July-Dec 1917

[steven brown]

Russ,
I have never been disgusted by your posts. I find them very informative and a great help to me in learning this subject. If I may comment on your style, you're well informed and aggessive in presenting your ideas. I have no problem with any of that.

[RussGannon]

Steve

If the clock dose not beat me here is a little something on 26 Mar 18.

You may or may not know that 25 Mar 18 was the critical day on the British Third Army front during the Michael Offensive - quite simply 17 German divisions bludgeoned their way through 6 battered British divisions and reached the old Somme front line at Hamel & Serre (ominous names of 1 Jul 16). Whilst fresh British, Australian & NZ troops were being rushed into the line, an all out air effort was called for on 26 Mar 18.

Called upon to help were 1 Sqn (SE5's) & 19 Sqn (Dolphins) based far to the north at Bailluel on British Second Army front. The 1 Sqn experience is telling - either side of 0630 14 SE5's departed Bailluel for Bruay on British First Army front - this was base of 4 AFC (Camels) & 40 Sqn (SE5's) already commited to flying missions into Third Army area. The SE's arrived at 0720 and at 0850 they took off to low bomb & mg German ground formations to around Bapaume. They returned at 1055 and then went out again at 1255! Camels of 4 AFC were already in action same area at 0830 and low bomb patrols would return at 1130, 1230 & 1515. 19 Sqn flew its first mission at 1000 and then again at 1200.

Summaries of these attacks are telling and space & time will only allow four examples:

Lt Denovan (1 sqn) attacked a collumn of infantry on the march along main road at Villers by dropping bombs from a height of 100ft - enemy scattered and fell and a general panic ensued.

A camp at Sapignes was attacked by bombs and the personnel, horses and transport was dispersed in absolute disorder - later the camp was seen in flames. The following pilots bombed the camp and circled around firing heavily as the camp dispersed - Lt's Mawbey, Gray, Hollis and Magoun (1 sqn).

Lt Blythe (19 Sqn) attacked troops at Le Sars with bombs, also observing bombs fall amongst transport - some troops fell down others scattered. All ammunition was fired at troops which scattered in complete disorder.

Lt Hainsby (19 Sqn) dropped bombs on infantry marching west and scattered them completely.

There are over 30 other summaries from these squadrons telling similar tales. Many by names which would be familiar to those who own of 'Above the Lines' - Hamilton, rigby, Clayson & Bateman of 1 Sqn, Maj Carter, Capt Leacroft, De Pencier, Hardaman & Fairclough of 19 Sqn, GH Lewis of 40 Sqn, Malley & Trescowthick of 4 AFC - aces all.

Pointedly none of these missions were contested in the air; what losses two 1 Sqn SE5's ftl and one 19 sqn Dolphin ftl. One 1 Sqn SE5 missing (Lt Gray pow). One 4 AFC pilot wounded (Wright) All with possible exception of Wright to ground fire.

Opposition was finally encountered on the last outing when Js 2 & Js 26 dove on the low flying planes with Js 26's Ltn Reimer probably accounting for Lt Denovan kia and Vfw Fruhner downing Lt Hollis pow (both 1 Sqn). Ltn Lange most likely shot down 19 Sqn's Lt Blythe in flames and Js 2's Ltn Plange likely accounted for Lt Hainsby kia. A third 'Martinsyde' (sic) was claimed by Ostv Esswien which likely reflects the Dolphin of Capt Jennings who ftl at Mazingarbe.

There were no recorded German losses but Lt Rigby of 1 Sqn poured 300 rds into one attacking Albatros which went down in flames c 1710 and was confirmed by 40 Sqn pilots trying to act as top cover. The number of attackers was given as nine. Shorttly after c 1725 8 EA attacked 19 Sqn (given as 1 tripe & 7 Alb scouts). Capt Jennings together with Lt de Pencier and Lt Warden of 40 squadron combined to crash an Albatros at Achiet le Grand. Other Alb scouts were sent down OOC by Harrison and Learoyd of 40 Sqn. Harrison's was at 1740 from a dual formation of 6 Tripes & 6 Alb scouts.

You may note that my choice of examples centered on those pilots who made the supreme sacrifice that day in what was telling support for the hard pressed Third Army.

Not surprising then that the war diary of the German 2nd Foots Guards would complain of this figghting: 'There are many British but no German flying men up.'

Cheers Russ

[Vin]

Originally Posted by RussGannon

...One 4 AFC pilot wounded (Wright) All with possible exception of Wright to ground fire.

...

Wright attributes his wound to ground fire. His account

...As I levelled out I caught sight of a motor lorry on the road with a couple of machine guns mounted, blazing away at me, and a moment later I felt as if I had been kicked in the backside by a giant mule, would have bounced out of my seat had my seat belt not held me in.

His wound saw him hospitalised in England, returning in July 1918.

[steven brown]

Russ,
I have read nothing about the Michael Offensive except what is mentioned in the Osprey aces books, so your details about March 25 and 26 are all new to me. I do seem to recall that the weather was not condusive to flying the first few days of the offensive. Once again, thanks for the data.

[RussGannon]

Steve

Operation Michael was a very big battle. I only quote the example for those four squadrons - upwards of 30 others did much the same both on Fifth Army Front & Third Army front - and they all repeated it on the 27th & 28th.

The situiation pretty well stabalised on Third Army front on 26 Mar and on Fifth Army on 28 Mar. A German attempt by their 17 Armee at Arras on 28 Mar was pretty well stopped in its tracks - no mist that day.

But it flared up again both sides of the Somme on 4 Apr with another big German attempt to carry Amiens. But this was pretty well stopped in its tracks also - plenty of British low bombing here 4 Apr - 6 Apr.

The centre of action then moved north when both German 6 Armee & 4 Armee went on offensive on Armentieres sector on I think 9 Apr - reasonable gains first couple of days ( a Portugese division collapsed and left a gapping hole in British line) but attacks fought to a standstill by 18 Apr - again a lot of activity by Schlastas and low bombing by RAF.

A renewed effort was made at Mt Kemmel on 25 Apr with a prodigious number of Schlasta's involved. The height defended by the French was captured and its loss necesitated the British evacuation of the Ypres salient - which had been gained at such cost July - Dec 17. On the bright side - the salient was retaken at end of Sep 18 with very little loss to British.

In late May German offensive attentions turned south to French sector - and again RAF squadrons on attachment to French flew a large number of low bomb missions there also.

As I've said before it is important to become conversant with the land battle if you want to understand the air war - to harp this point - the air war was not a separate theatre.

Good hunting.

Cheers Russ

[bristol scout]

Hi guys,

I agree Russ--my posts 13--16--and elsewhere should leave no doubt about how the air war----which of course is 'our' main interest--was only a small (but truly vital) facet of the ground---and sea ----war.

Dave.

[Jos]

Steven,

From the excellent book Schlachtflieger! by Rick Duiven & Dan-San Abbott:

The weather on the 21 st March was both favorable an unfavorable to the attacking German troops. The Somme River valley in the middle of the attacking 2 Armee was completely enveloped with fog, which coupled with the mist and low clouds had a great effect on the batlle. The weather was favorable for the attacking German infantry in that they suddenly appeared out of the mist and fog and quickly overran the British defense formations.
It was unfavorable in that the low clouds, mist and fog prevented the German Jagdstaffeln from taking off. The weather on the flanks was aparrantly better, as Jasta 35b, based in the 17 th Armee reported an air victory at 09.00 hours. By way of contrast, in the 2 Armee the Schusta were not even able to take off until around 10.30 hours, when they could fly under the low clouds as the fog lifted slightly. Thus the Schlachtgruppen could attack the British front lines as well as range far beyond them to attack reinforcements, artillery and reserve troops.
The Jagdstaffeln, at least in the 2 Armee, finally left the ground at 12.30 hours, when Jage Nr. 1 reported the destruction of two balloons at 12.55 and 13.10 hours.

Jos

[Jos]

To continue (still from Schlachtflieger!):


The Schutzstaffeln performed admirably during this operation. Machine gunning and bombing the frontline trenches, including using hand grenades, they then attacked the rear positions and succeeded in preventing reinforcements from moving forward. The combined strength of the Schusta raised such havoc in the British lines that their withdrawal was inevitable. Coupled with the strength of the attacking stormtroops, the British were forced to retreat.
The German offensive gained over 1200 square miles. More than 90.000 British were captured and vast quantities of stores plus more than 1000 guns were taken by the Germans. The British suffered 164.000 casualties, the French about 70.000.
Yet on 28 March 1918, only a week later, the attack suddenly came to a halt at Albert. Why? Due to the British blockade.

Having captured many supply depots, the German infantry had suddenly fallen upon stores that the blockade had prevented them from having during three long years of war. The British tins of bully beef and jam were pretty mundane for the average British soldier, but a Godsend to the common German infantryman. There was bread, real bread, not ersatz bread comprised of 80% sawdust; real coffee, not a mix of coffee and 50-60% sawdust; cheese, eggs, hams, chickens, all of which were delicacies they had not experienced since 1915. These in addition to the French wines, champagnes, brandies and cognacs were sufficient to halt the attack while the Germans indulged themselves in a literal feast! Ltn. d.R. Rudolf Binding wrote that he paused the infantry attack he was leading to polish his boots with real shoe polish.
All this "indulgence" while the main objective of Amiens with its cathedral spires was in sight.
Therefore the extent of the British blockade begun in 1915 had a very telling effect on the German advance in March, 1918.


Jos

[steven brown]

Russ and Jos,
I'm quite aware that I need to understand the ground operations to put the air operations in context. I'm just finishing 3 books on Cambrai and Passchendaele, which is why I started this thread on that time period. This thread has moved on to 1918, but I'm not there yet! I'll be starting 1918 soon, I trust. Would you recommend a good book on the 1918 spring offensive? Again, thanks for the information. I'm getting a good headstart on 1918.

[bristol scout]

Well, yes---obviously to some degree----even a fair bit, it was down to blockade induced shortages---but Germany had a very powerful fleet which had declined to fight after Jutland---and finally disobeyed orders to fight and mutinied instead. A bit more 'fight' might have eased the burden at home and could'nt have hurt the war effort! Let's face it---that's what they were paid to do!

Also the reason for the slow down and halt might be found in the following facts----which figure quite heavily i think.

The magnificent instrument of war that was the 'old' German army was gone---by 1918 a more even playing field had been reached between the main combatants--British and commonwealth--and Germans .

When, from 1916 Britain started to shoulder more and more of the burden her Armies, which had started out (in 1916) as little more than an enthusiastic militia, had learnt in the hard classroom of battle to be very accomplished battle practitioners------The GERMANS on the other hand had, by the end of 1917 (to use Ludendorff's own words ' our infantry approximated more nearly in character to a militia, and discipline declined') had their skills base destroyed to a large extent.

The best of the German army lay dead on the battlefields of Verdun and the Somme. As the old core of superbly trained N.C.O.'s vanished---so discipline declined. This 'militia' like 1918 army (stormtroops were in themselves an admission of this) had come about not so much from difficulties with rations because of the blockade--but by death, because of the tremendous battles of attrition (first started during the American Civil War) and those casualties could not be replaced simply by numbers---the expertise was gone.
That stopped the advance---that and the levelled rifles of an opponent who had learned all there was to learn by then about fighting.

Dave.