July-Dec 1917

[bristol scout]

HI STEVE,
Yes, and of course creating 'elite' units is not a perfect arrangement.
As Field-Marshall Slim once said (a different subject, and war but the same logic)
" .......was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the army, especially of the infantry, not only by skimming the cream off it, but by encouraging the idea that certain of the normal operations of war were so difficult that only specially equipped 'corps d'elite' could be expected to undertake them. Armies do not win wars by means of a few bodies of super-soldiers but by the average quality of their standard units........the level of initiative, individual training and weapon skill required in, say, a commando is admirable, what is not admirable is that it should be confined to a few small units. Any well trained infantry battalion should be able to do what a commando can do. This cult of special forces is as sensible as to form a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and say that no soldier, who does not wear it's green hat with a bunch of oak leaves in it, should be expected to climb a tree" !!!!
Field Marshall Lord Slim, 'Defeat into Victory'

Perhaps a similar mindset resulted in a reduction in the abilities of the 'run of the mill' Jastas etc.

Almost certainly the scorn and contempt heaped on those in high command between the war's (in britain) worked it's baleful influence on those having to command in W.W.2---and ---dreading to make mistakes of their own, made some that --they themselves---should have known better!

But---in the end--'all came right' in both wars----just lot's of people had to die getting there.

Dave.

[steven brown]

Bristol,
You're correct to be suspicious about the value of creating an elite unit by taking the best men from other units. The case of JG 1 is a case in point. The idea of massing multiple Jastas at a critical point was a great idea, but allowing MvR to pick and chose talent from other units probably wasn't neccessary. At the end of the time frame of this tread however, JG 1 was losing experianced pilots to lead the new Jastas being formed. This dilution of talent, combined with the attrition of the last half of 1917, must have affected JG 1 as well.

[bristol scout]

Originally Posted by steven brown

Bristol,
You're correct to be suspicious about the value of creating an elite unit by taking the best men from other units. The case of JG 1 is a case in point. The idea of massing multiple Jastas at a critical point was a great idea, but allowing MvR to pick and chose talent from other units probably wasn't neccessary. At the end of the time frame of this tread however, JG 1 was losing experianced pilots to lead the new Jastas being formed. This dilution of talent, combined with the attrition of the last half of 1917, must have affected JG 1 as well.

Steve,
how well that also describes (although not 'self inflicted) the situation on the ground in 1916 on the British front.

The tiny regular army gone past recall, the massive 'new army' lacking any kind of experience or martial ability, other than courage and enthusiasm----which simply is'nt enough against a resolute enemy.

Very few of the old regulars left to train and 'nurture' and a fearsome learning curve---and not just for the other ranks, but right up the ladder---awaiting---but no time to learn except in action (not forgetting that the 'infamous' first day on the Somme was also the 132nd. day of VERDUN!

The Germans had suffered the same at Ypres, in the Autumn of 1914 when they had thrown untrained but enthusiastic volunteers into battle---they afterwards referred to it as the 'KINDERMORD'---massacre of the innocents!

Sorry iv'e drifted again, and yet not as much as it may seem! To understand the air war, it is essential to fully understand the ground side of things----but i don't want you to think i'm pontificating or lecturing Steve.
Dave.

[steven brown]

Bristol,
Be not concerned about pontificating and lecturing, which at any rate, I don't feel you were doing. I became interested in WW1 avaition some years ago, but was distracted until recently. I've only begun to study this topic recently, and have learned a great deal from Russ, Graeme, you and many others. Please feel free to point out the error of my ways. I air my opinions here to find out if they have merit.
I fully recognize the need to study the air war within the context of the ground war. I'm reading several books right now on Passchendaele, Cambrai and the Ypres area in general in the latter half of 1917. It seems to me that the British made a huge leap forward in both ground and air tactics during this period. I'm really interested in understanding those changes and the response of the Germans to them.

[R Gannon]

Steve & Bristol

Quite a bit of water has passed under this particular bridge since I've had a chance to dangle my hook.

A point on numbers over the Ypres salient July - Nov 17. HA Jones in 'War in the Air Vol IV' with assistance of Reicharchive showed that there were 840 'Allied' aircraft arrayed against 600 German for most of the air battle betwwen La Bassee and Belgian coast. Of the latter some 200 were fighters. Indeed 24 of the German's then 43 Jadgstafflen were employed over the salient.

Pointedly however we should not get too carried away with the notion of these German units suffering in their Albatros DV's & Pfalz at the hands of SE5's Camel's & Bristols. These types were only gradualy coming into the line. Units like 1 Sqn & 29 Sqn soldired on with their Nieports, 54 & 66 Sqn with their Pup's, 32 Sqn with their DH5's, 1 Naval with their Sopwith Triplanes and 19 & 23 sqn's with their SPAD VII's - all of which the Albatros & Pfalz had a destinct fire power & horsepower advantage as well as the home ground advantage.

As to elite units - again too much is made of JG 1 as an elite unit. Jasta 10 was a mediocre unit both before and after Voss. And even the much hyped Jasta 11 was only an average performer over the salient. The best performers were Js 26, Js 36, Js 6, Js 4 & Js 18 (when under Berthold).

My view is that too much is made of Jadgstafflen performance - if they achieved their suuccess fighting over the British side, then they would truly deserve thee acolades that are so readily heaped on them. Of course they did not and I feel a more balanced view of the air war is required.

In an earlier post, note was made of the hopeless of the RFC's losses over Arras in the Spring - but again we must not look at the air fighting in isolation to the ground war - the naive body count appraisal so popular particularly with Germanophiles which leads to the flawed reasoning that as the Germans shot down 4 for 1 so they were winning in the air!

A simple quote from the KTB (war diary) of II Guards Fusiliers fighting at Bullecourt on 7 May 17 probably sums up the true picture:

"Our airmen nowhere in sight and the English are as cheeky as the devil."

[bristol scout]

Good points Russ, and complete agreement here.

I have long been an advocate of two points that are not always stressed on these pages enough,

1) The R.F.C. and temporarily the R.N.A.S. squadrons 'on loan' were tied inexorably into the British army tactical stance which was offensive orientated. (not surprising as the R.F.C. WAS army) This resulted in an offensive doctrine which was without doubt Trenchards---but which linked seamlessly (how could it not) with overall army tactics, and indeed Strategy.

I would say that the Air arm only became truly offensive Strategically with the formation of the I.A.F.

2) That it is, as we mostly agree, impossible to view the 'air war' without at least some understanding of the 'ground war' it was so important an adjunct to. Unfortunately their are some here with only hazy understandings of what was going on on the ground, although i don't mean that to sound overly critical---it's just that they are so inextricably linked they cannot be classed as seperate disciplines.

Too many times we hear comments like 'the air war itself did nothing to alter the war either way' or some such

Dave.

[steven brown]

Gentlemen,
Am I correct in my impression that British scout tactics changed and matured from late 1917 on? Prior to this time, it seems that flights were sent out to patrol an area and were operating independently. But after this time they began to have flights operate together for mutual support and before engaging, seeking some advandage. Similar to the Jasta's tactics, but with more tenacity and the need to fight it out to the bitter end since they ( the British ) were within the German lines.

[steven brown]

Russ,
I'm completely in agreement with you about the Jastas' performance.It doesn't do any good to conserve resources, attempt to fight only with clear advantage and gain a positive kill ratio if you end up losing the fight. The Germans were never able to curtail the RFC/RAF, and that had quite an impact on the ground war. Resource poor or not, more consistent aggression on the part of the Jastas was required.

[R Gannon]

Bristol & Steve

The RFC & att RNAS certainly had an influence on the ground. A good negative example is 16 Aug 17 - the Battle of Langemarck - the second major thrust of Third Ypres. Poor waether & poor communications led to a break down of co-operation between the Corps squadron's and the attacking divisions, where after reasonable gains on the ground, German counter-attack divisions were able to retake much of the won ground as the Corps aircraft were largely unable to direct Arty fire onto them to break up the attacks.

The next two major thrusts on 20 Sep & 26 Sep saw these problems overcome and the German counter-attacks were broken along the line.


The other great contribution was between 21 March & 28 March, when every available British squadron was thrown into low missions against the advancing Germans particularly from 25 March onwards. There can be no doubt of their effectiveness & contribution to slowing & halting the German advance. Again Jones in War in the Air gives ample evidence from German regimental histories to support this. Histories which again bemoan the lack of like support from their own air force.

The superficial readers however seem to dwell on what looks to be some good scoring on the part of units from JG I & JG III against SE5's & Camel formations - but in truth these successes were not in traditional dog-fights but against low flying planes - either encumbered with bombs at the beginning or low on ammo & fuel at the end. The bottom line being that these successes did little to relieve the suffering of the attacking German troops on the ground.

Of course when the boot was on the other foot from 8 Aug 18 onwards when the German Armee's were being forced relentlessly back - there was no like sacrifice on the part of the Jadgstafflen.

Tactics - one WW2 pilot said the prevailing tactics were the opinion of the Squadron commander at the time. What should not be missed is that British Offensive Patrol's were just that and British formation sought out and pretty well always attacked all German aircraft which could be closed with. Often without any finess. The problem was that in late 16 & early 17 the avaerage British scout lacked the horse power to routinely get above German scouts so as to gain the best advantage in attack - this was compounded by half the firepower which meant they could only achieve half the effective fire potential of the German scouts.

With the advent of the 200hp SE5a in particular and Camel's to a lesser extent from mid 17 onwards - British patrols could get above German formations and then dictate terms. The Dolphin also enjoyed this advantage in 1918.

On the other side of the coin, it is clear from British reports that Jasta formations would willingly accept combat - even at a height disadvantage - up to the middle of 1917. Thereafer they became more - to use the RFC venacular - 'Hunish.' Unwilling to accept combat without advantages of height or numbers - preferring dive and zoom attacks on formations or shaddowing them with aim of pouncing on stragglers. Not pretty but effective,

A common German Jasta tactic was to fly an upper & lower patrol. Usually three machines would fly in front and below the remainder of the Jasta formation - usually 5 to 6 machines. In part the lowere patrol were on lookout for Corps machines - 3 aircraft being the best number for attacks, as any more would see macines getting in each others way. Two would distract the observer while the 'kanon' would close in from behind and below. The second aim was to act as bait for British scouts. Once attacked the Lower flight would melt away and the Upper patrol would strike with advantage of height. I think it was a good tactic and many an inexperienced Brit scout pilot paid for taking the bait.

But certainly as 1917 progressed British flights would go out in pairs and co-operate. 1 Squadron foe example always sent out two flights at same time: one on Northern patrol and the other on Southern patrol over the salient, the two often meeting over the central salent. Jasta's also clearly co-operated from an early stage. It is interesting for example how Jasta 4 nearly always appears in Jasta 11's combats in April & May quite some time before creation of JG I.

I think the problem the German's had was not a lack of courage but a lack of recources - I'm ceratain both at Jasta level & Kofl level they knew they could not absorb the attrition an offensive air war would entail - not so much pilots but machines. By fighting over their own side they could better manage attrition but at the same time they surrendered the inituative.

Time as always against me.

Cheers Russ.

[Old Man]

Originally Posted by RussGannon

In an earlier post, note was made of the hopeless of the RFC's losses over Arras in the Spring - but again we must not look at the air fighting in isolation to the ground war - the naive body count appraisal so popular particularly with Germanophiles which leads to the flawed reasoning that as the Germans shot down 4 for 1 so they were winning in the air!

I expect, Sir, it was this post of mine you refer to:

"...Of course, because there were so many more English aeroplanes the percentages were lower, but another factor would surely be that German losses were higher that month than in the previous April. The thing about 'Bloody April' was not just the numbers lost by the R.F.C., but the sheer hopelessness of it, reflected in a ratio of losses running four or five English to one German. People's attitudes are much different when they honestly feel they are giving as good as they get...."

It seemed to me there was an unstated question hovering in the O.P., namely, why does September 1917 have no great dismaying name in English air annals while April 1917 does, since fewer men and machines were lost during the latter than the former. That piqued my interest and I gave an off-hand answer, that I stand by. The difference in the quality of equipment operated by the R.F.C., and its manifest effectiveness in contrast to the earlier situation, made a great difference in the attitude of R.F.C. fliers towards the losses they suffered.

I have said in other discussions that I do not feel that in any meaningful sense the Germans 'won' an air campaign in Bloody April, because I know of no evidence that they produced a situation in which English staffs were dissatisfied with level of information and assistance to artillery fire the R.F.C. provided them during the Arras fighting. That was the point of all aerial activity, and losses are immaterial to it, at least so long as the training and production facilities behind the air component are sufficient to bear them and maintain it in operation, and the moral of the men holds up despite them. By that standard, actually, it is pretty hard to point to any 'victory' in an air campaign during the Great War, since there are not many instances where it can be said one side of the other was 'blinded' by the activities of its aerial opponents, though of course General Weather can be said to have inflicted numerous setbacks to one side or the other.

That the men of the R.F.C. knew they were terribly outmatched in terms of operational equipment in the spring of 1917, and went into battle knowing their prospects for survival were poor if it came to a fight in most cases, seems beyond reasonable question. They were not fools, after all, and the technical mis-match had been obvious for months. That they went up and over anyway speaks with great credit to their sense of duty and qualities as fighting men, even as it indicts the men in charge of procurement and production harshly.

The equipment situation changed markedly to the favor of the R.F.C. during the summer of 1917, not only through the improvement of English equipment, but the lack of any improvement in quality of German equipment. No less than the Herr Rittmeister himself was complaining bitterly about the obsolescence of the Albatros, after all, and it was by then a design that was year old, which given the tempo of technical change in the field was practically pre-historic. It is not that all obsolescent types were removed from the English inventory, but newer, much more effective types did appear in sufficient numbers to alter both the actual and the perceived balance of the aerial contest, and to spread among the fliers of the R.F.C. a sense that a corner had been turned, and things were getting better, and would go on getting better.