Billy Bishop: 'Liar and Cheat'

Now to be fully accurate, a VC did not necessarily have to be "witnessed" but, in the absence of witnesses, there had to be corroborative evidence. Even if the events of 2 June 1917 HAD transpired as described by Bishop, how could a VC be justified ? I maintain it could NOT be justified. Yet it went through. Why ?

Markham and Greenhous both suggest the answer but do not expand upon it Allow me to take this further.

There is one thing that I find interesting - a comparison of Bishop's Combat Report of 2 June 1917 and the citation for his VC. The latter is based almost solely on the former, the only significant difference is that the citation mentions an enemy mechanic, the CR does not. It is almost as if Bishop wrote his own citation. Are there precedents for such similarities ? For example, does the VC citation for Leefe-Robinson parallel his CR ?

Why that VC when neither witnesses nor corroborative evidence was available ? The most often cited "reason" is that the RFC had been taking heavy losses, trench warfare had degenerated into stalemate, civilian morale needed a boost and the way to do it was to manufacture a hero (a la The Blue Max). It had been done before (Warneford and Leefe-Robinson were very timely heros) - but the "reason" cannot be proven because, simply put, we are never going to find a memo suggesting, urging or authorizing such a "production".

But I think there the reason. suggested by Markham and Greenhous bears further expansion. I admit my own views are conjecture - but my theory is as good as any other theory

You may recall, during earlier Forum discussions, the statement being made that Bishop had been "secretly" recommended for a VC even before 2 June and that I had stated it was more likely confusion with his DSO (and of course, all recommendations were to be "secret" until approved). But then, in THE MAKING OF BILLY BISHOP (page 93), I find reference to a letter Bishop wrote on 1 June 1917 saying that "I have just learnt that when I got my DSO, I was recommended for the VC".

Aside from evidence that Bishop has "VC on the brain", what do we make of this ?

Is Billy telling the truth - or another whopper ? The documents I have seen show it as a DSO being put forth on 7 May 1917 ("whopper ! whopper !"). But let us give him the benefit of the doubt and say that Scott recommended a VC (in a document now lost) and that Wing or Brigade turned it into a DSO.

What does this indicate ?

It indicates that, in matters pertaining to Scott, Bishop and/or No.60 Squadron, the rules about confidentiality and discretion were ignored - and later letters by Bishop to Margaret also indicate that the public learned more - and faster - than anyone expected or deemed prudent.

So, here is my scenario.

Scott recommends a VC on 2-3 June 1917, trotting Bishop before senior officers to tell his story, and they buy it. BUT...

In the absence of witnesses or corroboration, those involved in final approval are concerned. They ask Caldwell (the acting CO on 30 June) for more information - and he confirms their worst fears - there IS NO MORE INFORMATION - the account is based on "personal evidence" and no more.

It is nearly a month since the VC nomination (it took only a month from air action to gazetting when awarding it to McLeod and Barker, admittedly 10 and 17 months later) and the more they delay a decision the greater the leaks already appearing. The process has acquired a momentum of its own. Lacking the normal corroboration, the authorities can either stop the train (fearing that newspapers will trumpet the story as "VC DENIED - COLONIAL OFFICER'S WORD NOT GOOD ENOUGH") or flag it through the station.

They blinked.

They waved it through the station.

They allowed - just once - the award of a VC based solely on the recipient's report, without witnesses or corroborative evidence.

[Billy_Bishop]

OR, they did find witnesses during that time and therefore approved the VC without further delay.


VBR,

Al

But none appear to have been known to the authorities when then contacted Caldwell, and as of 30 June 1917 Caldwell could only confirm that the account was Bishop's own, without any corroborative evidence.

Meanwhile, we have the curious situation of a VC citation that reads so much like the recipient's Combat Report that it could almost have been drafted by Bishop himself.

[Billy_Bishop]

But then we have ALL of July and most of June for further reports to come in from other places and people. *Reports that Caldwell would not have been aware of.

In a pre-computer time, before the jet-age, it does take a certain amount of time for all this to filter down (or up) to where it needs to go.

However, since ALL the paperwork associated with his VC has long been destroyed, we'll never know for sure one way or the other.

VBR,

Al

[Tom_Cervo]

There is one thing that I find interesting - a comparison of Bishop's Combat Report of 2 June 1917 and the citation for his VC. * The latter is based almost solely on the former, the only significant difference is that the citation mentions an enemy mechanic, the CR does not. *It is almost as if Bishop wrote his own citation. *Are there precedents for such similarities ? For example, does the VC citation for Leefe-Robinson parallel his CR ? *

The combat report reproduced in Ray Rimmell's excellect "The Airship VC" is a long detailed account; the citation in the Gazette is very terse. As the only living witness, LR had to be the only account.
However, there was a substantial piece of corroborating evidence in Cuffley, Herts.

As for Philip Markham, those who think he was an iconoclast need only look up his report in OTF in which he concludes, based on careful examination of existing facts, that a strong case exists for Roy Brown having fired the fatal shot against von R. I have a strong bias for historians willing to go where the facts lead them, no matter how much they wish otherwise.

[Billy_Bishop]

Meanwhile, we have the curious situation of a VC citation that reads so much like the recipient's Combat Report that it could almost have been drafted by Bishop himself.

Actually, if you read Maj. Scott's report you'll see that is where the mechanics are mentioned.

I have an html version on my site at:
http://www.billybishop.net/bishop5.html

VBR,

Al

"But then we have ALL of July and most of June for further reports to come in from other places and people. Reports that Caldwell would not have been aware of."

Actually, it looks more as if June was taken up by senior officers looking for corroboration, and the telephone call to Caldwell was a desperate attempt to get something more. That leaves them July to keep looking (with or without success) or agonize over how they can stop the process (if they can).

"However, since ALL the paperwork associated with his VC has long been destroyed, we'll never know for sure one way or the other."

Quite true - maybe they did find some evidence (now lost to us) as Al Lowe suggests - or maybe the authorities were stampeded by press leaks and apprehended political fallout if they declined to award a VC (as I suggested) - or maybe Bishop's artistocratic friends just said to the King, "This nice young man did a great thing on your birthday, George. Why don't you ignore the rules and give him a VC. After all, you ARE the King."

Scott's report of 3 June 1917 is interesting. I assume it was from the Public Record Office at Kew. May I inquire as to the AIR 1 file reference ? I expect an opportunity to visit the PRO later this year and would like view it in the context of the whole file.

As an aside, I must say that those of us who knew Phil Markham would certainly be surprised that he would be called an iconoclast. I wrote at length about Phil earlier in this thread and shall not repeat my comments other than to say that he was a scholar and a gentleman. He entered upon his Bishop reseach with no axe to grind or hobby horse to ride. Indeed, it was his expressed hope at the outset that he would be able to verify Bishop's account of 2 June 1917; his friends knew how pained and surprised he was that his findings led to an opposite conclusion.

[Billy_Bishop]

The report from Jack Scott that I quoted on my site is from one of a number of Canadian Hansard reports I received when I first inquired into the controversy through Senator St. Germain's office back in 1998.

It was one of a number of documents that had been read into the record as part of their proceedings investigating "The Kid Who Couldn't Miss."

But I dare say, you should be able to find it at the PRO in Kew. As I am informed that is where they got their copies from.

I still think that June and July would have been spent getting reports in. If you look at the report Caldwell put in, it does not specify who it went to. There fore, I assume it went to Brigade first. Most likely they were the ones inquiring.

Assuming that to be the case (a not unreasonable assumption) I would suggest that higher levels were likely checking with other sources, POWs and such.

I would hazard a guess that when there are no IMMEDIATE witnesses, checking into a claimed action will take some time. And in the case of a possible VC award, I would suggest that time and care are taken not lightly.

At least, that's my opinion.

VBR,

Al

Here's another point to consider about this action. We've argued that Bishop may have exaggerated or fabricated this mission and/or its combat report.

As well, points have been raised about Bishop's societal influence. We don't know the absolute access or influence on British society which Bishop had. Certainly after his VC he was a more prominent figure.

It is possible that the RFC was under pressure from elsewhere to create an aviation hero. Ball was dead; the Germans were flaunting von Richthofen. Was Bishop just lucky to be in the right place at the right time?

Another point to consider from the Canadian side is that some saw the need for Canada to have some sort of national hero. One name that jumps to mind is Max Aitken, "Canada's Official Eyewitness" (a.k.a. Lord Beaverbrook). It's entirely possible that with Beaverbrook's position in British society that he took a shining to this young, impressive lad - and thus sought to make his life easier.

A "national hero" may have been seen by some as an integral part of bolstering national interest in late 1917 and into 1918. Remember that Canada had a controversial conscription crisis which nearly split the country. And while Vimy Ridge had been a moment of national pride, no one figure could really be drawn out of it to flaunt and promote (and even exploit) in front of the Canadian people.