Casualties for 60 Squadron RFC between March and July 1917:
6 March Major Graves KIA, Lt. Joyce KIA
11 March Lt. Whitehead WIA/POW
30 March Lt. Garnett KIA, 2Lt. Bower (shot up)DOW
2 April 2Lt. Williams KIA
5 April Lt. Townsend WIA/POW
7 April 2Lt. Smart KIA, 2Lt. Hall KIA, Capt. Knowles POW
8 April 2Lt Hervey POW, Major Milot KIA
14 April Capt. Binnie WIA/POW, Lt. Russel POW, 2Lt. Cock KIA, 2Lt. Chapman POW/DOW
16 April 2Lt Kimbell KIA, 2LT. Robertson POW/DOW, Lt. Langwill POW/DOW, Lt. Elliot KIA
24 April 2Lt. Clark shot down in flames, DOW
26 April 2Lt. Henderson, AA hit FTL INJ
27 April 2Lt. Stedman POW
6 May 2Lt. McKissock POW
18 May 2Lt. Grandin KIA
25 May 2Lt. Gilchrist WIA/POW
28 May 2Lt. Phalen KIA
3 June 2Lt. Gunner WIA
16 June Lt. Lloyd KIA
27 June Lt Murray WIA/POW
3 July Lt. Adams POW/DOW
10 July Major Scott WIA
15 July Lt. Parkes WIA/POW
22 July Lt. Mowle WIA
29 July 2Lt. Gunner KIA
35 RFC fighter pilot casualties, most of them KIA and POW. They lost in these four months as many as Jagdstaffel 11 lost during the whole war (in KIA/WIA/POW). And Jasta 11 was in the thick and center of the battles almost all the time. No wonder Mr Bishop was flying and lying about his deeds accomplished in empty air. If he had faced the German Jastas as the unsung heroes of his Squadron did, he would have been killed within days!!
You can relativize the British losses and bash the German pilots as much as you want. You live in La La Land, completely out of touch with the history of the German Air Force.
“The fighter units flying in support of the defensive action at Arras in April were Jagdstaffeln 3,4,11,12,27,28,30 and 33.Towards the end of April these formations had an average daily strength of only seven aeroplanes each due to losses, replacement difficulty and so on. Between 1 and 12 April there were 42 aircraft ready for action daily, and from then until the end of the month this figure had increased to 56 machines. The British estimated the strength of the German fighter force to be far higher, an error which speaks volumes for the energy and devotion to duty for
the Jasta pilots, and for the tireless efforts of the mechanics who kept the aeroplanes serviceable. Jagdstaffeln working on a special operational roster were airborne up to four times a day when the tactical situation in the air was critical. The policy of strict formation grouping localized the effectiveness of the relatively small number of fighter machines and the use of the Flugmeldedienst service was also a major factor, since it was upon the accuracy of reports from the forward Luftschutz Offiziere that the Gruppenführer der Flieger (Grufl) evaluated the aerial situation and the opportunity to send his fighters into action. When he did so, they were required to attack the enemy not only on the German side of the lines, but whenever possible on the enemy side. That this aggressiveness was successful is shown by the large number of aircraft brought down within the British lines.” Alex Imrie
The few German fighters (and units) accomplished astonishing things despite so many obstacles, obstacles that were multiplied the longer the war went on.
Askania