 'within French lines', while of the 9 observation machines claimed, only one was said to have come down in the French lines. Of the French losses acknowledged, 17 were fighters, with 10 of them going down behind the German lines, and 16 were observation machines, with 6 of these going down behind the German lines. I take the number of claimed German fighters with considerable salt, and have no explanation for the high proportion said to have come down within French lines: someone with more expertise than I on German fighter operations may perhaps weigh in here. I do, however, consider it worth noting that among the French fighter losses, which figures probably are accurate, a solid majority were lost in German territory.

The second set of numbers are overall figures for the Group de Chasse 15, commanded by Maj. Menard, during April and May of 1917 at the Chemin des Dames and vicinity. In this period, the several escadrilles of the unit flew 3,000 sorties, and reported 700 combats, two thirds of these over German territory. 52 victories were claimed, and 21 pilots lost. Again, I have no idea what the victory claims are worth, but feel reasonably sure the reports of the locations of combat are reliable.

[bristol scout]

Hi Old Man---forgive me for going a bit precious

However, back to business----If you are maintaining that French Generals were criminally inept for sending in attacks with the Bayonet, then, to be fair you must also conclude that German Generals were just as inept ---because their attacks, or more often counter-attacks, were conducted exactly the same?
And we know well enough that British Generals were profligate with their men's lives. But then so also were the Russians, And the Italians--etc. etc.

What we must conclude therefore--and similar casualty figures across the board seem to uphold this view----how could they not?-----Is that all the Generals of a complete Generation--right across the Globe---the highly trained proffessionals of the German Great General Staff, the unpredictable, but sometimes very successful officers of Imperial Russian Army, (only two major events of the war are known by the names of the Generals responsible for them---the disastrous Nivelle offensive of 1917 and the brilliant Brusilov offensive of 1916), the Republican products of St.Cyr, the Polytechnique and West Point, as well of those of Sandhurst and the Shires were all, since their performance was the same, criminally neglecting the basic tenets of war----such a proposition must surely be mythology unadulterated.

As for Verdun, isn't it a bugger when you set out to bleed an army white--and then find them unaccomodating when you decide you have had enough and want to break off the battle---but they decide to keep it going.

As someone who is a supporter of the 'strategy of evasion'---the 'knocking away of props'---what in the second war was called 'the soft underbelly' (who was it again who re-named it 'tough old gut)? An 'Easterner'--- You will, i know, at least concede that nothing much anybody did on the western front was very sensible in that viewpoint--the war should have been won elsewhere, and at much less cost!

Dave.

[steven brown]

Old Man,
It's good to see you reenter the lists.

Thanks for that paragraph in your post #123 about French fighter tactical patterns. It would be wonderful if you could expand on your comments. I think your point about all doctrines used during WW1 being experimental is quite valid. Without question, the British set the bar quite high as regards aggressiveness as an institutional characteristic. In all of avaition history, other air forces have equaled it, but none have surpassed it. I'm not particularly surprised that the French went their own tactical way. As for the comments of the German pilots, after having faced the high tempo of the British front, anywhere else may have seemed something of a rest.

[R Gannon]

Steven

In an earlier post I pointed out change in fortunes during April 17 - that in first half, the German's really seemed to dictate terms and then from 21 Apr onwards, the RFC look to make more and more of an inpact in aerial combats.

In relation to this I found this informative RFC document in the appendicies of the AVM Wrigley book: 'The Decisive Factor - Air Power Doctrine.'

'RFC Orders Regarding Offensive Patrols at Arras'
issued by HQ RFC on 15 Apr 17 and sent to all RFC Brigades:

"The GOC wishes the attention of Brigadiers to the necessity, under present conditions, of working offensive patrols at medium as wall as extreme heights.

The enemy seems fot the moment to have given up, to a certain extent, his method of depending entirely upon height and his machines and formations are undoubtedly slipping underneath our high patrols without being seen by them. His tactics are, of course, rendered easier by the cloud layer which, even on fine days, has extended of late somewhere between 5000 and 7000 feet. By coming up through or underneath these clouds his machines have on several occasions attacked our artillery and photographic machines unseen by our scouts although large numbers of the latter have been in the area at the time.

High patrols must be maintained, otherwise the enemy will undoubtedly adopt his former tactics again, but they often miss an opportunity through being too high. It must be remembered that the conditions which favour this form of attack by the enemy apply equally in our own case and that low patrols working under or through the clouds should obtain many opportunities of acting by surprise.

While, therefore, the GOC is very strongly opposed to anything in the nature of a local escort of scouts, he would like Brigadiers to consider carefully the advisability of working some of their patrols at or about the height at which the Corps machines are working, with high patrols up at the same time."

(Signed) RJ Barton, Capt
for Brigadier General
General Staff

Moreover this state of affairs is bourne out in the CR's of MvR; which point to most of his victories in April being scored on cloudy days at medium heights.

Cheers Russ