July-Dec 1917

[steven brown]

Old Man,
You mention that your knowledge is mainly general, and even if that were true, I need more insight into just that sort of thing. For example, the role or doctrine of the Jastas explains the behavior that I questioned. Again, thank you for taking the time.

[Old Man]

Originally Posted by steven brown

Old Man,
You mention that your knowledge is mainly general, and even if that were true, I need more insight into just that sort of thing. For example, the role or doctrine of the Jastas explains the behavior that I questioned. Again, thank you for taking the time.

Well, I am happy to be of some help, Sir. There are few better ways to clarify one's own understanding of a matter than to try and communicate it.

There are a couple of shaping factors I think deserve remark in this sort of discussion, that are often overlooked.

One is the factor of hindsight. We look back on this question of fighter usage through the lens of mature air power, come of age as a decisive arm in the Second World War. This pretty much established the correct use of fighters is dominating the enemy's air space. It is very easy to read this back into earlier periods, with a degree of surprise that anyone ever thought anything else. But it was not so clear at the time of the Great War that this was the case. People were feeling their way towards the proper use of the new tool, and there was room for disagreement, and varying interpretations of what early experience meant. To take an analogy from the technical side: the pusher configuration proved a dead end, but this was by no means certain even by early 1916. DeHaviland's Scout was every bit as fast as the first Halberstadt and Fokker D types, put into production after it was in service. The French had a sound argument at the start of the war in preferring pusher designs to tractor biplanes and monoplanes on grounds of the superior view they gave the crew. People who continued to design such machines, and even purchase them, were not fools; they had plenty of evidence in immediate conditions and practical considerations for their decisions. Perhaps they should have given different weights to various evidences than they did, but that is not quite the same thing as being a hidebound fool, as it is popular now to regard them.

Another factor is the different situations and experiences of the various air arms from the start of the Great War. A lot of human behavior grows up without much thought or planning: you do this and that as a first resction, and these become 'how things are done' for you, and guide your future behavior and thought accordingly. Just as the strategic situation of the German armies differed greatly from that of the Allied forces from the start of the Great War, so did the situation and experience of the German air service. Early reactions and decisions, and even perhaps national proclivities, set what might be called an organizational culture in the German air services that did differ somewhat from that in the Allied forces, and particularly in the English.

It should be remembered that from the early days the observer commanded a German two-seater: he was the officer, and his pilot generally an enlisted man trained by the army to be his aerial chauffer. Even officer pilots had little scope for adventuring on their own hook. This was a very different situation from the English, where in the early days the pilot was expected to show up with a pilot's license he had paid for, which effectively meant he would be an officer and gentleman, and keenly air-minded. His 'passenger' would usually be an enlisted man, and when he was the officer pilot did most of the technical work of observation (which is one of the reasons the English so valued 'stability' in reconnaisance machines).

When 'air fighting' began, there is no doubt the Allies got the drop on the Germans aloft, with armed machines and more aggressive behavior. The general response of the commanding observers was to try and avoid these distracting encounters and get on with the work, which is what the commanders wanted done. When the harassment reached a bit above nuisance level, the German response was to revamp their observation machines into the C class, with much improved performance and with an efficient machine-gun armament for the observer. The improved performance would enable the machine to evade many of the armed Allied machines handily, and the efficient armament would enable the machine to see off those it could not evade.

The Germans stumbled into single-seat fighter operations wholly without plan. The Fokker Eindecker was an accident, quite auxiliary to the program of re-equipment the Germans were embarked on in the spring of 1915. C-type two-seaters were already going into service as 'fighters', being used to escort the slower and unarmed, but still predominant, B-type machines at the front, and being used to chase away Allied observation machines, and to engage French bombers in the Rhineland. The Fokkers were gravy, so to speak, and there was no clear idea, and certainly no planning, to guide their use. The nearest thing to a guiding principle was a resolve not to let their 'secret weapon' become available to the enemy. This is a perfectly understandable impulse, and it produced orders that Fokkers were not to be flown over Allied ground. Thus from the very start of real German air fighting, single seaters had an auxiliary character, and a geographically restricted employment.

Since the Germans commenced air fighting in a situation where Allied machines were common over the German rear, and this did benefit Allied planners, it is natural enough that the first impulse was to deploy the new armed aeroplanes to bar Allied fliers from getting across the German lines. While the Fokkers got all the publicity, most of the work was done by C-class two-seaters, grouped into Kampfstaffeln. The technique chosen was the 'barrage patrol', basically flying a beat along the lines, and the superior endurance of the two-seaters recommended them for the task. This technique is widely criticized, but it has a commonsensical air that recommends it to a methodical mind, and in the early days did have its successes. The Fokkers came to be a supplement and back-stop to these patrols, rising to engage Allied machines observed to have gotten through them. The barrage patrols also served to shield German machines on artillery spotting duties, and the faster, armed two-seat machines were mostly able to take care of themselves when required to cross the lines into Allied territory.

The barrage patrols reached their zenith at Verdun, and the French memoir 'Notes of a Lost Pilot', describing operations in a Farman escadrille during late spring and early summer there, recounts more encounters with fighting German two-seaters than with Fokkers, and expresses every bit as much fear of them as of the single-seaters. With the eclipse of the Fokker Eindeckers by Nieuports and DeHavilands, the better of the German C-type machines took on the full brunt of air fighting for the Germans during the summer of 1916.

The reassertion of the German single-seat component towards the end of the Somme, with new, much superior equipment and a more solid organizational structure, fell naturally into the earlier pattern of employment. After all, the situation echoed the earlier one: the sky above the German rear was full of English aeroplanes, used to having their own way there. Clearing them off was a natural first step to doing anything else. Since they never seemed to stop coming, the first step could never be completed. It paid great dividends in destroyed enemy machines, which it was reasonable to suppose must sooner or later have some effect on enemy behavior, and it conserved trained men and expensive material. The object lesson of many enemy machines lost through very minor damage, because of where they were when that damage was sustained, could readily be taken as a powerful argument the enemy was behaving very foolishly, and the course being pursued was clearly the proper one. And it was, after all, what had always been done, which is one of the most powerful arguments in human behavior, even if the 'time out of hand' in question is measured in mere months.

[RussGannon]

"A formation battle this side of the lines is often more successful, because an enemy can be forced to land. Formation fights on the other side are the most difficult, especially with an east wind. Then, the commander must not stick ridgidly to his plan, for he will face great losses."

Manfred von Richthofen

Never a truer word, and of course it was the lot of the RFC/RNAS/RAF to fight formation battles on the German side with the prevailing west wind.

Old Man - I wasn't taking a shot, merely using your comment as a springboard to push the point that the air war was inexorably linked to the ground war. Although I try to keep away from the higher politics of WW1 - I pretty well concur with most of what you write.

As to point on losses April & Sep 17 - I think we all need to remember that individual battalions on the ground were suffering more casualties in one day of these offensives than the RFC / RNAS were to suffer during the these months as a whole. This might sound a little cold, but when viewed from this perspective, then it is clear that the men at the top were prepared to take the air losses, when balanced against the fruits of their operations.

One thing about September was that whilst RFC losses were indeed high, the fighters & fighter recon did far, far, more real damage to the Fleigertruppe than in April. And if I remember correctly, there was an argument between some in KOFL 4 and MvR around Sep 17 as to whether barrage patrols should be mounted to deny the RFC German airspace. Because its was all very nice for the gentlemen of of the Jadgstafflen to scoring victories, but these are worthless if they fail to relieve the pressure on their hard fighting ground troops by denying the RFC free reign over German territory.

Another problem with the later 1917 battles is that the German's claiming standards on 4 Armee front were lower than those on 6 Armee front during Mar - May, which I feel deluded them into believing they were doing more damage than they actually were. That they were somehow still prevailing as they had in April (actually March - May) when in reality they had surrendered the inituative.

And if I may I will offer a personal critism of the Jadgstafflen - I get the feeling that too many of its pilots were seduced by the personal prestige gained by scoring victories, at the expense of doing their duty in regards supporting their hard fighting ground troops.

Steve - Although in his orders, Ludendorff called on the Jadgstafflen to operate offensivly on the Allied side during the Spring offensive - I can assure you that the Jadgstafflen never intuated even one formation battle over the British side of the lines.

Cheers Russ.

[josquin]

Russ

Yes, people forget too quickly that Great War air services really existed
for the purposes of supporting the armies on the ground. Also, per
Ludendorff's order in the Spring 1918, an O.C. can issue any order
he chooses, but that does not ensure it will be carried-out by the
people doing the fighting. As always, your examples are illuminating
and fill-in all the gaps left by all the other discussions.


Old Man

For a "generalist," you evidence a wealth of specific factual knowledge
at a variety of levels of abstraction and generality. As was true for
your Forum contributions earlier, your present analysis is
impressively considered and informed. You discern the
factors and forces underlying German strategy and tactics
and then use this understanding and data to impart some
clarity concerning why such choices were made. As before,
nicely done!

Regards

Josquin

[Old Man]

Originally Posted by RussGannon

Old Man - I wasn't taking a shot, merely using your comment as a springboard to push the point that the air war was inexorably linked to the ground war. Although I try to keep away from the higher politics of WW1 - I pretty well concur with most of what you write.

Understood, Sir. I did want to clear it up, though, particularly as your favorite 'fighting word' had been employed. I quite agree with you about the scale of the aerial losses by compare to what the men on the ground suffered, and I expect that was felt by many of the airmen themselves. Many airmen's memoirs show a keen appreciation for the predicament of the infantry, and sometimes even a tinge of embarrassment at their own greater comfort in comparison.

Originally Posted by RussGannon

One thing about September was that whilst RFC losses were indeed high, the fighters & fighter recon did far, far, more real damage to the Fleigertruppe than in April. And if I remember correctly, there was an argument between some in KOFL 4 and MvR around Sep 17 as to whether barrage patrols should be mounted to deny the RFC German airspace. Because its was all very nice for the gentlemen of of the Jadgstafflen to scoring victories, but these are worthless if they fail to relieve the pressure on their hard fighting ground troops by denying the RFC free reign over German territory.

I have one of Mr. Kilduff's books on the Rittmeister, Sir, and your comment jogged me into digging it out. Apparently this was an on-going conflict with a Hauptmann Otto Bufe, the aviation attache on 4th Armee staff, from the arrival of Richthofen and his new Geschwader on that front. Mr. Kilduff cites at length a letter of 18 July written by Richthofen from hospital to a confidant on the Kogenluft staff, complaining of Bufe's orders for barrage patrols, and how these are being pressed on the acting commander of JG1 during his absence. It should be remembered that from Haupt. Boelcke on down, the 'sperreflug' was considered a discredited tactic among active German fighter pilots, and they regarded it as something only a man clinging to the past would set the slightest stock in. Richthofen was being a perfectly orthodox fighter pilot in decrying this, the only difference being he had the prestige to disregard the orders, and press directly to higher headquarters for their suppression. It is worth noting that in his initial address to the staffel leaders of JG1, Richthofen reportedly stated the unit's priorities would be "annihilation' of enemy trench-strafers, single-seaters, and bombers. That would seem to be well in line with what you feel they ought to have been doing, and perhaps had he not been sidelined by Lt. Woodbridge, shooting from a 'pre-historic packing crate' only a few days later, Richthofen might have set an example during that summer that would have altered the pattern of German fighter operations somewhat.

I agree with your point, though, that some German fighting leaders and pilots may have placed too much emphasis on the rewards of prestige reaped by simple number of victories. Of course, it would be easy to believe that any destruction of enemy machines must work to the assistance of the men in the trenches, so the thing could readily co-exist with a feeling of doing every bit of their duty to their infantry comrades. Certainly the French had some similar problems with their fighter pilots, perhaps exacerbated by the fact that it was not just medals but sometimes money awards from private funds that were secured by a tally of victories (at least until the end of 1917 when the practice was abolished).

[Old Man]

Originally Posted by josquin

Old Man

For a "generalist," you evidence a wealth of specific factual knowledge
at a variety of levels of abstraction and generality. As was true for
your Forum contributions earlier, your present analysis is
impressively considered and informed. You discern the
factors and forces underlying German strategy and tactics
and then use this understanding and data to impart some
clarity concerning why such choices were made. As before,
nicely done!

Regards

Josquin

Thank you, Sir! I appreciate your comments very much. This is a subject I have been very interested since about seven years of age, which is longer ago than I care to contemplate. I have read what I could bring to hand, and thought about what I have read, but I have never had any opportunity to do original research, or lay in much by way of the more recent publications. I am very grateful for the detailed information and archival materials many here are willing and able to share.

[bristol scout]

Originally Posted by Old Man

Thank you, Sir! I appreciate your comments very much. This is a subject I have been very interested since about seven years of age, which is longer ago than I care to contemplate. I have read what I could bring to hand, and thought about what I have read, but I have never had any opportunity to do original research, or lay in much by way of the more recent publications. I am very grateful for the detailed information and archival materials many here are willing and able to share.

Hi old man,

Whilst i concur with the sentiments expressed by Josquin and Russ---and do so most comprehensively---I must wonder about your 3rd. para. post 30, re. the impact of the CL class at this time.

Certainly during the great retreats of the allies during the early part of 1918 in the German offensives---when serious disruption and heavy casualties could have ensued---they were conspicuous by theoir absence--a British officer who went through that near disaster, Sidney Rogerson wrote----" It was a crowning mercy that (the Germans) they had no Cavalry. How many times during the retreat did we thank heaven for this! The sight of a few mounted men in the distance would at once start a ripple of anxiety......Cavalry was the one factor which would have smashed the morale of the defence in a twinkling"
'The Last Of The Ebb'---Rogerson.
What mayhem a seious onslaught by all the German air service could have wrought!
Instead 'the two-seater Schlachtstaffeln had been expanded to carry out ground attack and other support tasks---their effectiveness seems very low.IT IS HARD TO FIND IN ANY ARMY UNIT RECORDS ANY MAJOR INCONVENIENCES CAUSED BY THEIR ACTIVITIES' Sorry for the capitals, they are mine but not in the sense (it is so easy to seem arrogant in posts while not at all trying to)are they meant to be 'hammering home a point----just reinforcing it i assure you.

The last from 'bloody april--black september'

In all my many years---like yourself---of reading and studying i have not come across many accounts of British troops being very harrased---during daylight---by 'ground attack', conversley there are plenty of reports from the enemy of just this.

I suppose i'm claiming, at the end of the day, that the CL class, whilst being perfectly good aeroplanes, just were'nt that much of a problem!!!

Dave.

[Old Man]

Originally Posted by bristol

Hi old man,

Whilst i concur with the sentiments expressed by Josquin and Russ---and do so most comprehensively---I must wonder about your 3rd. para. post 30, re. the impact of the CL class at this time.

Certainly during the great retreats of the allies during the early part of 1918 in the German offensives---when serious disruption and heavy casualties could have ensued---they were conspicuous by theoir absence--a British officer who went through that near disaster, Sidney Rogerson wrote----" It was a crowning mercy that (the Germans) they had no Cavalry. How many times during the retreat did we thank heaven for this! The sight of a few mounted men in the distance would at once start a ripple of anxiety......Cavalry was the one factor which would have smashed the morale of the defence in a twinkling"
'The Last Of The Ebb'---Rogerson.
What mayhem a seious onslaught by all the German air service could have wrought!
Instead 'the two-seater Schlachtstaffeln had been expanded to carry out ground attack and other support tasks---their effectiveness seems very low.IT IS HARD TO FIND IN ANY ARMY UNIT RECORDS ANY MAJOR INCONVENIENCES CAUSED BY THEIR ACTIVITIES' Sorry for the capitals, they are mine but not in the sense (it is so easy to seem arrogant in posts while not at all trying to)are they meant to be 'hammering home a point----just reinforcing it i assure you.

The last from 'bloody april--black september'

In all my many years---like yourself---of reading and studying i have not come across many accounts of British troops being very harrased---during daylight---by 'ground attack', conversley there are plenty of reports from the enemy of just this.

I suppose i'm claiming, at the end of the day, that the CL class, whilst being perfectly good aeroplanes, just were'nt that much of a problem!!!

Dave.

All I can say, Sir, is that every account I have ever read of the aerial end of the German spring offensives allots the Schlachstaffel an important role in the German battle-plan for the 1918 attacks. The machines and the techniques had certainly proved themselves in the counter-attack at Cambrai, which was in some ways a sort of dress rehearsal of the battle-method employed the following spring. My understanding is that they were employed in direct battlefield support, sometimes within only a few yards of advancing German infantry. There might not be many English accounts emerge from the collapse of strong-points carried in that manner: in all instances the initial assaults were marked by great confusion and disorganization in the English front. Perhaps using the machines for exploitation behind the crumbling battle front, as light tanks rather than assault guns, so to speak, would have brought better results. Certainly the greatest successes of Allied fighter-bombers in the Second World War were gained by such an employment. But again, we are dealing with a time of experimentation and learning in regard to new weapons, when there really were no established patterns for their proper use as yet. My basic point is that since German doctrine and organization alloted the ground attack role to separate specialist units of two-seat machines, rather than to their fighter formations, the fact that the latter did not often engage in such operations should not be taken as indicating that the Germans did not engage in them, or that German fighter pilots were shirking in a way English fighter pilots were not.

[steven brown]

Old Man,
Thank you very much for that remarkable overview and history of the evolution of German doctrine. I have not been able to find anything that economical in words or informative in my reading so far.
Thanks to everyone else as well. I feel like an eager student sitting at the feet of masters. A few more decades of reading and studying should hopefully allow me to hold my own and maybe even contribute.

[Sagittarius]

I agree to steven! Its always fantastic how much historical knowledge can be found here. Honestly I would love to add something but there is not much to say from me. Like steve I feel like a student in the comany of some really good historians. I salute you, gentlemen!