July-Dec 1917

[R Gannon]

Romani

Mate I repeat, all you do is selectively contribute what OTHER people have learned. You don't do any real research. And just because somethuing gets into print does not mean it is gospel - there is plenty in print in both book and journals about the WW1 air war that isn't worth the paper its written on.

Now whats all this twaddle about German Storm flyers asserting their influence on the battlefield? - I suppose if one only reads glossy German accountings, then one might be deluded into believing this, but the hard truth that you clearly avoid, is that evidence for the effectiveness of these Storm flyers (with exception of 30 Nov and then only on southern sector against badly overstreched 55 Div) is negigable to say the least. As was highlighted in the Effectiveness of Ground attacks thread - In the spriing offensives you should have no doubt or denial that the British were far far better served by the RFC's ground attack campagn than the Germans were by their Storm Flyers.

As a point, I also went through Bean's detailed accounting of AIF operations i and again throughout 1917 & 1918 references to interdiction by German aircraft is minimal / ineffective; whereas RFC / RAF interdiction is well attested in the German regimental records he regularly quotes - including on 8 Aug 18 which in another post you tried to deny!!!!!

Some other points;

You say British coppied German tactics - all they copied were dive & zoom attacks; when they finally had fighters powerful enough to do so - as to copying other German fighter tactics - mate, the British did not have the luxury of fighting over their own side - so they could not avoid combats, engineer local numerical superiority or spin away wjhen in trouble - just to highlight a few.

Re your zeroing in on the 10 Naval refusal re the 28 Sep 17 raid on Rumbeke - they did not decend below 2000-3000ft not 300ft as you write. What you miss when Redpath said they were 'not for it' in regards another lower attack - is that your much vaunted Jastas were never for it! I know this gauls you, but airfield attacks was a solely British speciality many of which were undeniably effective - the Jastas & Schlasta were a total none show in this respect.

Another little point - MvR was part of 4th Armee not 6th Armee when he wrote tht revealing 18 Jul 17 letter.

As to seeing the wood for the trees - I've always looked at military matters from the sharp end - I learn my trade from the bottom up. I'm never overly interested about the wars between generals & politicians.

And I draw my WW1 air war conclusions from my air war logs that I have spent some 30 years developing, not from browsing through coffee table books like Morrows (though it sounds like a better than average one). I also take great interest in German activities which avoids the perochial one sided accouting that you seem to like. All in all this allows me a far far clearer vantage point than most researchers allowing for clarity in areas where the pool has become mudied by this prevailing pre-ordained notion of German aerial superiority that has been allowed to take root over the last fifty years.

You are welcome to your borrowed opinions Romani and you can be assured I don't share them.

R Gannon.

[Romani]

Originally Posted by bristol

Hi Romani---I was just wondering---if your going to go through the whole book, page by page, as it were

I am done. That was the gist of it. It's just that I like Morrow's book because I arrived to similar conclusions on my own. He filled some blanks in my knowledge, confirmed some suspicions I had, and made me see anothers under a different light. Honestly, this book is from 1993, if I had read it years ago, I would never have joined the Aerodrome or started collecting obsessively all the books about Great War aviation that I could lay my paws on. On the other hand, if I hadn't acquired that knowledge, I probably wouldn't have fully understood or appreciate Morrow's brick.

If I make an argument against the dogma of the British offensive at all costs policy saying that perhaps it wasn't such a good idea, is easy to dismiss it as "yeah whatever, just because you say so" if I present sources that can be checked, you can connect the dots by yourself.

Since I like Morrow's thesis and I don't feel like reinventing the wheel, I admit I took the lazy, easy way and scanned those pages relevant to the discussion.

[R Gannon]

During the British attack at Messines on 6 to 14 June, despite Allied numerical aerial superiority, the German infantry fliers controlled the enemy breakthrough on the evening of the first day. 88
The infantry fliers took high losses in their dangerous work, as they ranged over the front at 600 meters altitude, buffeted by the drafts of passing shells, and then descended to strafe British troops from 100 meters about the trenches, in the dead zone between the artillery fire from both sides. In these units only the commander was an officer. The crews were almost entirely noncommissioned officers and soldiers.

Romani

I would like to zero in on the above piece of German gloss that you quoted in your post 135

Listen to what HA Jones writes in relation to German air ops on 7 Jun 17:

'The German aircraft showed more activity over the battle area on the 7th than they had done for some days past and, in the morning particularly, repeatedly tried to get through to attack the Corps aeroplanes. For the most part they were frustrated by the barrage patrols, while the distant offensive patrols pilots also engaged many formations which would might otherwise have penertrated to the Messines area.'

My combat log corroberates this appraisal.

Contrary to the above gloss there is minimal evidence of German flyeers over the battle area - and no evidence what so ever to back the claim that German Infantry fliers controlled the break through.

The only metion of German auircraft in Edmond's official history is this footnote refering to the second phase in afternoon when Aus 4 Div moved forward to exploit:

'A German aeroplane had reported the start of this movement to battaries behind the Lys. Gen Wenniger, commander this sector, mentions in his battle report that his guns had been so reduced by British counter-battery fire that he could not adequately deal with the tempting targets offered by columns of British infantry crossing the Messines ridge, and that only when they came within range of the 4th Bav Div artillery, on the southern flank south of the Lys, could material damage be inflicted.'

Beans exhaustive account of the operations of the ANZAC Corps (3 & 4 Aus Div, NZ Div & 25 Brit Div) provides another damning picture of this supposed German air intervention - his account notes that at 0800 a single German plane managed to get through on ANZAC Corps front and began to direct the fire of a single 5.9' gun situated near Deulemont. This caused some casualties. A second plane got through c1100 - leading to a concentrated barrage beginning at 1130 - causing casualties to carrying parties.

The next note comes on 8 Jun 17 when 4 German aircraft were able to overfly the ANZAC Corps leading to a major barrage on the southern shoulder of Messines ridge from 1200 to the evening. No ground however was lost.

Finally on morning of 11 Jun 17 at 0530 a single German plane flew forward after a night attack by 43 & 36 Aus Bn's which had driven back 11 Bav IR - apparently to mark a new line of defence for the Germans who clearly had fell back too far.

This hardly corroberates German claims - pointedly both Bean & Edmonds also note some fanciful claims made in German histories about their 'failed' counter-attacks on 7 Jun 17 - sounds like German face saving both in the air and on the ground.

Edmonds also offers another interesting insight gleaned from an official German source: This state that Group Whytshaete was supported on 7 June by 5 Recon units, 2 Schustas & 1 Jasta. More over on moring of 7th, due to previous offensive activity by RFC, the Jasta was down to only 5 servicable machines whilst one of the Schusta's only had 3 of its 6 machines.

You being an expert, will undoubtedly know that the Jasta was Jasta 28, and this is a clear pointer that in the previous days they had suffered far more (aircraft) losses than just Emil Schaefer as is admitted in German reports.

Hope this fills in more gaps in your knowledge and that you appreciate that this underlines the danger of unilateral works, that only consult surviving German records. They rarely if ever present a balanced view of things.

Just for the record on 7 June FAA 211 had one machine shot about by ground fire whilst a Schusta 19 crew were wounded (and probably shot down) in air combat on 4 Armee front.

R Gannon

[R Gannon]

Romani

I would also like to zero in on your naive comment:

'I make the arguments against the dogma of the Bruitish offensive at all costs policy saying that perhaps it wasn't a good idea..'

So what then would have been a good ides???????? Please evail us of what you would have done if you were in Trenchards's shoes????

A point I have constantly made, is that the air war was not a separate theatre of war - it was linked, indeed subordinated to the ground war. And from 1 July 16 the British, with the exception of German 1918 Spring offensives, were on the offensive both on the ground and in the air. And it is the support that one gives to your ground troops which counts and in this regards the RFC / RNAS / RAF far excelled over the German Air Service have no doubt!!! Don't delude yourself by reading gossy German 'comic cuts' or perochial Germanophile perceptions, in isolation to what was actually happening on the British side.

Similarly in any war, any attacker will suffer heavy casualties if they are faced with a well trained and equipped defender - it is a simple fact of war. And if you arre not prepared to take casualties then you will never win a war. And I'm sure you know of the addage - the best form of defence is attack!!!!! And when you consider that whole battalions and indeed Brigades were being decimated in a single day on the ground, then if you were possessed of a military mentality, then you would grasp that the RFC losses were acceptable in view of the benifits they provided to the waging of the land war.

Addmittedly it is gauling that the RFC had to often prosecute the offensive policy with by comparison obsolete aircraft - with inevitable casualties - and my heart goes out to the pilots and crews who so selflessly sacrificed themselves - these were the real hero's not the swaggering Jasta pilots in the 175 hp two gunned Albatros flying in the relative safety of their own air space. Even when MvR was complaing in his 18 jul 17 letter - the RFC was still having to send goodly numbers of comparitively underpowered and under gunned Pups, DH5's and Nieuports against the DV's.

But maybe this bull dog spirit is the reason why the Red coats stood their ground and fought and won at Albuera when their less than resolved Allies quit the field.

Your mate Russ

[Romani]

To Mister Gannon: (all others skip this)

I am not looking at your posts anymore, I opened the last one, saw a few words and you seem to still be gnawing the same old bone, wich proved the wisdom of my decision. You don't need bother writing replies or comments addressed to me personally.

I am done in this thread, and I have no wish to engage in any debate or conversation with you.

To other posters:

That aside, in the spirit of contributing something of interest to other readers, and since it takes a minimum effort on my part,the following excerpts on British offensive policy from the Chapter on 1916, pages 171-72 are enlightening, as they show light on how this was carried over to 1917

The British strategy of seeking combat regardless of location or odds in an unrelenting offensive over enemy lines was alien to German fighter tactics. German Lt. Baldamus, downed by the British on 11 December. 1916, commented on the contrast in style between British and German aviators:

You seem to be magnetically attracted to any German aeroplane you see, and never weigh the situation. I saw one of your machines take on one Fokker, then two Fokkers, then three Folckers, before being shot down at Lille. We do not look for fights unless it is our duty. With us a machine ritould return without a fight, unless it is specifically sent up to fight. To return without a fight and with our work done, is the task with us. 131

Trie British, on the other hand, interpreted the German mode of operation as a lack of courage.

(snip)

Despite the fall resurgence of German fighter forces, Trenchard did not retreat from his offensive doctrine. Instead, the RFC headquarters' late September memorandum, "Future Policy in the Air," indicated a hardening of Trenchard's resolve that the airplane was primarily an offensive weapon.133 He believed that the French experience at Verdun had demostrated the value of the offensive. The British policy during the Somme of "relentless and incessant offensive" had forced the Germans on the defensive, and if the Germans took the offensive, the RFC would become more aggressive. He also believed that the value of the RFC during the Somme was its assistance to the ground forces and its offensive actions. He refused demands for the direct protection of army cooperation craft and instead advocated an even more vigorous offensive policy of bombing raids and patrols 20 miles behind the lines, a policy whose value he considered proven by the fact that fighter losses were five times those of corps aircraft, who could perform their work without interference. 134



My personal opinion: (who nobody needs bother to read)

Things are rarely clear cut as entirely right or wrong. I believe about RFC strategy that what might have been a success in 1916, was a failure in April 1917, and had mixed results in the July-December 1917 period.

Anyway, even if the RFC had been best employed, the capability of aviation in 1917 to influence events on the ground was marginal, given the stalemate of trench warfare and the failure of British offensives throughout 1917, with the exceptions of Vimy Ridge and Cambrai, where a breakin was achieved and a breakthrough was within the grasp if things had been different.

[steven brown]

Romani,
Thanks for the quotes from Morrow. Overviews like that are valuable to me in my current state of knowledge on this subject. I need to get that book as well as so many others.

Russ,
It's my understanding that the British became a bit more discriminating as to when and how to attack. Please see my post 21 in this thread. It seems the British realized that Hawker's old command,' attack everything', required a bit more sophistication. Too much audacity can be counter productive. Having said that, the fact remains that the audacity displayed by the British gained them the initiative and exposed the German lack of resources. German material and manpower shortages would not have mattered if the British had been timid.
I agree with your advice about reading divergent views. It's the only way to form complete ideas.

[R Gannon]

Romani

I'm simply demonstrating that yopu are punching way above your weight and that pretty well everything you say can be taken to task.
Qualify for example your claim that RFC influence on the ground were marginal!

How can you say the RFC failed in April? You seem to be loosing yourself in the body count syndrome - at no stage, despite losses, did the German Air Service ever deny RFCoperations over German territory in that bloody month. How can that be deemed failure?

Instead of endlessly trying to belittle the RFC's efforts & BEF ops on the ground with your superficial and selective reading of WW1 air & land operations - how about mounting a credible defence of Germn Air Service operations beyond quoting glossy German comic cuts that never wash when put under the microscope and answer why time & time again German regimental histories bemoan the absence of the German Air Service when it counted.

R Gannon

Steven

Yes it is importany to objectively evaluate the efforts of both sides. I'm well aware of what is in print but I try where ever possible I try to share data and opinions drawn from my own air war log - created by toiling long at the coal face of grass roots data.

What should not be allowed, or at least given credibility, are those, who driven by their ingrained biases; are want to formulate pre-concieved conclusions and then attempt to make the facts seem as to fit those biased conclusions.

Cheers Russ

[steven brown]

Russ,
Yes, you and I have talked about this before. There's nothing wrong with having an opinion as long as you give it up when confronted with indisputable evidence contridicting it. I certainly had a lot of nonsense in my head when I first started learning this subject!

[R Gannon]

Steven

Yes this is the beauty of Forum - freedom of speech - unlike an earlier arena of WW1 air war debate - where that debate would be stiffled when it did not pander a certain viewpoint.

Cheers Russ

[R Gannon]

Steven

If time does not beat my two fingured typing - here is anoth informative RAF document from the AVM Wrigley appendicies:

'The experience of fighting during 1918 has again proved the value of a vigorous and continued offensive in the air whether the army is advancing or retireing. At the same time tasks allotted to the RAF in direct connection with the fighting on the ground continue to increase, each new task imposed has the effect of reducing the offensive power in the air. A conflict of interests thus arises between the requirements in the air and the requirements on the ground, but the latter being dependant on the former, it stands to reason that the primary task of the RAF must be to gain and maintain superiority in the air, as without such superiority the effective co-operation of aircraft with other arms is hindered, and the Army may be deprived of all assistance from the air at times when it is most needed.

The methods by which the RAF can assist the Army are as follows:
a. By close co-operstion with the other arms, Cavalry, Artillery, Infantry and Tanks, in battle.
b. By reconnaissance and photography.
c. By the destruction of enemy communications by bombing.

In addition assistance can be afforded by:
a. The attack with bombs and machine gun fire of enemy troops and transport on the ground by low flying attacks.
b. The formation of smoke screens by dropping smoke bombs.
c. The dropping of ammunition and food to the troops in the front line.

These latter tasks absorb machines and reduce the offensive power of the RAF in the air. They can, therefore, only be justified if superiority in the air is assured.

Superiority in the Air

The normal method of gaining superiority in the air is by the defeat of the enemy fighting machines in the air. This postulates two conditions:
a. That the enemy fighting machines can be found.
b. That when found they can be engaged in combat.

With the number of machines available on any given front it may not always be possible to be strong in the air throughout the hours of daylight. To attempt to keep fighting machines in the air during each hour of the day would probably result in being weak everywhere and at all times. Apart then from local fighting patrols the available fighting machines should be concentrated in such strength as to preclude engagements.

Recently the enemy has consistantly refused combat against regular formations, and has adopted tactics against single machines and stragglers. In addition he has concentrated large formations of fighting machines with the object of attacking our bombing formations....'

A little more to follow later.

Cheers Russ