July-Dec 1917

[steven brown]

Russ and Old Man,
Thank you for the very informative and clear posts. I always look forward to them.
The impression that I'm getting is that by late 1917 many flight leaders in the RFC were realizing that attack at all costs was not productive. A realization attributed to Sholto Douglas by author Ralph Barker, was that more British losses occurred while attacking than defending, because during an attack, flight support was lost due to individual pursuit of targets. Men like Mannock and McCudden stressed the importance of seeking the advantage before attacking, and that it was ok to live to fight another day. Also that the initiative to attack must lie with the flight leader. This was what the Jastas had been doing for some time, but I feel that the Jastas took casualty avoidance too far. Of course the Germans had men like Lother R and Werner Voss who were aggressive to a fault, as did the British.

[Sagittarius]

but I feel that the Jastas took casualty avoidance too far.

I'm very doubtful at this statement. In late 1917 the german airplanes were not only just not competitive, the allies have also outnumbered then more and more. So I think the germans just did the only thing what was right in this situation: Simply mot attacking when the odds are against you. They could not efford avoidable losses of men and machines in greater numbers like their opponents could. German supply was quite stretched already at this time and it didn't became better in 1918.
So in my eyes the german had simply no choice. They weren competitive enough for struggleing with the allies at each encounter.

[steven brown]

Sagittarius,
Thanks for your thoughts. I was not saying that the Jastas should have been as aggressive as the British, and in my first post of this thread, I expressed my surprise at how well they held on in late 1917, but I do feel that they should have intervened more often over the front lines to disrupt the British gun spotters and ground strafers. I understand that their resources were limited and that they were doing what they felt they must, but the RFC attacks on the German ground troops were very distructive. It accomplishes nothing to save resources if you lose. Maybe I just do not realize how bad their supply situation was. I have not yet read much about 1918, but it seems the Jastas were much more aggressive then, at least on the French/American front.

[Old Man]

Originally Posted by steven brown

Sagittarius,
Thanks for your thoughts. I was not saying that the Jastas should have been as aggressive as the British, and in my first post of this thread, I expressed my surprise at how well they held on in late 1917, but I do feel that they should have intervened more often over the front lines to disrupt the British gun spotters and ground strafers. I understand that their resources were limited and that they were doing what they felt they must, but the RFC attacks on the German ground troops were very distructive. It accomplishes nothing to save resources if you lose. Maybe I just do not realize how bad their supply situation was. I have not yet read much about 1918, but it seems the Jastas were much more aggressive then, at least on the French/American front.

I think Mr. Bristol made an excellent point, Sir, here in an earlier post:

"The R.F.C. and temporarily the R.N.A.S. squadrons 'on loan' were tied inexorably into the British army tactical stance which was offensive orientated. (not surprising as the R.F.C. WAS army) This resulted in an offensive doctrine which was without doubt Trenchards---but which linked seamlessly (how could it not) with overall army tactics, and indeed Strategy."

This applies to German aerial operations, and jagdstaffel operations, as well. German orientation on the Western Front was defensive, as the Germans had gains in hand from the very beginning, and Allied forces were doing a very good job of bleeding themselves white in futile offensives. German aerial practice linked seamlessly into overall tactics and strategy as well. English airmen did what they were ordered and organized to do, and so did German airmen.

It should be appreciated that division of labor in the German air service differed somewhat from that in the R.F.C., and entailed more division into specialities. The jagdstaffel were conceived as interceptor units, to rise and meet and defeat penetrations into German territory. Escort and ground attack work was handled by different formations, equipped with two-seat machines, eventually of the CL class, which were equivalent in performance and handling to single-seat machines, in the style of the Bristol Fighter. Just because jagdstaffel were not performing these tasks does not mean they were not being carried out, and with some effectiveness.

In any case 'trench fighting' was extremely hazardous for the airmen. It has been a while since I read through Mr. Gould-Lee's memoir, but I recall his account of ground attack work at Cambrai describes being shot down several times, and confesses that the work scared the dickens out of him. It was determined by studies during the war that four hundred feet was the optimum height for a man on the ground with a rifle or machine gun to shoot accurately at an aeroplane, and in ground attack work, a pilot was pretty much operating right around that 'sweet spot'.

[bristol scout]

And indeed anyone wanting a 'flavour' of how deadly ground strafing was need only read 'Winged Victory'. " Unfortunately they (camels) were good machines for ground strafing..............it was, indeed the great casualty maker........you could do very little to avoid machine gun fire from the ground (which)...no one could get used to...."

I must draw your attention to 'futile offensives'----If the Germans had been in occupation of half of England, and quite content to stay there---would it have been futile to attempt, time and time again, no matter what the cost, to drive them out? Futile is a word not always best used when Democracy itself is fighting for it's very existence. And talk of how 'futile' had been that war, led inexorably to 'appeasement and dis-arming ---which, equally inexorably led to the next war---was that war futile? And yet such great bloodbaths as happened on the western front, and indeed on all fronts--- also happened in the later war---the names were mostly Russian names, and not French or Belgian ones! The grinding down, attritional battles still took place---how could they not---it was the era of mass armies par excellence.

The invention of one piece of, in a later war almost ubiquitous, kit would have changed the face of that war, namely, the hand held walkie-talkie.

I have little time for 'Futility'.
Dave.

[Old Man]

Originally Posted by bristol

And indeed anyone wanting a 'flavour' of how deadly ground strafing was need only read 'Winged Victory'. " Unfortunately they (camels) were good machines for ground strafing..............it was, indeed the great casualty maker........you could do very little to avoid machine gun fire from the ground (which)...no one could get used to...."

I must draw your attention to 'futile offensives'----If the Germans had been in occupation of half of England, and quite content to stay there---would it have been futile to attempt, time and time again, no matter what the cost, to drive them out? Futile is a word not always best used when Democracy itself is fighting for it's very existence. And talk of how 'futile' had been that war, led inexorably to 'appeasement and dis-arming ---which, equally inexorably led to the next war---was that war futile? And yet such great bloodbaths as happened on the western front, and indeed on all fronts--- also happened in the later war---the names were mostly Russian names, and not French or Belgian ones! The grinding down, attritional battles still took place---how could they not---it was the era of mass armies par excellence.

The invention of one piece of, in a later war almost ubiquitous, kit would have changed the face of that war, namely, the hand held walkie-talkie.

I have little time for 'Futility'.
Dave.

At the risk of going very far afield, Sir, I must stand by the assessment. It is hard to describe the predominantly French offensives prior to Verdun as anything but futile, or to regard the Somme or the various offensives of 1917 as victories for the Allies. The tool of attrition worked both ways, and harmed the Allies quite as much as it did the Germans. I should state, though, that in assessing the overall conduct of the Great War, I am not a 'Westerner' but an 'Easterner', and am of the view French and English generals made a bad mistake in war policy by concentrating on their enemy's strongest point rather then seeking ways around, which were open. As a matter of fact, the Allies won the Great War in the east, not the west, and no less than Gen. Ludendorf considered the tipping point to be the belated break-out from Salonika, rather than the repulse of his offensive in the west. The tremendous loss of life and limb absorbed by all major participants in the Great War left them hollowed out as societies, and it is in this great fact, rather than in atmospherics of its characterization, that the seeds of both 'appeasement' and 'revanchism' are best sought. That the French leadership desired above all else to expel Germany directly from French soil is understandable, but it played into their enemy's hands, particularly when pursued in the manner it was. Nor do I consider that 'Democracy itself' was at stake in the Great War. The real stake of the Great War was the Ottoman question; even the long rivalry between France and the Germans was a comparatively minor element. A German victory would have resulted only in the creation of a land empire in western Europe, similar in most ways to that of Austro-Hungary in central Europe and Russia in eastern Europe. England would have maintained its maritime empire, though without its Middle Eastern elements that would have remained with a revitalized Ottoman realm, and the United States would have remained effectively an imperial power in the Pacific and Latin America. All major contenders in the Great War were imperial powers to one degree or another, and in empires democracy is solely for the metropolitan population. Without regarding this as a particularly good outcome, a decent argument can be made that it might have been preferable to the decades of totalitarianism that did eventuate from the pressing of the Great War past 1917.

[bristol scout]

I respectfully disagree with everything you have said ----in that post you understand----but we, being poles apart on the conduct of the Great War, it's impact had it been lost on world wide Democracy, and the reasons for appeasement should perhaps leave it at that.
It would be quite unlikely that our diametrically opposed views could ever find common ground regarding where the bulk of and best of the German army was, and why it had to be beaten there.

With respect though,
Dave.

[steven brown]

Old Man,
Once again a comment of yours has cleared the muddle of my half informed impressions. Until now it had escaped my attention that the purpose of the Jastas was to be intercepters defending the rear areas. That would explain MvR's comment about letting the customer into the shop, and also explain the Jastas not penetrating British airspace on a regular basis. I guess my next question would be wheather this strategy changed in 1918. I believe that the German army adopted a defensive stance from the end of Verdun until the spring of 1918 when they went over to the offense. Would it be true to say the same for the Jastas?
Your debate with Bristol about the overall picture of the war is quite interesting. I think I'll wait for the two of you to break a few more lances before I foolishly express my opinion.

[Old Man]

Originally Posted by bristol

I respectfully disagree with everything you have said ----in that post you understand----but we, being poles apart on the conduct of the Great War, it's impact had it been lost on world wide Democracy, and the reasons for appeasement should perhaps leave it at that.
It would be quite unlikely that our diametrically opposed views could ever find common ground regarding where the bulk of and best of the German army was, and why it had to be beaten there.

With respect though,
Dave.

Be assured, Sir, the respect is mutual, and I agree we should agree to disagree on the matter, and return to the topic of aerial operations. I appreciate your courtesy and restraint on something clearly close to your heart, that you have given a good deal of thought to.

Be well, Sir!

[Old Man]

Originally Posted by steven brown

Old Man,
Once again a comment of yours has cleared the muddle of my half informed impressions. Until now it had escaped my attention that the purpose of the Jastas was to be intercepters defending the rear areas. That would explain MvR's comment about letting the customer into the shop, and also explain the Jastas not penetrating British airspace on a regular basis. I guess my next question would be wheather this strategy changed in 1918. I believe that the German army adopted a defensive stance from the end of Verdun until the spring of 1918 when they went over to the offense. Would it be true to say the same for the Jastas?
Your debate with Bristol about the overall picture of the war is quite interesting. I think I'll wait for the two of you to break a few more lances before I foolishly express my opinion.

Mr. Bristol and I will break no more lances on the matter, Sir. He is quite right that we will neither persuade the other, nor find much common ground. The question broke governments when it was a current matter, and we will not settle it here, and so should agree to disagree and leave it at that.

I appreciate your kind words towards my comments, which I consider to be pretty general, and which are based on secondary sources and the usual memoirs only. There are certainly people here vastly better informed than me on most any topic, and certainly on German fighter operations.

The principal aerial feature from the German side during their offensives in the spring of 1918 was intense activity by the ground attack units, the Schlachtsaffeln, equipped with CL class machines by Halberstadt and Hannoveranner. These operated in mass formations of a couple of dozen machines (at least that was the doctrine), and down low enough that standard stick grenades were their usual 'bombs'. Their 'beatings up' of ground troops had appreciable effect, and their actions were every bit as aggressive as anything done by English fighters during the retreat of their forces.

The operations of the jagdstaffeln must have altered to some degree in the fluid situation. During the static period, they were wired in to a system of front-line observers who reported the appearance of Allied aeroplanes by telephone to their fields. This system must have broken down during the advance, and flights towards active patches would seem indicated instead. On the other hand, the need to conserve fuel must have provided a check to flights 'on spec' that might not encounter anything. There must have been a great deal of improvisation and muddle, whatever the orders and doctrines were. Rapid advance can be nearly as disorganizing as rapid retreat, especially when all involved are used to immobility.