WWI Replica Safety

[RAF56_Ball]

Well done, Rob. Well done.
Look forward to meeting you face to face at Dayton! Hope to get to the other events this year, too.

[Machinbird]

“If you want to go up, pull back on the stick, if you want to go down, pull back a little bit more.” Old aviation saying.
The story I wish to relate has at least two key lessons. I will relate the second part of the story first to explain the fix I got myself into and the thought processes and factors required to extricate my hide to fly another day. How I went down the primrose path to making this mistake is the other part of the story which I will relate on another day.
This story happened over 40 years ago and was clearly a case of bad headwork, no real planning and inadequately thinking a maneuver through. I can still remember it as if it was yesterday. Heck, I can close my eyes and still see it.
The story:
I had just taken off after a touch and go wheel landing in my Luscombe and it was important (for reasons to discuss later) to reverse course immediately. My airspeed was perhaps 85 or 90 mph and my altitude no more than 15 feet. Most of you would fortunately not even dream of the maneuver I did in this situation. What I attempted was to pull the nose straight up and perform a hammerhead at the top. The only mental calculation I did prior to doing the maneuver was that the engine was running strongly and my total energy should be higher at the end of the maneuver than at the beginning.
The maneuver was not done to impress those watching on the ground, but solely to expedite my reversal of direction (But it didn’t).
Predictably, as the nose swung at the top of the hammerhead and the sky in the windshield was replaced by a field of Soybeans, I realized just how foolish I had been.
The immediate response to the situation was to lay on some angle of attack to pull out of the dive. But then came an important questions that I should have asked myself earlier.
“How do I know I am getting all the performance I can out of the airplane? Can I pull a little bit harder?” The mental calculator said perhaps I could but there was a possible penalty. If I stalled the aircraft, wing drop would roll the plane into an attitude from which recovery would be impossible. Again I processed the question and I became aware of a familiar light vibration of the stick that was caused by turbulence over the ailerons from the high angle of attack. Any more angle of attack and I would stall. Nothing could be done now but to hold what I had and see how it comes out. At least I would hit the bean field upright at a shallow angle if I hit at all. It might be survivable, hitting upside down would be fatal. It only took a few seconds but finally the Luscombe bottomed out of its dive with the wheels 5 feet over the beans, but I couldn’t stop and consider what had just happened. I had to continue with the thing that got me in trouble in the first place……….
The only reason I survived this maneuver was complete familiarity with the maneuver and the aircraft’s response to it. I had heretofore done the hammerhead at altitude and was very comfortable with the maneuver. I was also very familiar with the Luscombe’s response to high angles of attack, not only at 1 g level flight but the range of 1 to 4 gs of maneuvering load.
The first reason I am relating this story is to stress the training value of taking an aircraft right up to its stall angle of attack over a range of airspeeds (up to the maneuvering speed) just so that you will know what it feels like. I’m not talking airliners and twins here or any aircraft restricted from such maneuvers, just ordinary single engine aircraft which you might occasionally have reason to maneuver at more than 1 g flight. You will probably find that your aircraft gives you much stronger signals that it is hitting its angle of attack limits when pulling 2 and 3 g’s than you will receive with a level flight stall. Once you recognize these signals, you will also recognize them when they are not so strong and you will be much less likely to stall your aircraft while maneuvering.
Another lesson is something we all should already know. Maneuvering close to the ground must be preplanned to the nth degree. Seat of the pants flying has no place close to the ground. The penalty for violating this law is not always enforced but when it is, it is severe.

I think I'll let you folks chew on this portion of the story before telling you the first part of the story. I know none of you would ever consider doing anything even remotely resembling the maneuver described, right?
Pleasant dreams,
Sid

[Joe Perkel]

Well Sid, no engine out return to airport, and not to "impress" anyone on the ground,... what happened then?,...did you forget your wallet?

Your familiarity and handling of that aircraft, was more akin to "wearing" it than just simply sitting there. That's a special skill level to be strived for, but not easily attained by most G.A. pilots. Your description puts me there with you, I just let out out my breath,...thank you for sharing.

Not long ago, I had started a list of my own early years of foolishness to post here as an example of "accidents in waiting" mindset, when I realized that I would have been posting a list of violated F.A.R.'s. Really stupid stuff!

[drrivah]

Sid:
Did my first hour in an A65/Luscombe 8A weekend before last to Frederick and back. Surprised by its performance. Got to ask whether you pulled this off in an A or E, and which engine? Any worries about the spars afterwards?

Thanks for the thrills: lovely airplane.

Please post Part II.

-pete

[Machinbird]

Originally Posted by Joe Perkel

Well Sid, no engine out return to airport, and not to "impress" anyone on the ground,... what happened then?,...did you forget your wallet?
Your familiarity and handling of that aircraft, was more akin to "wearing" it than just simply sitting there. That's a special skill level to be strived for, but not easily attained by most G.A. pilots. Your description puts me there with you, I just let out out my breath,...thank you for sharing.

Not long ago, I had started a list of my own early years of foolishness to post here as an example of "accidents in waiting" mindset, when I realized that I would have been posting a list of violated F.A.R.'s. Really stupid stuff!

Sorry about making you wait for the other part of the story Joe. Nothing so simple as a forgotten wallet, but perhaps something more compelling. I hate to think of how many F.A.R's were probably violated.
Wearing the aircraft? That is probably too kind. But it relates to the point I was making about flying at high angle of attack over a range of airspeeds to get a better feel of an aircraft. After the advanced tactical flights in the training command and later in the Fleet, I was aware that I had a much better feel for those aircraft from all the high angle of attack maneuvering we did. I'm not talking about snatching the stick back to create a stall at various speeds, but instead to continuously fly and maneuver the aircraft at altitude at a safe range of airspeeds while at high angle of attack (with a proper training buildup). Once you have done that with a particular aircraft, It is highly unlikely it will surprise you with a stall.

Originally Posted by drrivah

Did my first hour in an A65/Luscombe 8A weekend before last to Frederick and back. Surprised by its performance. Got to ask whether you pulled this off in an A or E, and which engine? Any worries about the spars afterwards?

Thanks for the thrills: lovely airplane.

Please post Part II.

Hi Pete. Congratulations on your Luscombe time. They are great fun to fly. How did you like the featherlite rudder forces?
My Luscombe was a 1939 Model 8A with the fuel tank behind the seats and the 65 HP A-65 powerplant. Since the whole maneuver was done below the maneuvering speed, there was no worry about the spars or any part of the structure.
So without further delay, let me post Part II.
Sid

[Machinbird]

It was a rainy day at the airport. It had been raining since the previous evening and the rain was finally stopping and the ceiling was lifting. Those of us waiting around the airport lounge of our VFR only grass field were hoping for a chance to fly. One fellow was an airline pilot on Lockheed Electras. I was a Navy carrier pilot back from a combat cruise and enjoying life back in the States. We had a friendly relationship and I had helped him troubleshoot a generator problem in his BT-13 and he had taken me up for a ride in his aircraft.
In the early afternoon we concluded that we could safely fly the pattern (which was normally at 600 feet for that airport). The Electra pilot rented one of the airport operator’s J-3 cubs and I checked out my 1939 Luscombe and taxied out to the crosswind runway. Weather was not a factor and we both began shooting touch and go landings.
I was on final and the J-3 had just completed a touch and go in front of me when I saw it commence an immediate turn after lifting off. “Oh Ho!” I thought. “We can have a race around the pattern. I should have an advantage flying the faster aircraft.” Little did I know what I was getting myself into.
The Electra pilot was most competent and after a few circuits, I found the J-3 was gaining on me. I hadn’t really considered the strategy behind how to make a minimum time circuit of the pattern. I "trangularized" the pattern into an angled climbing “downwind”, a base, and a final/landing leg. My landings were getting sloppy as I plopped the plane onto the ground and went flying immediately. Would wheel landings help to speed up the pattern?
The J-3 was still gaining on me. How high was high enough on downwind? What else could I cut from the pattern to save time? In desperation, I tried going into the vertical to reverse direction leading to the situation at the beginning of this tale. But I was still getting my butt kicked. Perhaps the extra 20 HP in the J-3 or the tighter turning radius was the deciding factor, but I was tremendously relieved when the airport manager, back from his errands, walked out to the runway intersection and waved in the J-3.
As I taxied back to the tie down the thought rolled over in my mind. What just happened? How did I get myself in so much trouble so quickly? Here is what I have distilled from the experience.
The root cause of the extreme hazard I got myself into was the element of competition. Humans are a competitive species. Competition is built into us. When you engage in competition with another, you had better have firm ground rules set up in advance. If you don’t have ground rules, there are NO LIMITS.
For example, the military sets up ground rules for practicing air to air combat. The floor of air to air combat is raised to 10,000 feet, and the first person to hit the floor calls off the fight. If not for the floor, pilots would literally fly themselves into the ground trying to best the other man.
If you ever perceive you are in a contest against another human while flying an aircraft, the red flags in your mind should trigger. The only way to compete against others is with complete ground rules and procedures for calling off the contest should things exceed the limits of the ground rules.
I hope this safety concept is useful to you in your own flying. Even though this is a story of human foolishness, it is something we all need to be aware of and to guard against.
Best wishes to all.
Sid

[Joe Perkel]

Originally Posted by Machinbird

I hope this safety concept is useful to you in your own flying. Even though this is a story of human foolishness, it is something we all need to be aware of and to guard against.

Best wishes to all.
Sid

Understood! Add to that the natural inherent competition of one famous aircraft model against another, then the parallel to a similar competition pitting replica against replica, is not at all far fetched. Good point Sid!

I wont dignify the blatant stupidity of a newly minted and cocky pilot. Suffice to say I was lucky to survive my early years, thankfully experience and maturity eventually prevailed. Aside from a very near mid-air with a King Air, (me in a Seminole, an eerie coincidence), at I believe the very same intersection as the recent Everglades accident, I can relate two incidents applicable to any type of flying including WWI replicas. After all is said and done, they are after all airplanes with pilots. The near mid air was simply a see and avoid error, with failures on the parts of the safety pilot and myself in my aircraft, and the pilots of the King Air, in a late afternoon rendezvous. Sound familiar?

Both of the following two incidents are excersises in decision making and potential for benefit or consequences.

1) Late seventies and flying a rented 150 over Padre Island National Seashore. A very popular Texas coast destination not unlike Daytona Beach Florida. It's a nice clear day, with a fairly stiff sea breeze. All of a sudden, I start to see what looks like a bit of oil running up the lower left windshield. Not much, just a trickle. I look at temp and pressure, and see no drop in pressure, but a tiny bit hotter than usual? What was that temp 5 minutes after takeoff? Do I beat feet for the mainland and take a chance if something breaks?, then having to shut down and ditch in Laguna Madre, or set it down on the beach right here? I chose a nice stretch of unoccupied beach. The Park Rangers contacted my FBO, who sent help to find out it was a cracked fitting. (This in my pre A&P days, so I really don't know to this day, what or where). End result, we were off again in the late afternoon none worse for wear,..a good day.

Still, I made the error of failing to tell anyone (confess), to ATC, UNICOM, VHF guard,..anyone of my intentions. This was pre-cell phone days, so had we hit anyone, or cracked up for some reason, there could have been quite a delay. As luck had it, a park patrol saw me.

2) The second incident, twenty some odd years later, and another beach (this one Ft Lauderdale) and a Cherokee. I have made mention on several occasions now about the population density here in South Florida. It aint a pretty picture. Now flying northbound over water at 500 with a sightseeing party aboard, nice and heavy just under gross, typical hot summer day. I regret this one to this day because it was a serious case of "get homeitis", although it turned out well.

Now all of a sudden comes this "Thud" followed by a moderate engine vibration, passengers scared, everybody talking at once, me again looking at the engine vital signs with no symptoms on the gages, power available, airframe under my control. Still shake rattle and roll, what is this? I'm thinking bird strike maybe? Didn't see one, did I loose a piece of the prop, engine, what is this? Look at a map and you will see that Ft Lauderdale International is near the beach, about 5 miles north of me, but home at North Perry is miles inland over a whole lot of population density. Me want to go home, silly me.

Still, I make at least two successive "fairly decent" choices, I call "Pan Pan Pan" on VHF guard and get Ft Lauderdale approach. I tell them I've started a circling right turn out to sea to gain altitude to go to Perry. He rightly suggests FLL but "Butthead" says "Nah,...I'm good for Perry". All eyes on the silly Cherokee that chugs it's way back to Perry for a long straight in. The problem, I lost half of the fiberglass spinner. The other half stayed intact and set up the vibration.

Moral of the story, home is safely on the ground wherever that may be. The closer the better.

[j ferguson]

Joe’s story about the spinner reminded me of something I shouldn’t have done. In fact several things.

The 1962 210 was being annualed and I got a call from the shop. “Did it idle at the recommended 600 rpm when I brought it in.” Yes.

“It doesn’t now. We recommend a rebuilt fuel-pump.”

They installed the pump and the idle came down a bit but was still high, but not alarmingly so. All gauge indications were ok when I came to pick it up so I flew it back to Chicago.

Following week was a trip to Toronto. On running up the engine to come home, there was a “clunk.” Gauges seemed fine and since it was summer, I thought I could put it in the lake if I had a problem. Gauges were ok all the way home, but when I looked over the plane on arrival, it had oil streaks leading from the rear of the cowl over the starboard door and on to the tail.

The shop showed me cracks in the crankcase right behind the prop and said it looked like I was in for a major.

I shopped around and found a rebuilder in Indiana who had a yellow-tagged case.

I then flew the plane down to his shop – again with all good indications on the gauges. I did fly well outside the then-limits of development in Chicago with the intention of putting it in a field if something failed, but nothing did.

The call from the shop started with “Did you really fly that thing in here?”

The front main bearing had apparently seized to the crank and rotated. The pin had gouged a rut in the journal and then stopped and the bearing had quit turning but was partially shattered. The oil filter was full of bearing shards.

And the only indication of trouble going into this was the higher than usual idle at the annual and, of course, the clunk. I suspected that the engine had somehow been run without oil.

The higher idle was the power setting needed to overcome the additional friction of the expired bearing/bearings. Since I hadn't run the engine without oil, maybe it was an undocumented feature of the annual.

I called the shop that had done the annual and asked to talk to the owner. I told him that I was not going to take any further action since it was likely impossible to prove anything but I wanted him to know what I thought and if I was correct, take whatever measures to see that his gang didn’t run any more engines without oil.

He told me it was impossible for this to have happened in his operation, but he didn’t sound entirely convinced.

You can draw your own conclusions about the number of stupid things I did.

[Joe Perkel]

Originally Posted by j ferguson

".... and if I was correct, take whatever measures to see that his gang didn’t run any more engines without oil.

He told me it was impossible for this to have happened in his operation, but he didn’t sound entirely convinced.

You can draw your own conclusions about the number of stupid things I did.

John,

Your story is a good example of how everybody who touches the airplane, can be a critical link in the chain of events. At my airline we had some guys forget to install O-rings for the chip detectors on a Tristar once which nearly ditched as a result. They were able to re-light #2 at the last moment and scoot into MIA, only to fail again in the taxiway.

I have now been exposed to all areas of operations in aviation,... ATC, Maint, and Operations, as well as a forced career change to the Health Care Industry. (Wife and I are both Critical Care RN's).

I have seen the chain of events in effect everywhere, put blind faith in no-one, not even your Doctor!

Your story is a perfect example of how you would have been the final say as to whether or not there had been an accident. The aircraft had given you fair warning.

Thanks for sharing that.

[j ferguson]

1. I flew a plane whose engine could not be made to idle at the recommended rpms without knowing what the problem was.

2. I flew a plane which had gone "clunk" without knowing why.

3. I flew a plane that was throwing oil and had visible cracks in the crank-case again without knowing why, but assuming that if it had flown in that way, with a light touch, it could fly out.

And lastly, although I'm not sure it is criminal, I had and likely still have a very cavalier attitude toward putting planes in the grass.

This last could have come from never having had to do it.

Or my confidence could have come from having constantly practiced getting the plane as slow power-off as it could be made to go and still fly. I also tried very hard to have the planes I flew quit flying exactly where I intended on every landing - that's EVERY landing.

I thought that if you could get it on the ground at less than 60 knots, hopefully much less, and you didn't run into concrete, you could survive. I don't know if this is realistic.