July-Dec 1917

[steven brown]

Russ,
Thanks for that quote from the British directive. It provides a small window into the tactical chess game that each side was engaged in. The Germans were obviously focused on evading the British fighters and attacking the observation aircraft, as they should have been. The British losses in the second half of April were not as high as the first half, and while there were many possible reasons for that, it could be that the British fighters were more succesful in interfering with the German interceptions of the 'working aircraft'.

[R Gannon]

Steven

Yes, I've been taking a bit more interest in altitudes of late - one average Brit fighter OP's were conducted 13-15,000ft. Sometimes up to 18,000ft on good days - but oxygen depradation a real problem above 15,000ft. Whilst a lot of fighter recon & Arty work was done around 7,000ft.

Height is really the key. I think too many enthusiasts devote too much time to manouvreabilty of fighters - horse power & fire power were the real keys to success. Attacking, if possible with surprise, from height. And where possible employing dive & zoom tactics and avoiding classic dog-fights.

Although I've never seen it articulated, I suspect MvR used clouds quite a lot in his tactical approach. Not only in April 17, but if you work through his CR's; he gains the greater percentage of hi victories on cloudy & over cast days.

Cheers Russ

[bristol scout]

Hi Russ,

VERY informative stuff my friend----time for some of us to re-read our history books with a fresh outlook perhaps.

Cheers,
Dave.

[Romani]

I am refloating this thread, with a blank slate for all the parties involved, and in the spirit of contributing to civil and informative debate.

There's a lot to comment about, so I will start at the beginning, continuing as time and energy allow.

Originally Posted by steven brown

Bristol,
You're correct to be suspicious about the value of creating an elite unit by taking the best men from other units. The case of JG 1 is a case in point. The idea of massing multiple Jastas at a critical point was a great idea, but allowing MvR to pick and chose talent from other units probably wasn't neccessary.

I am surprised about this misconception of Jagdgeschwadern as elite forces of picked pilots, it's a notion as outdated as thinking there ever was an "anti-Richthofen" squadron.

The JGs are best described as rapid deployment forces, to react quickly to threatened sectors and/or to achieve a concentration of forces at one point to achieve a local air superiority.

They weren't a concentration of hand picked aces, Richthofen and the other JG commanders picked up succesful aces to lead staffeln within the JG, but that was more or less the standard practice throught the GAS, aces were usually though not always given the command of a Jasta.

[Romani]

With the goal of sharing information pro bono publico, and answering the original question of the thread, extending the period one month earlier , I will copy excerpts from the excellent "The Great War in the Air" by John Morrow, the headers are mine, where applicable, I will write the source used by Morrow as noted in the endnotes

Air forces strength at Ypres

By the time Richthofen returned on 14 June, the air war was about to reach a new level of intensity with the Allied attacks in Flanders, first a Messines and then at Ypres. At Ypres between 31 July and 10 November the Allies concentrated 840 planes, 350 of them fighters, against the Gemans' 600, 200 of them fighters, in an aggressive aerial campaign.87

87. (The War in the Air Raleigh and Jones)

Beginning of infantry flyers

The British attack at Arras in April also witnessed the debut of "in fantry fliers," who had evolved from the protection flights for army cooperation planes (Schutzstaffeln or Schustas). These battle fliers (Kampf flieger) or, as they preferred to be called, storm fliers (Sturmflieger) supported the infantry with machine guns and grenades. That summer the Schusta became an effective offensive and defensive weapon, attacking enemy batteries, strong points, and infantry reserves with machine gun fire and light fragmentation bombs. Captain Wilberg, commander of fliers of the Fourth Army in Flanders, introduced wireless telegraphy to direct operations over the battlefronf. During the British attack at Messines on 6 to 14 June, despite Allied numerical aerial superiority, the German infantry fliers controlled the enemy breakthrough on the evening of the first day. 88
The infantry fliers took high losses in their dangerous work, as they ranged over the front at 600 meters altitude, buffeted by the drafts of passing shells, and then descended to strafe British troops from 100 meters about the trenches, in the dead zone between the artillery fire from both sides. In these units only the commander was an officer. The crews were almost entirely noncommissioned officers and soldiers.

88.
Pictorial history of the German Air Service,1914-18 Alex Imrie

[Romani]

The tide turns against the Jastas - Creation of the fighter group (Jagdgeschwader)


As the storm fliers asserted themselves over the battlefield, German fihter units found their task in the heavens above more difficult. In May and June the British, equipped with new fighters, began to regain the advantage. The German fighter force was ill-prepared to meet the challenge, most modern plane being the D5, which was merely a lightened Albatros D3. On 23 June, in an attempt to offset Allied superiority by concentrating resources, Kogenluft grouped four Jastas into Jagdeschwader 1 under Richthofeen at Courtrai. The mobility of what would soon be called the Richthofen Circus enabled the unit's colorful planes to appear at key points at the front with unprecedented rapidity.

Richthofen is wounded - German fighter pilots demoralized at British superiority

Richthofen had barely assumed command of JG1 when he was shot down on 6 July, wounded in the head from long range by an FE2 observer, while convalescing, he attested to the serious condition of German fighter forces in a letter of 18 July to his close friend, Lieutenant von Falkenhayn of Kogenluft staff:

I can assure you that it is no longer any fun being leader of a fighter unit at this army [Sixth Army]. . . . For the last three days the English have done as they please . . .
Our airplanes are inferior to the English in a downright ridiculous manner. The triplane [Sopwith] and the two-hundred-horsepower Spad, like the Sopwith single-seater [Camel] play with our D5s. Besides better quality aircraft they have quantity. Our fighter pilots, though quite good, are consequently lost! The D5 is so antiquated and laughably inferior that we can do nothing with it.
. . . The English even have C-planes [Bristol fighters], thus two-seaters, that the Albatros is not capable of overtaking, that overtake it in a curve with the greatest of ease, against which one is simply powerless.
You would not believe how low morale is among the fighter pilots presently at the front because of their sorry machines. No one wants to be a fighter pilot any more.

[steven brown]

Russ,
Given MvR's obvious tactical acumen, I'm quite sure that he would have exploited clouds or anything else that he could. Indeed, I'm sure that all the great tactical leaders on both sides were doing the same. Your idea that the British heavy losses in the first half of April are partially the result of a British delay in responding to the German tactic of flying under the cloud cover is very intriguing. As you say, a study of meteorological conditions and the height of patrols might yield an insight or two.

[Romani]

I will mention only briefly the "storm fliers" again and skip Cambrai because they were covered at length in the spin off thread from this one about effectiveness of ground attack. In this post I cover the equipment and quality of the 2-seaters unit, wich while the Jastas were in decline, they could hold their own in despite of Allied superiority thanks to an excellent material much superior to the mostly obsolete and mediocre 2-seaters flown by the Allies.


New German 2-seater types: CL and J classes

One of the reasons for the storm fliers' success was their aircraft. Beginning in the summer the Schutzstaffeln received the CL-types, Halberstadts and Hannoveranas, light, strong, and maneuverable two-seaters ...also received AEG, Albatros, and Junkers- Jl armored infantry fliers. Aircrews praised for the absolute security they offered from machine gun fire from the ground. Though they were vulnerable to enemy fliers above, their operational altitude of 100 meters was low for flak, which was ineffective under 200 meters.

German long range and observation 2-seaters -

German long-range reconnaissance crews also received superior aircraft. Top crews flew over the lines alone and at high altitude in high-performance machines, using their skill and the planes' ability to evade the enemy. At the beginning of 1917, they would climb to their operational ceiling of 15,000 feet behind German lines and do the reconnaissance at full speed, losing 6,000 feet on the way.94

94. Interrogation of observation officer, 21 January 1917

By the end of the year their planes were capable of 20,000-foot ceilings on such missions with little loss of altitude. Albatros C7s, DFW C5s, LVG C5s, Rumpler C4s and 7s enabled the best crews to hold their own even against the new British fighters.

British aces had a healthy respect for these two-seater crews, some of whom were formidable. Naval 8 squadron commander Johnstone found difficult to attack LVG, Albatros, and Aviatik two-seaters successfully because of their performance at altitudes above 17,000 feet. In December DFW, LVG, and Rumpler two-seater crews proved challenging opposition even for ace James McCudden. McCudden's modified SE5A could reach 20,000 feet, where craft like the Rumpler, whose heavily cambered wing was far more efficient at high altitude than the SE5A's flat one, usualy operated with impunity. In McCudden's accounts of combats with four seaters at high altitude, three escaped, while in an encounter at low altitude a lone DFW forced him to break off combat for fear of being shot down.
Billy Bishop's patrol of six once jumped a lone German two-seater, wich turned in a flash, attacked them head-on, hitting Bishop and another member of his squadron, and escaped, earning Bishop's accolade a "very fine pilot and a very brave man."

German air crews quality

Although heavy losses in planes and crews in 1917 forced the air arm to send aviators to the front with less training and shortages were affecting the quality of materials in aircraft and engines, the best and experienced crews and their airplanes remained highly effective. German observers in particular were an elite, much better trained than their Allied counterparts. While pilot training took two months, observer training three and was much more comprehensive. It cost less to produce pilots than observers, who seldom became pilots. Within the air arm, congenial relations reigned between commissioned and noncommissioned aircrew and tween pilots and observers, nicknamed Emil and Franz, who formed a close-knit team.97

97 interrogations, 30 April and 1 of May, 1917


Organization of the German air arm

In 1917, as air support became essential to the successful prosecution of land combat, the air arm became an integral part of the army. Each division had a flight unit and, if possible, a battle unit; each corps headquarters had two flight units for reconnaissance and artillery observation; each army headquarters had a flight unit for long-range reconnaissance three special photographic planes, a flight unit for observation for long range artillery, and a fighter wing or group.


Tomorrow, time willing, I will continue with the British

[steven brown]

Romani,
Welcome back to the debate. I plead quilty to what you call a misconception, that is, the idea that MvR had some advantage in hand picking pilots for JG 1. I cannot think of anything I've read that specifically stated it. It's just an impression that I've picked up.
The other points you bring up are the reasons I began this thread. It seemed to me that as 1917 progressed, the initiative, both on the ground and in the air, slipped from the German's grasp. I was interested in other's ideas on how the British attained dominance and the German's tactical response to the situation.
At this point in my understanding, I think the British became as tactically astute as the Germans, and combined with their aggressiveness, drove the Germans on the defence. Many of the German problems, lack of resourses and numbers, would have been less important if they were faced by a cautious foe. All the factors worked together. British numbers and superior aircraft were given greater weight when deployed aggressively and vice versa.

[R Gannon]

Steven

As one who indulges in original research, as oppossed to the high sounding regurgitation of the opinions & perceptions of others, in regards the clouds issue; I'd like to draw your attention to a comment at the end of a combat report submitted by 2Lt WW Brown of 84 Sqn on 17 Mar 18. Brown had led his flight to attack 9 'red' Triplanes flying just under the clouds at 7,000ft. In this fight he sent a Triplane down OOC and I'm pretty confident this relects the wounding of Ltn Stienhauser of Jasta 11.

His final comment is illuminating: ".....During the fight, the Triplanes kept stalling out of the clouds, firing short bursts, and then diappearing again."

I think it would be fair to say MvR was leading the 9 'red' Triplanes. And this like so many contemporary British windows to Jasta tactics presents a picture far removed from the popular romanticised picture of Jasta's - as a roaming pride of lions, in truth their tactical acumin was more akin to a pack of wolves - harrying assailants,avoiding direct combat and trying to isolate and pick off stragglers.

Cheers Russ