July-Dec 1917

[Jos]

Hello Steven,

I can recommend:

Spring 1918. To the last man by Lyn MacDonald and The Kaiser's Battle by Martin Middlebrook.


Jos

[steven brown]

Thanks Jos.

[R Gannon]

Vin

Thanks for your post # 63 re the wounding of Wright. I only get a little time in Forum and am always in a rush.

Bristol.

I must admit I get a little fed up with the constant excuse making in regards the failures of the German war machine. This is in my view is the flaw in the German military mindset and those who unquestioningly embrace it - the inability to give due credit to the opposition. Of course all sides put the best possible gloss on their own troops activities, but I feel in this day and age when so much information is available about the operations of both sides that we should be able to see past that gloss and be a little more objective with our writings.

And as a student of the land battle of Operation Michael I feel like calling out: What about the sacrifice and defiance of the poor Tommies and ANZAC's on the ground????? As you point out it wasn't a route. There was an aweful lot of hard fighting on the ground 21 Mar to 28 Mar which brought the German jugernaught to a halt. And the record of that defence only 'occasionally' notes the interferance of the Schlasta's.

Cheers Russ

[bristol scout]

THANK YOU RUSS!

Dave.

[R Gannon]

Bristol

What also leaves me cold, is the style of presentation that leans more towards propaganda than historical truth and accuracy - where writers dwell on the claimed successes of their chosen side, whilst at the same time being less than forthcoming about their own losses.

This will probably be familiar ground to you but for the benfit of those who are looking in and are not particularly conversant with Operation Michael the simple arithmatic is as follows:

On 20 Mar 18 the Germans had amassed 62 divisions (many newly released from the Russian Front) in 17 Armee, 2 Armee & 18 Armee between Arras and St Quentin. Opposite them was the British Third & Fifth Army's the latter somewhat overstreched by a political decision for the British to take over additional frontage from the French. Between them they had 28 divisions and even though German establishment was a little less than Brit divs this still meant that the Germans outnumbered the British 3 to 1. Which as an ex-military man I know are the odds one requires to prosecute a successful attack.

On 21 Mar 18 (Der Tag) the 32 divisions of the German first line assailed 18 British divisions in the front line - with a thourough barrage of 6000 guns and the aid of mist great inroads were made into the British lines - there were nearly 40,000 Brit casualties, half of whom were taken prisoner. It was no walk over however, as German casualties also ammounted to about 40,000.

There followed what is called the retreat - in truth a fighting withdrawl as both Third & Fifth Army's sought to stem the tide. In all 42 British and Dominion divisions were committed. Also playing a pivotal part was the RFC. By 28 Mar 18 there were 20 unbowed Brit & Dom divs in the front line with another 7 battered divisions in close support. They were facing 37 German divisions in the front line, only a handful of whom had assaulted on 21 Mar. To the south 9 French divs faced off against 6 German divs in front line. Odds then were only 4 to 3 in German favour and hence German assault stalled. It is simple arithmatic, not the distractions of cans of bully beef or the state of the old Somme battle field.

An attempt to kick start assault on Amiens 4-6 Apr by 2 Armee saw 22 German divs attack 8 Brit & Dom and 4 French divs. This only resulted in some marginal gains.

British casualties for 21 Mar to 5 Apr came to 177,739 - half of whom were MIA (a goodly number of these being POW's). When French casualties are added, the total Allied loss came to approx 250,000. German losses also came in at nearly 250,000.

When the Battle of the Lys, 2nd Villers Bretonneux and Kemmel are added then British casualties came to 239,793 and French cas to 110,000. Total German casualties came to 348,300!!!!!!!!

As British author Gregory Blaxland noted - 'They were the most bloody 40 days of the war.'

Cheers Russ

[bristol scout]

Absolutely Russ---and what British General----ever----before or since ever had those massive numbers to contend with?

As Foch said---' Never at any time in history has the British army achieved greater results in attack than in this unbroken offensive.....' And to paraphrase John Terraine a bit...This was a victory due to the excellence of the ordinary fighting soldier, the commanders of armies, Corps and Divisions--and the loyal unselfishness of their Commander-in-Chief, who always new the cost had to be borne.

Britains Army of amateurs turned consumate proffessionals won the war----a pity that it's politicians could not win the peace, and that misconceptions of the way the war had been won, and neglect of the victories that had caused this, not only made the next 'round' more certain, but also made it more difficult to conduct and more ruinous to win.

Dave.

[steven brown]

I've been following the debates on this thread and the one that budded from it with great interest. In addition to a wealth of knowledge about ground attack operations and the spring 1918 offensives, a larger point has also been made. By the summer of 1917, the GAF seems to have lost the initiative, and other that the occasional resurgance, never regained it. Rumani has done a wonderful job explaining the doctrine/organization and the physical travails of the GAF and gives these as explanation for the GAF defensive posture. While these have great importance and contributed to the GAF failure, others, most notably Russ and Bristol, argue that an overlooked factor was the aggression and competency of the RFC/RAF. Faced with a skillful and tenacious foe, the GAF found it's ability to infuence the ground battle severly limited. The Jastas still defended vigorously, the aerial losses on both sides in summer and fall of 1918 show that, but the RFC/RAF had gained a position of unarguable domination mainly through their own efforts, not because of some resource difficulties faced by the GAF. This is what I've taken from the posts of Russ and Bristol. Have I got your arguments right gentlemen?

[bristol scout]

Hi Steve,
I, for one, am quite happy with that. Worth remembering what i think Corelli Barnett once said----For the first AND ONLY time in it's entire and illustrious history the British Army had taken on AND DEFEATED the main body of the main enemy in a continental war...I paraphrase him a bit, but the essential truth is, surely----'Every road was littered with broken down motor trucks, guns, machine guns and trench mortars. Great stacks of supplies and of military hardware of all kinds were abandoned. Every railway line was blocked with loaded trucks which the Germans had been unable to move....It is beyond dispute that on Nov.11th. the lines of communication immediately behind the German Armies had been thrown into complete disorder by the streams of traffic converging on the Muese bridges, disorder greatly intensified by the attacks of the allied airmen. The German armies, unable to resist on the fighting front, could no longer retreat in good order, partly because of the congestion on the roads and railways behind them, which not only hampered the movements of the troops, but prevented the systematic supplyto them of food and ammunition, partly owing to the fact that there were no horses left to draw the transport to the fighting troops'
Sir Frederick Maurice.

This is what causes an army to be beaten--in a word CATASTROPHE!--it reads like something from a later war.
This is what the allies accomplished---and a great part of that was done by British and Dominion troops-----troops who had become superb battle practitioners--on the ground and in the air--the hard battles of attrition that had gone before had ground down the German army and the reward was victory. As in any defeat, any number of theories will emerge as to why --but you never need to look much beyond the quality of the men who inflicted that defeat to explain it!

Dave.

[R Gannon]

Steve

I would suggest very strongly that the RFC gained dominance over the Ypres salient July - Nov 17.

As to March 18 - the Germans had as many aircraft as the British but were simply not flexible enough to make the big effort - leaving ground attacks to the Schlatas - they should have taken a leaf out of the British book and made an all out effort when it was needed - bombed up those pretty little Triplanes. Albatros & Pfalz and flung them at the British troops in the rear areas - particularly on 25 Mar when there was much confusion congestion and even panic.

Cheers Russ

[steven brown]

Russ and Bristol,
I'm glad I got your arguments right, and frankly, I agree with your point. I feel that it must be said here, that there is no evidence, in general, to question the courage of the German aircrew. McCudden wrote, ' The more I fight them the more I respect their fighting qualities. ' Neither side lacked for courage.