WWI Replica Safety

[Joe Perkel]

Originally Posted by Jim Bruton

Obviously there is more to Life than safety, or else we'd be talking quilt-making here.

Actually, pricking your finger with a staph colonized quilt needle, could lead to a systemic bacteremia, complicated by neurologic involvement, respiratory and renal failure!

Your are of course correct, the wing suit guys put a whole other spin to the entire concept of risk management.

[Jim Bruton]

Jeff,

Makes me glad that my early experiments with an umbrella at my grandparents' barn weren't more encouraging...

Jim

[Butch]

Joe,
It was supposed to be funny. I thought it would be 'fighter squadron' humour, Sid (Machinbird) called it 'ready room' humour, and The Bald Eagle wanted to pile on with something else, something really bad. Take a joke that is made at your expense as a compliment. That is how it was meant. We used to say that negative slack tends to increase. So it did not pay to show thin skin. Just wait until you have the upper hand and then pile on. But in good, malicious humor.
By the way, can you model a SPAD 7 for me? I cannot seem to get anything done on my project since Spadmaker was banished, and since we had our third baby. Baby jokes anyone?
Pete

[Joe Perkel]

Originally Posted by Butch

Joe,
It was supposed to be funny. I thought it would be 'fighter squadron' humour, Sid (Machinbird) called it 'ready room' humour, and The Bald Eagle wanted to pile on with something else, something really bad. Take a joke that is made at your expense as a compliment. That is how it was meant. We used to say that negative slack tends to increase. So it did not pay to show thin skin. Just wait until you have the upper hand and then pile on. But in good, malicious humor.
By the way, can you model a SPAD 7 for me? I cannot seem to get anything done on my project since Spadmaker was banished, and since we had our third baby. Baby jokes anyone?
Pete

Pete,

"Ready room humour", perhaps so, I took it as a 50/50 chance it was a typical forum attack and responded that way. My stupidity then for letting it get to me.

I will tell you this, the local mid-air shook me up! Reason is because I have seen too many rivets up close myself. Too much density down low around here. So you hit a soft spot, but I figure it maybe was bad timing and not so much a thin skin issue.

My CAD modeling is slow going as it's not my area of expertise. I learned it specifically for a retirement project like this. As it is right now, I can't commit to taking on anything extra since I barely can get my own stuff done. If that should ever change, I will let you know.

All is good then, my apologies for turning sour!

[j ferguson]

I'm sorry. I too was a little slow. trouble with net is that often the tweakee doesn't pick up the droll inflection.

I find this thread invaluable. If it were addressed to safely flying 150's it would be different. I don't think I need to be told to "fly the plane" any more. The words are tatooed on my backside, right next to "maintain airspeed."

But we are not discussing planes of which there are currently thousands and where you can hope that type-specific problems will happen to someone else first and be the subject of an AD, a Flying Magazine article, or become part of our lore. You don't have to be a test pilot in a 150, except maybe when it's fresh out of the shop.

So we come down to operational issues and design issues. I was fascinated by the Fred Murrin wind-driven air pump relief valve setting report. I don't doubt for a minute that this is something I could have done, or for that matter, do. I wonder if he's discovered that the induction system on his engine needed more than the 1 1/2 psi he'd set the valve for and that he was getting the additional pressure via the head of fuel in a full tank.

There are also the handling issues, drag, and different performance peculiar to high drag/low powered planes - a type I haven't flown. And with wing profiles not found in more recent planes. And no elevator trim.

And the drag contributed by the very low propeller rpms possible on a gear reduction engine - perhaps an undocumented feature - but one that can be useful in a too high approach, but which must always be taken into account in a plane so equipped.

And then there's the business with the unburnt fuel emitted by blipped or ignition sequenced rotaries. It would be really nice to find out that this is a non-issue and get some insight into why.

So maybe we should be thinking about "why is this airplane different from all other airplanes?"

[RAF56_Ball]

Originally Posted by Joe Perkel

Engine Failure on Take-off
Establish glide speed, wings level, mixture off, switch off, land straight ahead, is standard procedure. (Ejection if military; always was envious of that capability!) Everyone is taught this.
The problem becomes for people when faced with this situation, is that the self preservation instinct, is not to crash into what's ahead. It must be a truly mental anguish moment, but not one with time to mull over. This one has to be thought out in advance, and mentally reviewed on each and every flight.

Joe,
No offense intended and I will try to phrase this carefully. This is an area that I am very passionate about, which often makes me sound too intense. I suspect you have already considered all of this, and hopefully will be more for encouragement of others.
Been flying since '72, and an AME. Doesn't make me an expert, just knowledgeable. The problem is NOT failing to think it out in advance, although reviewing in the mind is a good thing. It is a failure in flying it the way it needs to be flown, and that comes from inadequate practice.
The most important thing a pilot can do to prevent most injuries in an accident is to maintain adequate airspeed (in fact AOA more accurately) for the condition of flight, and especially not try to stretch the flight path. The second most important is maintaining coordinated flight, which will do tons to prevent that low altitude spin. But a pilot only does quickly and regularly that which he has done before.
AOPA has an array of excellent online short courses. They are good resources. Get the download from AOPA on "Stall/Spin: Entry point for crash and burn?", look at their course "Aerodynamics-Stalls Spins and Safety" as a nice audio/visual as well, but go practice maneuvering.
If I have not done it in PRACTICE I will most likely fail to do it in an emergency. That is because when our startle reflex is activated, we take several seconds to recognize we are truly in trouble, then a second give or take to decide what to do, then ~3/4 of a sec to do it, before we have to reassess what the effects of what we just did are. Low to the ground, we look at the immediacy of that terra firma, and are slowed even further. If I don't already do it reflexively, I am likely to move the stick in the direction I WANT to go - up - rather than the direction that continued flying DEMANDS - down.
Practice (in ANY plane you are "comfortable” with first, and I recommend with an instructor so you can get corrective feedback initially) an engine failure or 30.
Take a look at the biennial flight review requirements and fly them regularly. We encourage practice flying our annual re-qual (we call it a Form-5 ride in the CAP) which is basically the same thing, as a training flight regularly. Take some unusual attitude training, practice it regularly and consider refreshing it just before you fly the Baby the first time – your first flight in it, not it's first in the air. Consider having someone with LOTS of experience in floats, biplanes and hopefully both to do the flight testing (I seem to recall your background is a bit limited there, but forgive me if I am underestimating your background). And if possible, that bench seat you mentioned may not be so bad. Even with one set of controls, a qualified instructor might be helpful.

I hope this has helped.

On a separate note, what would be lacking in the Rotec 3600?

[RAF56_Ball]

Originally Posted by j ferguson

"Trapping and mitigating." That's really really good. Thank you so much for this very perceptive way of expressing how you need to pounce on your mistakes.

I have come to really appreaciate my current instructors. One is the quinessential steam guages guy, who said something so obvious and honest it was life changing - "Glenn, you will make mistakes no matter how long you fly. Your job is to learn to recongnize and manage them."

Admitting that I will make them frees me from denial. Learning how to find them as early as possible frees me to resond more effectively.

"Truly superior pilots are those who use their superior judgment to avoid those situations where they might have to use their superior skills."

But the rest of the rules were a real relief after some of the heaviness of this thread.

http://www.paxpublications.com/humor/AVIATION.pdf

[Joe Perkel]

Consider having someone with LOTS of experience in floats, biplanes and hopefully both to do the flight testing (I seem to recall your background is a bit limited there, but forgive me if I am underestimating your background). And if possible, that bench seat you mentioned may not be so bad. Even with one set of controls, a qualified instructor might be helpful.

I hope this has helped.

On a separate note, what would be lacking in the Rotec 3600?

Mine is a classic example of a "chain of events" opportunity for accident prevention. I have time in nighter floats nor bipes, and must rectify both prior to flight. Someone else test flying, is also a forgone conclusion.

While I concur with the value of maneuvers practice and repetition, the hidden value of this thread is the human element,..mental preparedness, evaluating accidents, identifying weaknesses, and talking it about openly without fear. NASA, called it, Crew Resource Management, for multi-crewed craft, but we can call it say,...(AA) Attitude Adjustment! We tend to have a "head in the sand" attitude in GA, which shows up in the reports with high time pilots doing silly things (example Tiger Moth). First step in prevention, is identification of the problem.

The ROTEC develops significantly less shaft torque at T.O. than the original Clerget, but is nearly perfect for a PUP replica at some 20 lbs less than original. A bigger one, with a twee bit more power for me would be perfect. I'm concerned this drag factory needs every bit of it, particularly with the floats.

Thanks for your input!

[RobW]

February 2002, I'm out solo in my 1948 C-170 tooling around for fun and collecting data on rates of climb at various power settings. It is getting late so I head back to Fredericksburg, VA. About four miles out I give a position report. As I let up on the transmit key I hear an experimental provide almost the same position report. Assuming that the experimental was faster than me, I pulled the power back a little, put on carb heat, and kept my eyes open.

It was very near dusk. The sun was going down over my left shoulder... about to disappear below the horizon. I can't see the experimental, but I'm not too worried about him. I hear him call downwind while I was still a mile or two out so I'm just keeping my eyes open. The FBO asks if I want fuel (they were ready to close) and I say yes.

I turn downwind at midfield, still unable to see the experimental. I'm at pattern altitude, going about 90mph. I hear the experimental call base, and catch a shadowy glimpse of a small white aircraft crossing my path ahead and below. I continue on downwind to give him time to get around and land.

I hear the experimental call final, so I begin my turn to base. Out of habit, I know exactly how far to pull the throttle back to put me in the neighborhood of the right base leg power setting. I do that and the engine does a huge power decrease... way more than expected... I tell myself that I'm tired and must've overcontrolled while looking for that experimental. I put the power where it should be, put in 20 degrees of flaps and look for traffic.

I turn final and can see that the plane ahead of me is clear of the runway. I run through my before landing checklist one last time... and continue on. I'm on a longer than normal final because of my slight downwind extension... no biggie. The sun is gone now and it is getting dark. I turn on the cabin lights.

At the appropriate point I pull the throtle back to idle to begin my glide down to final.

The engine quits cold... prop turns maybe two times then stops. It feels like I am standing on the brakes the plane is decelerating so fast. I pitch down, run through the check list... mix rich, carb heat, fuel on both, ignition... and reach up to grab the starter pull handle. As I'm grabbing the pull handle I note that my airspeed which was at about 80mph is now dropping through 60 despite my nose down pressure. My altitude is less than 500'.

Less than 500' means stop dorking with the engine and fly the plane. I continue to push forward on the yoke to regain my lost airspeed and am astounded at how much forward pressure is required. I spin the trim wheel all the way forward and still feel like I am about to hit the forward stop of the elevator control.

I can instantly tell that I pulled the power back slightly too soon and may not make the runway. Crap.

Between me and the runway is a farmers field... just freshly plowed, perpendicular to my direction of travel. I remember seeing farm equipment in the area to my left, but now it is dark, so not safe to go there, to the right is a row of trees... again in the dark.

Just before the runway is a double set of railroad tracks on a 15' berm. I look at my glide path... and that is where I'm going to hit. rats...

I continue to apply nose down pressure to keep my speed up... and here is where my mind started to screw with me. It was incredibly hard to keep pushing forward as the ground came up... one part of my mind was telling me to pull back... the other was telling me to keep the speed up. I knew what to do... and I did it... but, wow, it sure was hard to keep that forward pressure in. I debated for a moment about leaving the flaps in or pulling them out... I left them alone... the flaps on a 48' C-170 aren't much to speak of anyway... and I didn't want to introduce any new variables into the equation.

I decided that my impact point was going to be about midway up the berm. I decided that my best course of action was to continue straight ahead, give it a good hard flare just before impact, and perhaps I'd balloon up and over the tracks to the other side and at least be on the airport property. Bob Hoover's comments about trying to not dent the spinner in a crash, and flying the plane till every part stops moving came to mind...

I'm shutting things off now... and am ready to turn off the master. I click it off and the panel goes black... oooo... don't like that... very lonely feeling... so I flick it back on for a few more moments...

I can see shadows going by on the ground below me... my impact spot hasn't moved. I forget all about the master and focus on the landing. As the trees along the track go by I haul back on the yoke...

The plane does not respond... the same lack of control authority I had for keeping the nose down is now manifesting itself in pitch up... I just don't have the energy to pitch up and the plane mushes into the side of the berm... striking the landing gear and the nose bowl at about the same time.

The right gear is torn off, the plane climbs about 3 feet up the berm and stops moving. I can hear fuel pouring out of the plane. I flick off the master, open my door, and hop out... straight into a bunch of blackberry thorns... I climb up to the top of the berm, cross the tracks, go down the other side... then realized I'd crossed the tracks without looking to see if a train was coming... they come through there at about 60mph. That made me laugh at the stupidity I'd just demonstrated... survived the plane crash only to get hit by a train...

I stopped for a second to assess myself. I had a knot on my head about the size of a grapfruit, my knees had gone into the panel and bent it about 6" back... my right hand was grasping the throttle on landing (out of habit) and had gone into the instrument panel, bending the carb heat knob and leaving this nifty looking Nike swoosh shaped cut on my ring finger and breaking a bone in my hand. It is amazing how much your body can stretch... I decided I didn't know how much longer I'd be awake, so I jogged up to the FBO.

Then all the real fun happened. Oh joy... paperwork, FAA, insurance... fun.

The culprit was carb ice. Sometime in the past, someone modified the carb heat box... and while it appeared to work... and would give you a drop in RPM when applied... the FAA guy decided that it just didn't have enough ummph that day to counter the amount of ice I was getting.

My plane was talking to me and I didn't hear it... when I did that small power reduction on base... and got a huge unexpected power reduction... I should have realized then that I'd picked up ice in the carb. If I'd thought Ice was the problem... then opening the throttle up full and hitting the starter probably would have restarted the engine, but that is hindsight now.

Ok, the point of this long story was that even when you know what it is you are supposed to do... parts of your brain will argue with you that what you are doing is wrong... you must have the self discipline to do what you know is right and quiet all those second guessing thoughts. I feel for that guy in the tiger moth... I have no idea what he was thinking or trying to do and hesitate to be critical... what looks obvious from our perspective may not have been so obvious from the cockpit of that little plane.

I miss my C-170.

[Joe Perkel]

Originally Posted by RobW

Ok, the point of this long story was that even when you know what it is you are supposed to do... parts of your brain will argue with you that what you are doing is wrong... you must have the self discipline to do what you know is right and quiet all those second guessing thoughts. I feel for that guy in the tiger moth... I have no idea what he was thinking or trying to do and hesitate to be critical... what looks obvious from our perspective may not have been so obvious from the cockpit of that little plane.

I miss my C-170.

Rob,

An amazing and well written story, thanks for sharing the experience with us!

The passage above demonstrates the value of instrument training in a nutshell. You were likely correct in not applying additional flaps as the angle would have steepened and required even more forward pressure.

My primary instructor’s airplane was a 150 Aerobat with the 40 deg flaps as I recall. He used to teach me (many many) power off landings with none, half, and full flaps. The full flap approach could only be attempted with the landing zone secure and absolutely massive amounts of downward pressure, like diving face first into the ground, and the flare needed to be on the money. Engine out landings are one of those things that needs to be practiced with regularity.

Dusk, is the # 1 time of day for the big nasty, and usually in the pattern. At a non-towered field, establish two way communication on the Unicom freq until at least one of you sees the other. The most likely scenario has been shown to be, one high and one low wing aircraft on the same pattern leg, consider departing the pattern in level flight for reentry if no joy.

As for being critical of others mistakes and second guessing, that is precisely where the value lies in learning from accidents. You cannot be there, so it’s the only way to benefit from them. In the case of the Tiger Moth Rob, look closely at the chain of events. That accident was preventable before engine start.

Sorry about the plane Rob, but it was a good landing!